This paper develops a theoretical model of product innovation where research and development (R&D) effort by a monopolist firm is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. The government attempts to aid such efforts with a matching grant. We consider different scenarios depending on whether two parties act simultaneously, act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game with a trigger strategy. We also consider cases (i) when the products are exported, (ii) when the firm lobbies for R&D subsidy, and (iii) when the firm is foreign owned. We characterize situations when government intervention increases the chances of product innovation and when it does not.
%0 Journal Article
%1 patricia1990economics
%A Patricia, Laurens
%A Christian, Le Bas
%A Stéphane, Lhuillery
%A Antoine, Schoen
%C Chur; New York
%D 2016
%I Harwood Academic
%J Economics of innovation and new technology.
%K risisProject
%N 4
%P 311-333
%T Economics of innovation and new technology
%U http://www.worldcat.org/search?qt=worldcat_org_all&q=10438599&dblist=638&fq=dt%3Aser&qt=facet_dt%3A
%V 26
%X This paper develops a theoretical model of product innovation where research and development (R&D) effort by a monopolist firm is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. The government attempts to aid such efforts with a matching grant. We consider different scenarios depending on whether two parties act simultaneously, act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game with a trigger strategy. We also consider cases (i) when the products are exported, (ii) when the firm lobbies for R&D subsidy, and (iii) when the firm is foreign owned. We characterize situations when government intervention increases the chances of product innovation and when it does not.
@article{patricia1990economics,
abstract = {This paper develops a theoretical model of product innovation where research and development (R&D) effort by a monopolist firm is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. The government attempts to aid such efforts with a matching grant. We consider different scenarios depending on whether two parties act simultaneously, act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game with a trigger strategy. We also consider cases (i) when the products are exported, (ii) when the firm lobbies for R&D subsidy, and (iii) when the firm is foreign owned. We characterize situations when government intervention increases the chances of product innovation and when it does not.},
added-at = {2017-03-17T14:06:52.000+0100},
address = {Chur; New York},
author = {Patricia, Laurens and Christian, Le Bas and Stéphane, Lhuillery and Antoine, Schoen},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29eadf34855ca175102fc19e531595128/laurensp},
interhash = {edd1e3e1627692da07cdd37e46f3a5e9},
intrahash = {9eadf34855ca175102fc19e531595128},
issn = {10438599},
journal = {Economics of innovation and new technology.},
keywords = {risisProject},
number = 4,
pages = {311-333},
publisher = {Harwood Academic},
refid = {19583017},
timestamp = {2017-03-17T14:06:52.000+0100},
title = {Economics of innovation and new technology},
url = {http://www.worldcat.org/search?qt=worldcat_org_all&q=10438599&dblist=638&fq=dt%3Aser&qt=facet_dt%3A},
volume = 26,
year = 2016
}