@article{Harhoff.2003,
        title = {Profiting From Voluntary Information Spillovers:  How Users Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations},
        author = {Dietmar Harhoff and Joachim Henkel and Eric Von Hippel},
        journal = {Research Policy},
        number = 10,
        pages = {1753-1769},
        volume = 32,
        year = 2003,
        abstract = {Empirical studies of innovation have found that end users frequently develop important product and process innovations. Defying conventional wisdom on the negative effects of uncompensated spillovers, innovative users also often openly reveal their innovations to competing users and to manufacturers. Rival users are thus in a position to reproduce the innovation in-house and benefit from using it, and manufacturers are in a position to refine the innovation and sell it to all users, including competitors of the user revealing its innovation. In this paper, we explore the incentives that users might have to freely reveal their proprietary innovations. We then develop a game-theoretic model to explore the effect of these incentives on users’ decisions to reveal or hide their proprietary information. We find that, under realistic parameter constellations, free revealing pays. We conclude by discussing some implications of our findings. Copyright 2003 Elsevier Copyright of Research Policy is the property of Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts)
Empirical studies of innovation have found that end users frequently develop important product and process innovations. Defying conventional wisdom on the negative effects of uncompensated spillovers, innovative users also often openly reveal their innovations to competing users and to manufacturers. Rival users are thus in a position to reproduce the innovation in-house and benefit from using it, and manufacturers are in a position to refine the innovation and sell it to all users, including competitors of the user revealing its innovation. In this paper, we explore the incentives that users might have to freely reveal their proprietary innovations. We then develop a game-theoretic model to explore the effect of these incentives on users’ decisions to reveal or hide their proprietary information. We find that, under realistic parameter constellations, free revealing pays. We conclude by discussing some implications of our findings. Copyright 2003 Elsevier Copyright of Research Policy is the property of Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts)},
	biburl = {http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2b5f2d6ba76281bd5220866e3945e1e85/callagialla},
	keywords = {BUSINESS enterprisesBUSINESSMENINCENTIVES in industryTECHNOLOGICAL innovationsKNOWLEDGE managementinnovationSpilloversDIFFUSIONLead users}
}

@article{Breznitz.2005,
        title = {Collaborative Public Space in a National Innovation System: A Case Study of the Israeli Military's Impact on the Software Industry},
        author = {Dan Breznitz},
        journal = {Industry & Innovation},
        number = 1,
        pages = {31-64},
        volume = 12,
        year = 2005,
        abstract = {Both systems of innovation and cluster theories emphasize the importance of institutions that facilitate learning and information diffusion as well as community building for the continuous success of industrial systems. Nevertheless, they fail to combine their insights into a general system-level understanding. In order to fill this gap the concept of collaborative public space (CPS) is defined. It is then used to analyze the Israeli military's role within the Israeli IT industry, employing the case study method to analyze a specific section of the military--MAMRAM--the main programming, software engineering, and computer users training unit. The paper's main findings are that, contrary to the commonly argued view, which sees the military mainly as a supplier of factors of production such as high skilled labor, or technological spin-offs, the military has been playing a critical role in the continuing success of the high-tech industry by providing it with a CPS. The military acts as an important center of information gathering, processing, and dissemination for the Israeli software innovation system, as the originator and strengthener of many social networks, and as the connecting node between various weakly tied social networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]},
	biburl = {http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/285b968abdbcf8c69580f441b510c9562/callagialla},
	keywords = {COMPUTER centersDIFFUSION clustersstate-industry industryTECHNOLOGICAL innovationcollective innovationsCOMMUNITY innovationsPUBLIC interactions learningtechnological networksISRAELsystems of software spacesSOCIAL upgradingindustrial}
}