@book{lievrouw2006hnm,
title = {{Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Social Consequences of ICTs}},
author = {L.A. Lievrouw and S.M. Livingstone},
publisher = {Sage Publications},
url = {http://www.brookings.edu/global/gi2006_guriev.pdf},
year = {2006},
description = {medgov},
abstract = {How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absense of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information
either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler?s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.},
keywords = {-freedom Pressefreiheit bureaucracy censorship medgov media new_media non-democratic_politics }
}
::