]> BibSonomy publications for /author/Dellarocas http://www.bibsonomy.org/burst/author/Dellarocas BibSonomy BuRST Feed for /author/Dellarocas 2008-07-20T23:32:41+02:00 A predictive empirical model for pricing and resource allocation decisions. dblphttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20af5992d4a6c757872422cd205dcf8bc/dblp dblp 2008-06-26T00:00:00+02:00 dblp
A predictive empirical model for pricing and resource allocation decisions.
Wolfgang Ketter and John Collins and Maria L. Gini and Paul R. Schrater and Alok Gupta ICEC 449-458 (2007)
to dblp by dblp on 2008-06-26 00:00:00 ]]> ICECconf/ACMicec/2007449-458ACM International Conference Proceeding SeriesA predictive empirical model for pricing and resource allocation decisions.2582007dblp 2008-06-26 00:00:00.0 Tools for Inventing Organizations: Toward a Handbook of Organizational Processes http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a312ddca91521d5d3da8744e16998da0/msn msn 2008-05-05T14:01:46+02:00 cites.pclass cites.procm research.bizInt.bpm
Tools for Inventing Organizations: Toward a Handbook of Organizational Processes
Thomas W. Malone and Kevin Crowston and Jintae Lee and Brian T. Pentland and Chrysanthos Dellarocas and George M. Wyner and John Quimby and Abraham Bernstein and George A. Herman and Mark Klein and Charles S. Osborn and Elisa O'Donnell Organizing Business Knowledge. The MIT Process Handbook (2003)
to cites.pclass cites.procm research.bizInt.bpm by msn on 2008-05-05 14:01:46 ]]> Organizing Business Knowledge. The MIT Process HandbookTools for Inventing Organizations: Toward a Handbook of Organizational Processes2003cites.pclass cites.procm research.bizInt.bpm 2008-05-05 14:01:46.0 Immunizing Online Reputation Reporting Systems Against Unfair Ratings and Discriminatory Behavior todohttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2f595bbe0efe3675310a77927bd85ee42/utrust utrust 2008-04-20T20:48:43+02:00 todo
Immunizing Online Reputation Reporting Systems Against Unfair Ratings and Discriminatory Behavior
Chrysanthos Dellarocas (2000)
to todo by utrust on 2008-04-20 20:48:43 ]]> Immunizing Online Reputation Reporting Systems Against Unfair Ratings and Discriminatory Behavior2000todo 2008-04-20 20:48:43.0 Tall Heads vs. Long Tails: Do Consumer Reviews Increase the Informational Inequality Between Hit and Niche Products? http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2203985544e62ba73f70123797bdd2a5b/dawinci dawinci 2008-04-15T16:36:16+02:00 long_tail online product_reviews user-generated_content word-of-mouth
Tall Heads vs. Long Tails: Do Consumer Reviews Increase the Informational Inequality Between Hit and Niche Products?
Chrysanthos N. Dellarocas and Ritu Narayan Robert H. Smith School of Business Research Paper (2007)
to long_tail online product_reviews user-generated_content word-of-mouth by dawinci on 2008-04-15 16:36:16 ]]> Robert H. Smith School of Business Research Paper December06-056Tall Heads vs. Long Tails: Do Consumer Reviews Increase the Informational Inequality Between Hit and Niche Products?2007long_tail online product_reviews user-generated_content word-of-mouth 2008-04-15 16:36:16.0 By providing a platform where consumers can discuss obscure products not covered by mainstream media, user-centered media, such as online product review forums, are expected by many to reduce the informational inequality between hit and niche products and thus help shift demand towards the long tail of less popular products. Some researchers have challenged this viewpoint, arguing that other aspects of the Internet, such as the prevalence of prominently displayed statistics about the actions of prior consumers, end up reinforcing consumer attention on already popular products. In this paper, we empirically test the merits of these two hypotheses by investigating how a population's propensity to contribute post-purchase online reviews for different products of the same category (motion pictures) relates to offline and online indicators of those products' popularity. We discover the presence of an interesting tension between the population's preference to review products that are lesser known in the offline domain and its simultaneous attraction to discussing products that many other people have already commented on online. Overall, it appears that the latter effect dominates: A Gini coefficient analysis reveals that the weekly volumes of user-contributed movie reviews in our sample are even more skewed towards popular movies than the corresponding weekly box office revenues. Our findings have implications for online forum designers and for ongoing research on the long tail theory. How Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile? http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c2179b9d6e1b491036940bc6accefb46/dawinci dawinci 2008-04-15T16:29:58+02:00 internet mechanisms reputation update
How Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile?
Chrysanthos N. Dellarocas Information Systems Research 17 (2006)
to internet mechanisms reputation update by dawinci on 2008-04-15 16:29:58 ]]> Information Systems ResearchSeptember3How Often Should Reputation Mechanisms Update a Trader's Reputation Profile?172006internet mechanisms reputation update 2008-04-15 16:29:58.0 Reputation mechanisms have become an important component of electronic markets, helping to build trust and elicit cooperation among loosely connected and geographically dispersed economic agents. Understanding the impact of different reputation mechanism design parameters on the resulting market efficiency has, thus, emerged as a question of theoretical and practical interest. Along these lines, this note studies the impact of the frequency of reputation profile updates on cooperation and efficiency. The principal finding is that, in trading settings with pure moral hazard and noisy ratings, if the per-period profit margin of cooperating sellers is sufficiently high, a mechanism that does not publish every single rating it receives but rather, only updates a trader's public reputation profile every k transactions with a summary statistic of a trader's most recent k ratings, can induce higher average levels of cooperation and market efficiency than a mechanism that publishes all ratings as soon as they are posted. The note derives expressions for calculating the optimal profile updating interval k, discusses the implications of this finding for existing systems, such as eBay, and proposes alternative reputation mechanism architectures that attain higher maximum efficiency than the, currently popular, reputation mechanisms that publish summaries of a trader's recent ratings. Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms in Online Trading Environments with Moral Hazard http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/25f0c0d8485b347cb7f8d3d01bba3d96c/dawinci dawinci 2008-04-15T16:19:43+02:00 hazard internet mechanisms moral reputation
Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms in Online Trading Environments with Moral Hazard
Chrysanthos N. Dellarocas MIT Sloan Working Paper (2004)
to hazard internet mechanisms moral reputation by dawinci on 2008-04-15 16:19:43 ]]> MIT Sloan Working PaperJuly4297-03Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms in Online Trading Environments with Moral Hazard2004hazard internet mechanisms moral reputation 2008-04-15 16:19:43.0 This paper offers a systematic exploration of reputation mechanism design in trading environments with opportunistic sellers, imperfect monitoring of a seller's actions and two possible seller effort levels, one of which has no value to buyers. The objective of reputation mechanisms in such settings is to induce sellers to exert high effort as often as possible. I study the impact of various mechanism parameters (such as the granularity of solicited feedback, the format of the public reputation profile, the policy regarding missing feedback, and the rules for admitting new sellers) on the resulting market efficiency. I find that the maximum efficiency that is attainable through reputation mechanisms is bounded away from the hypothetical first-best case where sellers could credibly pre-commit to full cooperation by a factor that is related to the probability that cooperating sellers may receive "unfair" bad ratings. Furthermore, the maximum efficiency is independent of the length of past history summarized in a seller's public reputation profile. I apply my framework to a model of eBay’s feedback mechanism and conclude that eBay's simple mechanism is capable of inducing the maximum theoretical efficiency independently of the number of recent ratings that are being summarized in a seller's profile. I also derive optimal policies for dealing with missing feedback and easy online identity changes. Building Trust On-Line: The Design of Reliable Reputation Reporting: Mechanisms for Online Trading Communities http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2de0ed8ba4b83d05f30e8be38fe6e7357/dawinci dawinci 2008-04-15T15:14:14+02:00 design reputation thesis trust
Building Trust On-Line: The Design of Reliable Reputation Reporting: Mechanisms for Online Trading Communities
Chrysanthos N. Dellarocas MIT Sloan Working Paper (2001)
to design reputation thesis trust by dawinci on 2008-04-15 15:14:14 ]]> MIT Sloan Working PaperOctober4180-01Working Paper SeriesBuilding Trust On-Line: The Design of Reliable Reputation Reporting: Mechanisms for Online Trading Communities2001design reputation thesis trust 2008-04-15 15:14:14.0 Designing Reputation (Feedback) Mechanisms http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2ca992afac248a408f12f4fbb76b1486f/dawinci dawinci 2008-04-14T11:35:07+02:00 design feedback mechanisms online reputation systems
Designing Reputation (Feedback) Mechanisms
Chrysanthos N. Dellarocas and Federico Dini and Giancarlo Spagnolo Handbook of Procurement (2006)
to design feedback mechanisms online reputation systems by dawinci on 2008-04-14 11:35:07 ]]> Handbook of ProcurementDesigning Reputation (Feedback) MechanismsAccepted Paper Series2006design feedback mechanisms online reputation systems 2008-04-14 11:35:07.0 The Sound of Silence in Online Feedback: Estimating Trading Risks in the Presence of Reporting Bias http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2fbe816c2eb365b2dbfc38466a77fc4cc/dawinci dawinci 2008-04-14T11:25:53+02:00 bias reporting reputation systems
The Sound of Silence in Online Feedback: Estimating Trading Risks in the Presence of Reporting Bias
Chrysanthos N. Dellarocas and Charles A. Wood SSRN eLibrary (2006)
to bias reporting reputation systems by dawinci on 2008-04-14 11:25:53 ]]> SSRN eLibraryThe Sound of Silence in Online Feedback: Estimating Trading Risks in the Presence of Reporting BiasWorking Paper2006bias reporting reputation systems 2008-04-14 11:25:53.0 Self-interest, reciprocity and participation in online reputation systems Main paper DBhttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/200eff7dad83f3d85ecba648f3ef98448/cameron cameron 2007-12-07T21:41:23+01:00 incentives reputation
Self-interest, reciprocity and participation in online reputation systems
Chrysanthos N. Dellarocas and Ming Fan and Charles A. Wood (2004)
to incentives reputation by cameron on 2007-12-07 21:41:23 ]]> 4500-04Self-interest, reciprocity and participation in online reputation systemsWorking Papers2004incentives reputation 2007-12-07 21:41:23.0