%0 Journal Article %1 frenoy-genetic-evolution-cooperation-2013 %A Frénoy, Antoine %A Taddei, François %A Misevic, Dusan %D 2013 %I Public Library of Science %J PLoS Comput Biol %K alife cooperation evolution %N 11 %P e1003339 %R 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003339 %T Genetic Architecture Promotes the Evolution and Maintenance of Cooperation %U http://dx.doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1003339 %V 9 %X <title>Author Summary</title><p>Cooperation is a much studied and debated phenomena in the microbial world marked by a key question: Given the survival of the fittest evolutionary paradigm, why do individuals act in seemingly altruistic ways, paying a cost to help others? Kin selection and group selection, together with mathematical tools from areas such as economics and game theory, have provided some answers. However, they largely ignored the underlying genetic and genomic mechanisms that drive the evolution of cooperation. In this study, we show that the architecture of the genomes has a major role in shaping the fate of cooperating populations. Specifically, we use an <italic>in silico</italic> evolution platform and discover that genes for cooperative traits are “hiding” behind metabolic ones by overlapping their sequences or sharing operons. In conditions where cheaters may outcompete the cooperators, this entangled architecture evolves spontaneously and effectively protects cooperation from invasion by cheater mutants. We describe a novel genetic mechanism for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation and, by taking into account the second order selection pressures on the genomes, highlight the need for going beyond simple game theory models in its study.</p>

@article{frenoy-genetic-evolution-cooperation-2013, abstract = {<title>Author Summary</title><p>Cooperation is a much studied and debated phenomena in the microbial world marked by a key question: Given the survival of the fittest evolutionary paradigm, why do individuals act in seemingly altruistic ways, paying a cost to help others? Kin selection and group selection, together with mathematical tools from areas such as economics and game theory, have provided some answers. However, they largely ignored the underlying genetic and genomic mechanisms that drive the evolution of cooperation. In this study, we show that the architecture of the genomes has a major role in shaping the fate of cooperating populations. Specifically, we use an <italic>in silico</italic> evolution platform and discover that genes for cooperative traits are “hiding” behind metabolic ones by overlapping their sequences or sharing operons. In conditions where cheaters may outcompete the cooperators, this entangled architecture evolves spontaneously and effectively protects cooperation from invasion by cheater mutants. We describe a novel genetic mechanism for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation and, by taking into account the second order selection pressures on the genomes, highlight the need for going beyond simple game theory models in its study.</p>}, added-at = {2014-05-06T13:30:38.000+0200}, author = {Frénoy, Antoine and Taddei, François and Misevic, Dusan}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29952ea8aa360d0e8f94438341f8c6d48/mhwombat}, doi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003339}, interhash = {72c4e4e46b81c8c381709c86b1a246c7}, intrahash = {9952ea8aa360d0e8f94438341f8c6d48}, journal = {PLoS Comput Biol}, keywords = {alife cooperation evolution}, month = {11}, number = 11, pages = {e1003339}, publisher = {Public Library of Science}, timestamp = {2016-07-12T19:25:30.000+0200}, title = {Genetic Architecture Promotes the Evolution and Maintenance of Cooperation}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1003339}, volume = 9, year = 2013 }