@unpublished{Rij-05,
        title = {A Nash Equilibrium Refinement for Myerson's Network Formation Game},
        author = {Arnout van de Rijt and Vincent Buskens},
        note = {Under Review, Journal of Social Structure},
        year = 2005,
        url = {http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=A+Nash+Equilibrium+Refinement+for+Myerson's+Network+Formation+Game&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8},
        added = {2007-06-11 17:22:07 +0200},
	read = {Yes},
	rating = {0},
	uri = {papers://C3B117CD-23C4-4854-9426-AC96AFB113DA/Paper/p76},
	modified = {2007-06-12 16:54:25 +0200},
	description = {March 2008},
	biburl = {http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24368a9a1b7c29cd8e2d3585c91a9f630/bertil.hatt},
	keywords = {Equilibrium Network Formation and Selection}
}

@phdthesis{Cha-04,
        title = {Network Formation and Economic Applications},
        author = {Subhadip Chakrabarti},
        year = 2004,
        added = {2007-06-11 17:22:07 +0200},
	affiliation = {Blacksburg},
	rating = {0},
	uri = {papers://C3B117CD-23C4-4854-9426-AC96AFB113DA/Paper/p63},
	url = {file://localhost/Users/bertilhatt/Documents/Papers/Chakrabarti/2004/Chakrabarti%202004.},
	modified = {2007-06-11 17:22:06 +0200},
	description = {March 2008},
	abstract = {Networks, generically, refer to any applicaton of graph theory in economics. Consider an undirected graph where nodes represent players and links reprensent relationships between them. Players can both form and delete links by which we mean that they can both form new relationships and terminate existing ones. A stable network is one in which no incentives exist to change the network structure. Ther can ve various forms of stability depending on how many players are allowed to delete any number of links at a time while any pair of players can form one link at a time. We introduce a network-value function, which assigns to each possible network a certain value. The value is allocated according to the component-wise egalitarian allocaiton rule, which divides the value generated by a component equally amoung members of the component (where a component refers to maximally connected subgraph). An efficient network is one that maximizes the network value function. We show that there is an underlying conflict between strin pairwise stability and efficiency. Efficient networks are not necessarily strongly pairwise stable. This conflict can be resolved only if value functions satisfy a certain property called ``middlemen-security''. We further find that there is a broad class of networks called ``middlemen-free networks'' for which the above conditionis automatically satisfied under possible value functions. We also look at three network applications. A peering contract is an arrangement between Internet Service Providers under which they exchange traffic with each other. We apply the notion of conjunctive permission value to demonstrate the formation of hierarchical firms in a competitive labor market. Comparative or targeted advertising is defined where a firm directly or indirectly names a competitor. We also examinea model of targeted advertising between oligopolistic firms using non-cooperative game theoretic tools.},
	biburl = {http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2665b9372fa10b76c75259e3f8239954c/bertil.hatt},
	keywords = {Peering Pairwise Value Permission Equilibrium Advertising Stability Nash Comparative and Private}
}