%0 Journal Article %1 Demirel2011 %A Demirel, Güven %A Prizak, Roshan %A Reddy, P. N. %A Gross, Thilo %D 2011 %I Springer Berlin / Heidelberg %J Eur. Phys. J. B %K adaptive-networks coevolution cyclic-games game-theory graphs networks rock-paper-scissors %P 1--8 %R 10.1140/epjb/e2011-10844-4 %T Cyclic dominance in adaptive networks %X The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a paradigmatic model for cyclic dominance in biological systems. Here we consider this game in the social context of competition between opinions in a networked society. In our model, every agent has an opinion which is drawn from the three choices: rock, paper or scissors. In every timestep a link is selected randomly and the game is played between the nodes connected by the link. The loser either adopts the opinion of the winner or rewires the link. These rules define an adaptive network on which the agents' opinions coevolve with the network topology of social contacts. We show analytically and numerically that nonequilibrium phase transitions occur as a function of the rewiring strength. The transitions separate four distinct phases which differ in the observed dynamics of opinions and topology. In particular, there is one phase where the population settles to an arbitrary consensus opinion. We present a detailed analysis of the corresponding transitions revealing an apparently paradoxical behavior. The system approaches consensus states where they are unstable, whereas other dynamics prevail when the consensus states are stable.

@article{Demirel2011, abstract = {The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a paradigmatic model for cyclic dominance in biological systems. Here we consider this game in the social context of competition between opinions in a networked society. In our model, every agent has an opinion which is drawn from the three choices: rock, paper or scissors. In every timestep a link is selected randomly and the game is played between the nodes connected by the link. The loser either adopts the opinion of the winner or rewires the link. These rules define an adaptive network on which the agents' opinions coevolve with the network topology of social contacts. We show analytically and numerically that nonequilibrium phase transitions occur as a function of the rewiring strength. The transitions separate four distinct phases which differ in the observed dynamics of opinions and topology. In particular, there is one phase where the population settles to an arbitrary consensus opinion. We present a detailed analysis of the corresponding transitions revealing an apparently paradoxical behavior. The system approaches consensus states where they are unstable, whereas other dynamics prevail when the consensus states are stable.}, added-at = {2011-03-21T13:11:01.000+0100}, author = {Demirel, Güven and Prizak, Roshan and Reddy, P. N. and Gross, Thilo}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2793428cafa2fabb56f402c3df19baa77/rincedd}, doi = {10.1140/epjb/e2011-10844-4}, file = {Demirel2011 - Cyclic dominance in adaptive networks.pdf:Evolutionary Game Theory/Demirel2011 - Cyclic dominance in adaptive networks.pdf:PDF}, groups = {public}, interhash = {12d8fbcec6c6896c50af2be6cb387e44}, intrahash = {a88147c3b4fa3b6487ad1d1348b13478}, journal = {Eur. Phys. J. B}, keywords = {adaptive-networks coevolution cyclic-games game-theory graphs networks rock-paper-scissors}, pages = {1--8}, publisher = {Springer Berlin / Heidelberg}, timestamp = {2011-03-30T16:38:32.000+0200}, title = {Cyclic dominance in adaptive networks}, username = {rincedd}, year = 2011 }