@book{lievrouw2006hnm,
        title = {{Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Social Consequences of ICTs}},
        author = {L.A. Lievrouw and S.M. Livingstone},
        publisher = {Sage Publications},
        year = 2006,
        url = {http://www.brookings.edu/global/gi2006_guriev.pdf},
        description = {medgov},
	abstract = {How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absense of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information
either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler�s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.},
	biburl = {http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/264d2e692a16d14b11a9bddd83097770f/afeld},
	keywords = {new_media pressefreiheit non-democratic_politics censorship medgov media bureaucracy -freedom}
}