BibSonomy :: publication ::

tag user group author concept BibTeX key search:all search:crisox

The blue social bookmark and publication sharing system.

entry of crisox:

(0)

This publication has not been reviewed yet.

rating distribution

average user rating

The average rating is computed over all reviews. However, some of them may be invisible to you due to the visibility setting chosen by the reviewers.

(0.0 of 5.0 based on 0 reviews)

Information provision in financial markets.

by: Moez Bennouri, C. Clark, and Jacques Robert

In: Annals of Finance, Vol. 6, Nr. 2 (2010) , p. 255 - 286.

Resources (URL, PDF, PS...)

URL:	http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=47579195&site=ehost-live

We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance market depth, price efficiency, volume of trade, and expected welfare when regulators can induce improved information provision in one of two ways. Regulations can be designed that either provide investors with more accurate information by improving the quality of prior information, or that enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our rational expectations equilibrium, improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the anticipations and trading motives of all market participants. We find that both alternatives improve market depth. However, in the limit, we show that improvi

Description

EBSCOhost

BibTeX record

@article{4757919520100401,
  abstract = {We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance (market depth, price efficiency, volume of trade, and expected welfare) when regulators can induce improved information provision in one of two ways. Regulations can be designed that either provide investors with more accurate information by improving the quality of prior information, or that enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our rational expectations equilibrium, improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the anticipations and trading motives of all market participants. We find that both alternatives improve market depth. However, in the limit, we show that improvi},
  added-at = {2010-02-09T17:53:14.000+0100},
  author = {Bennouri, Moez and Clark, C. and Robert, Jacques},
  biburl = {http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2ec01784e6066fe5d98fe0d2542bf7359/crisox},
  description = {EBSCOhost},
  interhash = {093384893ea4cc726638814ee1355d2a},
  intrahash = {ec01784e6066fe5d98fe0d2542bf7359},
  issn = {16142446},
  journal = {Annals of Finance},
  keywords = {ecommerce},
  number = 2,
  pages = {255 - 286},
  timestamp = {2010-02-09T17:53:14.000+0100},
  title = {Information provision in financial markets.},
  url = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=47579195&site=ehost-live},
  volume = 6,
  year = 2010
}

Endnote record

%0 Journal Article
%1 4757919520100401
%A Bennouri, Moez
%A Clark, C.
%A Robert, Jacques
%D 2010
%J Annals of Finance
%K 
%N 2
%P 255 - 286
%T Information provision in financial markets.
%U http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=47579195&site=ehost-live
%V 6
%X We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance (market depth, price efficiency, volume of trade, and expected welfare) when regulators can induce improved information provision in one of two ways. Regulations can be designed that either provide investors with more accurate information by improving the quality of prior information, or that enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our rational expectations equilibrium, improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the anticipations and trading motives of all market participants. We find that both alternatives improve market depth. However, in the limit, we show that improvi