| Authors: |
Abdul Ali
and Manohar U. Kalwani
and Dan Kovenock
|
| Tags: |
BUSINESS
managementMARKET
orientation
planningCOMPETITIONMARKETING
productsMARKETINGPRODUCT
researchNEW
|
| Abstract: |
In this paper, we investigate project selection choices of duopolists facing two alternatives: undertaking a "pioneering" type project (Type A) aimed to develop a highly innovative product, or an "incremental innovation" type project (Type B) aimed to develop a less innovative product such as the modification of an existing product. A key objective of our research is to examine how firm characteristics such as their differential efficiencies in completing projects, differences in the degree of substitutability between Type A and B products, and first mover advantages affect product development strategies. We develop a game-theoretic model to obtain insights into the project selection problem taking into account competitive reactions to a firm's choice of project development strategies and technical uncertainties associated with project completion times. We report model findings on recommended project selection strategies for efficient and disadvantaged firms. Further, we examine how a firm's choice of a Type A project is affected by an increase in the variance of the project completion time of a Type A project relative to that of a Type B project, while the ratio of their mean completion times is held constant. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts)
In this paper, we investigate project selection choices of duopolists facing two alternatives: undertaking a "pioneering" type project (Type A) aimed to develop a highly innovative product, or an "incremental innovation" type project (Type B) aimed to develop a less innovative product such as the modification of an existing product. A key objective of our research is to examine how firm characteristics such as their differential efficiencies in completing projects, differences in the degree of substitutability between Type A and B products, and first mover advantages affect product development strategies. We develop a game-theoretic model to obtain insights into the project selection problem taking into account competitive reactions to a firm's choice of project development strategies and technical uncertainties associated with project completion times. We report model findings on recommended project selection strategies for efficient and disadvantaged firms. Further, we examine how a firm's choice of a Type A project is affected by an increase in the variance of the project completion time of a Type A project relative to that of a Type B project, while the ratio of their mean completion times is held constant. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts) |
@article{Ali.1993,
title = {Selecting Product Development Projects: Pioneering versus Incremental Innovation Strategies},
author = {Abdul Ali and Manohar U. Kalwani and Dan Kovenock},
journal = {Management Science},
number = {3},
pages = {255-274},
volume = {39},
year = {1993},
abstract = {In this paper, we investigate project selection choices of duopolists facing two alternatives: undertaking a "pioneering" type project (Type A) aimed to develop a highly innovative product, or an "incremental innovation" type project (Type B) aimed to develop a less innovative product such as the modification of an existing product. A key objective of our research is to examine how firm characteristics such as their differential efficiencies in completing projects, differences in the degree of substitutability between Type A and B products, and first mover advantages affect product development strategies. We develop a game-theoretic model to obtain insights into the project selection problem taking into account competitive reactions to a firm's choice of project development strategies and technical uncertainties associated with project completion times. We report model findings on recommended project selection strategies for efficient and disadvantaged firms. Further, we examine how a firm's choice of a Type A project is affected by an increase in the variance of the project completion time of a Type A project relative to that of a Type B project, while the ratio of their mean completion times is held constant. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts)
In this paper, we investigate project selection choices of duopolists facing two alternatives: undertaking a "pioneering" type project (Type A) aimed to develop a highly innovative product, or an "incremental innovation" type project (Type B) aimed to develop a less innovative product such as the modification of an existing product. A key objective of our research is to examine how firm characteristics such as their differential efficiencies in completing projects, differences in the degree of substitutability between Type A and B products, and first mover advantages affect product development strategies. We develop a game-theoretic model to obtain insights into the project selection problem taking into account competitive reactions to a firm's choice of project development strategies and technical uncertainties associated with project completion times. We report model findings on recommended project selection strategies for efficient and disadvantaged firms. Further, we examine how a firm's choice of a Type A project is affected by an increase in the variance of the project completion time of a Type A project relative to that of a Type B project, while the ratio of their mean completion times is held constant. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts)},
issn = {0025-1909},
keywords = {BUSINESS managementMARKET orientation planningCOMPETITIONMARKETING productsMARKETINGPRODUCT researchNEW }
}
::