On the alleged perversity of the evidential view of testimony
Analysis, (2012)Abstract
1. My wife tells me that it’s raining, and as a result, I now have a reason to
believe that it’s raining. But what kind of reason for belief does her testimony
provide me with? According to the evidential view of testimony (EVT), what
my wife’s testimony provides me with is evidence: evidence indicating that
she believes that it’s raining, which then indicates that it is indeed raining.
Until recently, most epistemologists of testimony, both reductionist and
non-reductionist, accepted some version of EVT. In recent years, however,
EVT has met with an objection in the form of what I will label the perversity
argument. The perversity argument was first presented by Richard Moran
(2005) and elaborated by Faulkner (2007, 2011) and others. They argue that
in conceiving of the reason for belief provided by testimony as evidence, EVT
mischaracterizes the kind of reasons normally provided to an audience by
speakers’ testimony. The problem with such an evidential view of testimony,
it is argued, is that thought of as evidence, testimony is evidence that is
deliberately produced in order to make others believe. But to the extent
that testimony is to be thought of as evidence, its deliberate nature undermines
its epistemic status. As a result, EVT portrays us as perversely according
to testimony having a privileged status as a vehicle for knowledge.
Against this, I want to argue that in spite of its initial plausibility, the perversity
argument fails. For there is no reason to think that the deliberate
nature of testimony, as such, diminishes its status as evidence.