We propose a new mechanism of interactions between game-theoretical agents in which the weights of the connections between interacting individuals are dynamical, payoff-dependent variables. Their evolution depends on the difference between the payoff of the agents from a given type of encounter and their average payoff. The mechanism is studied in the frame of two models: agents distributed on a random graph, and a mean field model. Symmetric and asymmetric connections between the agents are introduced. Long time behavior of both systems is discussed for the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snow Drift games.
Mogielski2009 - A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas.pdf:Evolutionary Game Theory/Mogielski2009 - A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas.pdf:PDF
%0 Journal Article
%1 Mogielski2009
%A Mogielski, Krzysztof
%A Platkowski, Tadeusz
%D 2009
%J J. Theor. Biol.
%K networks game-theory coevolution adaptive-networks
%N 1
%P 145 - 150
%R 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.06.007
%T A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas
%V 260
%X We propose a new mechanism of interactions between game-theoretical agents in which the weights of the connections between interacting individuals are dynamical, payoff-dependent variables. Their evolution depends on the difference between the payoff of the agents from a given type of encounter and their average payoff. The mechanism is studied in the frame of two models: agents distributed on a random graph, and a mean field model. Symmetric and asymmetric connections between the agents are introduced. Long time behavior of both systems is discussed for the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snow Drift games.
@article{Mogielski2009,
abstract = {We propose a new mechanism of interactions between game-theoretical agents in which the weights of the connections between interacting individuals are dynamical, payoff-dependent variables. Their evolution depends on the difference between the payoff of the agents from a given type of encounter and their average payoff. The mechanism is studied in the frame of two models: agents distributed on a random graph, and a mean field model. Symmetric and asymmetric connections between the agents are introduced. Long time behavior of both systems is discussed for the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snow Drift games.},
added-at = {2011-01-13T13:26:11.000+0100},
author = {Mogielski, Krzysztof and Platkowski, Tadeusz},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2b4fdc390387832bd39c817da205f2c35/rincedd},
doi = {10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.06.007},
file = {Mogielski2009 - A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas.pdf:Evolutionary Game Theory/Mogielski2009 - A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas.pdf:PDF},
interhash = {13748e36872b7abaa0f386b25375d0d6},
intrahash = {b4fdc390387832bd39c817da205f2c35},
journal = {J. Theor. Biol.},
keywords = {networks game-theory coevolution adaptive-networks},
number = 1,
pages = {145 - 150},
timestamp = {2011-01-13T13:26:11.000+0100},
title = {A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas},
volume = 260,
year = 2009
}