<rdf:RDF xmlns:burst="http://xmlns.com/burst/0.1/" xmlns:admin="http://webns.net/mvcb/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:syn="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/" xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" xmlns:cc="http://web.resource.org/cc/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" xmlns:swrc="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#" xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"><channel rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/burst/concept/user/acf/USA"><title>BibSonomy publications for /concept/user/acf/USA</title><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/burst/concept/user/acf/USA</link><description>BibSonomy BuRST Feed for /concept/user/acf/USA</description><dc:date>2008-10-16T08:58:12+02:00</dc:date><items><rdf:Seq><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27b1f9f75bda9294cebbb9d419dfb7ae0/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27ba8451f51c715cb918e840ca24b00bd/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e76652b006f9f9d12ace68c97e73ab68/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c2a53c370cf8baeb2bb5c97129e6dcc0/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21a8a60f49c879210d41db2d279ebe324/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2cbc229ccfd2af14d737df436cc7bc8df/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23331c99299a6300bc655abc0941c1f57/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a5ffb08fd2418345bc7ebfcf1c8ba86a/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24485999a10c6624220fc1e0a3f7099d9/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/211f3f98a88aed7dcba5696885c2c1e6e/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29aa8d6528e71b63ea7de9e61d5030556/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21a61c72ec839bcbc4a59b34b74673ba5/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23e43b2121331ee9d43591a40756aeac5/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/22067516bd49a75278375d6ee702079a1/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/223792fec81e4c60ab7bb20e70629de2a/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/294dddbe8f08694a5ac53569c9502e746/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e9794aa28ec0fcab22918ad357da99ac/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2d4e6b7959ac88a3bf5338a15f03ca83c/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20cd116210259b63d5c55d97a83f26bfe/acf"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2b33a3ec5338ac7f972eebc1e32630fc8/acf"/></rdf:Seq></items></channel><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27b1f9f75bda9294cebbb9d419dfb7ae0/acf"><title>Lead Paint Prompts Mattel to Recall 967,000 Toys</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27b1f9f75bda9294cebbb9d419dfb7ae0/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>product_safety product_quality news example China US_media </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;Louise &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Story&#034;&gt;Story&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;The New York Times&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;August 2, 20072007. &lt;/em&gt;</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/product_safety"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/product_quality"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/news"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/example"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/US_media"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27b1f9f75bda9294cebbb9d419dfb7ae0/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/27b1f9f75bda9294cebbb9d419dfb7ae0/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/business/02toy.html"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>The New York Times</swrc:journal><swrc:month>August 2, 2007</swrc:month><swrc:title>Lead Paint Prompts Mattel to Recall 967,000 Toys</swrc:title><swrc:year>2007</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>product_safety product_quality news example China US_media </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Matel the maker of Barbie dolls and Hot Wheels cars, is recalling
	nearly one million toys in the United States today because the products
	are covered in lead paint. 
	
	
	Susan Etheridge for The New York Times
	
	Nickelodeon, which owns Dora the Explorer, says it will keep a closer
	eye on its toy makers. 
	
	According to Mattel, all the toys were made by a contract manufacturer
	in China. 
	
	
	The recall, the second biggest this year involving toys, covers 83
	products made from April 19 to July 6. Many of them feature Sesame
	Street and Nickelodeon characters — including the Elmo Tub Sub, the
	Dora the Explorer Backpack, and the Giggle Gabber, a toy shaped like
	Elmo or Cookie Monster that toddlers shake to hear giggles and funny
	noises.
	
	
	Mattel says it prevented more than two-thirds of the 967,000 affected
	toys from reaching consumers by stopping the products in its distribution
	centers and contacting retailers, like Wal-Mart, Target and Toys
	‘R’ Us, late last week. But more than 300,000 of the tainted toys
	have been bought by consumers in the United States. According to
	the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the toys may have a date
	code from 109-7LF to 187-7LF on the product or packaging.
	
	
	A complete list can be found at nytimes.com, mattel.com or cpsc.gov.
	
	
	Mattel is hardly the first manufacturer to encounter a breakdown in
	the Chinese production chain. In recent months, factories in China
	have been sources of poisonous pet food sold in stores in the United
	States, dangerous car tires, and lead paint on the popular Thomas
	&amp; Friends wooden toys.
	
	
	The Chinese government has said it is working to improve its product
	regulations, even as members of Congress have called for legislation
	requiring more inspections of imports from China.
	
	
	This is Mattel’s 17th recall in 10 years. Most recently, an infant
	swing made by its Fisher-Price division was taken off the market
	because of a risk children could be trapped in its moving parts.
	And in its largest consumer action involving toy safety, in 1998,
	the company recalled more than 10 million Power Wheels cars.
	
	
	Speaking of the new recall, Nancy A. Nord, acting Consumer Product
	Safety Commission chairwoman, said in a statement, “These recalled
	toys have accessible lead in the paint, and parents should not hesitate
	in taking them away from children.” 
	
	
	The statement said that the commission had stated an investigation
	and that “ensuring that Chinese made toys are safe for U.S. consumers
	is one of my highest priorities and is the subject of vital talks
	currently in place between C.P.S.C. and the Chinese government.”
	
	
	Earlier this summer, RC2, the maker of Thomas trains, recalled 1.5
	million trains and accessories because a Chinese supplier had coated
	them in lead paint. At that time, consumer safety experts and toy
	industry analysts said that Mattel was unlikely to face such a problem.
	
	
	“There are companies that live up to their obligations to the government
	as well as to consumers, and they are one of them,” Julie Vallese,
	a spokeswoman for the Consumer Product Safety Commission, said of
	Mattel in mid-July.
	
	
	But Mattel’s safety checks — which include independent audits of facilities
	and ownership of many of its own factories in China — did not prevent
	the chain of events that led to today’s recall. 
	
	
	In early July, according to Mattel executives, one of the European
	retailers that sells Mattel toys discovered the lead on some products.
	On July 6, Mattel stopped operations at the factory that produced
	the toys and initiated an investigation. 
	
	
	On July 18, Mattel took a reporter for The New York Times on a tour
	of a factory in Guanyao, China, and of Mattel’s toy safety lab in
	Shenzhen. At that time, Mattel executives say, it was unclear whether
	Mattel was facing a widespread lead paint problem, or if the European
	case was an anomaly.
	
	
	Last Thursday, the same day The Times ran an article about Mattel’s
	toy safety procedures, the company’s executives say they received
	conclusive data that persuaded them to recall the 83 products. Then,
	the company contacted retailers who stocked the toys.
	
	
	“This is a vendor plant with whom we’ve worked for 15 years; this
	isn’t somebody that just started making toys for us,” Robert A. Eckert,
	the chief executive of Mattel, said in an interview. “They understand
	our regulations, they understand our program, and something went
	wrong. That hurts.”
	
	
	Mattel requires the factories it contracts with to use paint and other
	materials provided by certified suppliers. Mattel executives said
	they did not know if the contract manufacturer substituted paint
	from a noncertified supplier or if a certified supplier caused the
	problem. 
	
	
	Mr. Eckert said Mattel was considering various ways to overcome the
	problem, including reducing the amount of toys it makes through contract
	factories. About 50 percent of Mattel’s revenue comes from toys made
	in 11 factories it owns and operates. That is a high share for the
	toy industry.
	
	
	But the other half comes from toys that it outsources to up to 50
	manufacturers in China. Those toys tend to be short-term products
	that feature characters from movies and television shows rather than
	Barbie dolls or other Mattel brands. 
	
	
	In light of the recalls, Nickelodeon — which owns the characters Dora
	the Explorer and Diego — has decided to introduce a third-party monitor
	to check up on all of the companies that make toys under its brands,
	including Mattel.
	
	
	Sesame Workshop, the nonprofit organization behind the “Sesame Street”
	program, is considering adding third-party testing, Gary E. Knell,
	president and chief executive of Sesame Workshop, said in a statement.
	
	
	This summer, the Toy Industry Association has been working with the
	Consumer Product Safety Commission on new regulations to require
	more stringent safety checks. Carter Keithley, president of the association,
	said the federal government needed to help the industry block China
	from using lead paint. 
	
	
	“We don’t have lead paint in this country any more, and they shouldn’t
	either,” Mr. Keithley said of China. “If there was no lead paint,
	then we wouldn’t have this problem.”
	
	
	Thomas G. Rawski, an economics professor at the University of Pittsburgh,
	who has visited factories in China regularly since 1975, though not
	toy factories, said companies there are trying to check product quality,
	but more improvements are needed.
	
	
	“The mechanisms for preventing this stuff don’t leap out of a tree,”
	Mr. Rawski said. “They have to be built up carefully, and I think
	it’s very clear this process of building is going on in China right
	now. That means there are lots of things happening that in an ideal
	world shouldn’t be happening, including things that wouldn’t happen
	in Japan or the U.S.”</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.06.01" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Louise Story"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27ba8451f51c715cb918e840ca24b00bd/acf"><title>Corporate environmetal reporting: informal institutional chinese cultural norms</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27ba8451f51c715cb918e840ca24b00bd/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>stakeholder corporate_environmental_reporting environment corporate_reporting management_strategy CER accounting cultural_norms China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;Anna Lee &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Rowe&#034;&gt;Rowe&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;July8 &amp;#8211; 10 July 2007. &lt;/em&gt;</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/stakeholder"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/corporate_environmental_reporting"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/environment"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/corporate_reporting"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/management_strategy"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/CER"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/accounting"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/cultural_norms"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27ba8451f51c715cb918e840ca24b00bd/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/27ba8451f51c715cb918e840ca24b00bd/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Misc"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.unisa.edu.au/commerce/events/docs/2007/unisa020807.pdf"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:address>Dr Anna L. Rowe
	
	Graduate School of Business
	
	Curtin University of Technology
	
	GPO Box U1987
	
	Perth 6845
	
	Western Australia
	
	Email: Anna.Rowe@cbs.curtin.edu.au</swrc:address><swrc:booktitle>Fifth Asian Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference</swrc:booktitle><swrc:month>July</swrc:month><swrc:organization><swrc:Organization swrc:name="Curtin University of Technology, Western Australia"/></swrc:organization><swrc:title>Corporate environmetal reporting: informal institutional chinese
	cultural norms</swrc:title><swrc:year> 8 – 10 July 2007</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>stakeholder corporate_environmental_reporting environment corporate_reporting management_strategy CER accounting cultural_norms China </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>The significance of global environmental issues have been further
	propelled to the forefront, with the current public awareness highlighted
	by the 2007 United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
	Al Gore’s global warming statements and the Stern review. As the
	most populous nation on earth with one fifth of humanity, coupled
	with an appetite for raw materials to boost its economic growth,
	China has a prominent role in solving global environmental challenges.
	
	
	Research in corporate environmental reporting (CER) as an environmental
	management strategy to communicate with stakeholders has provided
	a discerning body of knowledge. However, there exists, a glaring
	‘gap’ in the literature in relation to the study of CER in an emerging
	nation such as China. The main purpose of this paper is to explore
	the normative assumptions underpinning CER in China focusing on Shanghai.
	Findings from the data appear to reverberate well with institutional
	theoretical approach within the Chinese cultural norms (informal
	institutional rules) in understanding the embryonic progress of CER
	in China.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.05.04" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Anna Lee Rowe"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e76652b006f9f9d12ace68c97e73ab68/acf"><title>Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media?</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e76652b006f9f9d12ace68c97e73ab68/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>PR&amp;media corruption Shanghai PR Public_Relations fun blog Chinese_media China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;William &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Moss&#034;&gt;Moss&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Imagethief (Blog)&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;29.01.8:14 AM20051101. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own, not those of his&lt;span class=&#034;info&#034;&gt;...&lt;span&gt;Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own, not those of his agency. For more information see &amp;#196;bout Imagethief&amp;quot;, below.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
		    .
	    &lt;/em&gt;</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/PR&amp;media"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/corruption"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Shanghai"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/PR"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Public_Relations"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/fun"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/blog"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Chinese_media"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e76652b006f9f9d12ace68c97e73ab68/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2e76652b006f9f9d12ace68c97e73ab68/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://news.imagethief.com/blogs/china/archive/2005/11/01/4968.aspx"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Imagethief (Blog)</swrc:journal><swrc:month>29.01.8:14 AM</swrc:month><swrc:note>Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer
	working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own,
	not those of his agency. For more information see &#034;About Imagethief&#034;,
	below.</swrc:note><swrc:title>Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media?</swrc:title><swrc:year>20051101</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>PR&amp;media corruption Shanghai PR Public_Relations fun blog Chinese_media China </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>The week before last I had lunch with a foreign correspondent who
	asked me if there was corruption in PR in China. Although I was only
	providing background, and not speaking to him on the record, I was,
	to put it politely, diplomatic in my answer. Ever mindful of the
	brand that graces my business-card, it’s an issue that I tend to
	tread lightly upon. I did, however, send him on to a friend who has
	been here longer than me and who works independently and is, therefore,
	inclined to be more forthcoming about such things.
	
	
	
	But the topic arose again last week, courtesy of bloggers Bingfeng,
	of Bingfeng Teahouse, and Myrick, of Asiapundit. Bingfeng fired the
	first shot in a post telling foreigners who complain about China’s
	media restrictions to find something better to do with their time.
	The crux of his argument was the blocking of any individual site
	affects only a few thousand people. However, a pervasive culture
	of media corruption fostered by “foreign MNCs” (multinational corporations)
	affects everyone in China:
	
	
	
	As we all know, the blocking of these web sites, in its worst situation,
	influence the life of a few thousands in china, while at the same
	time, the corrupt journalists/media taking money from firms and various
	organizations and writing misleading articles to fool the public
	is a everyday story in china, as i know, the norm of taking money
	from firms to make favorable media exposures was cultivated by many
	MNCs in china, which bribe chinese journalists in the name of &#034;media
	PR&#034; or &#034;marketing PR&#034; activities, and bribe them when they have a
	&#034;PR crisis&#034;. such collusion affects the lives of millions of people
	and you could do something to change it, especially a lot of them
	are related with MNCs in china.
	
	There is some truth in what Bingfeng wrote. On this site I have previously
	written, tongue somewhat in cheek, of the “transportation claim”
	commonly paid to journalists who attend press events in China. According
	to the journalist I had lunch with, foreign technology companies
	originated this practice about ten years ago. I don’t know the detailed
	history. Anyone who does is invited to comment.
	
	
	
	So I agree with Bingfeng to some extent. However, before he makes
	me his “star of the week” again, he needs to read on, because I’m
	going to bite later.
	
	
	
	Myrick posted a rather interesting response to Bingfeng. First, he
	pointed out that he, a foreign correspondent by day, was recently
	offered 500 RMB (about US$60) himself while attending an event sponsored
	by a nameless European telecommunications firm. He mentioned that,
	although he refused the money, three Chinese journalists who were
	present accepted. I suspect that this was vanilla “transportation
	claim” (车马费) as 500 RMB is the amount typically offered to journalists
	who attend an event from out of town, while 200 RMB is the going
	rate for journalists from in town. If Myrick was attending an event
	in the town he is based in, then there is some inflation happening.
	
	
	
	I would like to point out that whoever offered Myrick the money, even
	if it was simply transportation claim, was an idiot or badly trained.
	Foreign correspondents work differently than Chinese ones on many
	levels. Any PR firm, local or foreign, that doesn’t train their staff
	on these differences is courting trouble. In my company we often
	dissuade clients from mixing local and foreign journalists not only
	because it makes things like the transportation claim awkward, but
	because we often have different messages for domestic and overseas
	audiences.
	
	
	
	In a rebuttal to Bingfeng that I agreed with, Myrick wrote the following:
	
	
	
	Bingfeng is correct that this is a serious problem for China - a 2003
	study by the Institute for Public Relations [proxy link – WM] puts
	China dead last in a list of 66 countries in a study on the acceptability
	of bribery for coverage.
	
	
	Still, by citing the existence of this problem as a criticism of free-speech
	advocates he is making a common fallacy of argument by evading the
	issue.
	
	
	
	This is also known as the Chewbacca defense.
	
	
	
	That last link is from the blocked-in-China Wikipedia. I regret that
	readers here won&#039;t be able to access it without a proxy.
	
	
	
	The problems of censorship in and press bribery in China are related
	issues, both shape the content of news here. But to say that censorship
	of a website is something that only affects a &#034;few thousand&#034; is a
	gross understatement. While it may be only a handful of residents
	who are affected by a block on a single blogspot site, the control
	of information in China promotes ignorance, retards democratic development
	and prevents the building of an educated civil society. This affects
	1.3 billion.
	
	
	The report that Myrick points to is well worth looking at. The reason
	why I agree with Myrick’s response, besides correctly calling out
	the “Chewbacca defense”, is that it points out that there is a relationship
	between corruption of the media and censorship. I think that relationship
	is quite deep, and has to do with how the media have evolved here
	and what Chinese societal expectations of the media are. I also think
	that relationship should be looked at in terms of corruption in general.
	
	
	
	Not to be dissuaded, Bingfeng came back with the following:
	
	
	
	[The] so-called &#034;bribery for coverage&#034; is more than just giving money
	to get favorable media exposures, thanks to the cultivatons of MNCs
	in china, the collusion between media and business has evolved into
	more sophisticated forms that influence/manipulate the public and
	they are unfortuantely followed by more and more organizations and
	individuals. khodorkovski-style chinese firms are on the horizons
	and their agents are already very active. this imposes an immediate
	threat to the emerging &#034;civil society&#034; in china, not the censorship.
	
	
	&#034;free speech/press fighters&#034; could do something to change the media
	corruptions, but in the short term i don&#039;t see their chant could
	do anything to reduce the media censorships. MNCs are the one who
	set the norms of media bribery, government &#034;PR&#034;, media &#034;PR&#034;, marketing
	&#034;PR&#034;, etc. and our &#034;free speech/press fighters&#034; could do something
	to ask them to change the norms or even follow a more strict business
	ethics. this is a more approachable goal.
	
	
	
	like many things in china, the dysfunctional part of the system is
	not removed directly through a confrontational approach, but through
	the cultivations of incremental parts of the system. a less corrupt
	media will forster an environment that leads to less censorship.
	
	
	
	the only disadvantage of a different roadmap is that hte process will
	be less satisfying for the moral superiority of some westerners and
	perhaps doesn&#039;t fit into the political agendas of some of them.
	
	
	
	Here again, Bingfeng is half right. There is “collusion between media
	and business [that] has evolved into more sophisticated forms that
	influence/manipulate the public.” We call that public relations,
	and it’s what I do for a living. But no matter how distasteful you
	might find it, it is not necessarily corrupt, and seems not to have
	undermined civil society in most of the rest of the world.
	
	
	
	The origins of the transportation claim notwithstanding, blaming MNCs
	and PR companies for corruption in the Chinese media is absurd. Complicit
	though they may sometimes be, it’s like blaming vultures for the
	death of your horse in the desert. This argument is the reframing
	of a victimization theme I often see wielded against foreigners and
	multinationals when discussing problems in China. It plays well on
	nationalist sentiments and often does a really good job of deflecting
	attention away from serious, underlying issues worthy of scrutiny.
	The Chewbacca defense, as Myrick pointed out.
	
	
	
	Furthermore, to suggest that a cleaner media will lead to fewer restrictions
	on free speech is, quite simply, to put the cart before the horse.
	I believe the exact opposite is true. Free speech and a less fettered
	press are much more likely to be effective weapons against corruption.
	
	
	Who Are You Calling Corrupt?
	
	Chinese companies and institutions, as anyone who lives here rapidly
	learns, are quite capable of corruption without any foreign influence
	whatsoever. Corruption, in the media or anywhere else, isn’t something
	that springs up spontaneously, or as the result of the wicked influence
	of foreign MNCs, who are perennial favorite targets of Chinese nationalism.
	Corruption is like a gas. It’s always there and it expands to fill
	the shape and volume of the space available for it.
	
	
	
	The volume of space available for corruption is created by lack of
	transparency and by well established patterns of government and commercial
	behavior. While many countries, including the United States, have
	corruption, China leaves a comparatively wide-open space for it.
	For some details, sift through Transparency International’s website,
	which ranks China at number 78, alongside such illustrious company
	as Morocco, Sri Lanka, Senegal and Suriname. Or this more recent
	article (subscription) by Andrew Yeh, one of the Financial Times’
	Beijing-based journalists, on the OECD’s assessment on the impact
	of widespread corruption in China.
	
	
	
	However, this isn’t to say that some MNCs won’t collude with corruption.
	MNCs tend to be amoral beasts that adapt themselves superbly to any
	environment in which they need to operate. Many governments are aware
	of this, which explains laws like the United States’ Foreign Corrupt
	Practices Act. Companies like mine often help to clean up the mess
	when MNCs get caught misbehaving. Bingfeng may be shocked to learn
	how often those cleanup efforts involve absolutely no bribes.
	
	
	
	For the record, in my time in the PR industry in China, I have never
	witnessed anything I felt to be corrupt. I have never seen anyone
	in my company do anything I felt was corrupt. Nor, in the course
	of their work with me, have any of my clients, all MNCs, done anything
	I felt was corrupt or even borderline. One of my clients’ policies
	on separating advertising and paid coverage from PR is so strict
	that we don’t even help with advertorial copy, something I did all
	the time in Singapore.
	
	
	
	If I was asked to do something I felt was wrong, I would decline to
	do it and warn whoever was asking me of the consequences. If necessary,
	I would resign before compromising myself, my colleagues or my company.
	I don’t think this is likely to happen, so it doesn’t keep me up
	nights. Our (Chinese) finance director is one of the most scrupulous
	and careful men I have ever met. He is constantly reminding us of
	our financial disclosure and probity obligations as part of a listed,
	international media conglomerate. Furthermore, despite the occasional
	ghastly scandal, there is no company as aware of the value of its
	reputation as a global PR company.
	
	
	
	None of this, however, means that Bingfeng is wrong about there being
	corruption in the media or in PR in China. Within our office, it’s
	the local, Chinese PR firms that take the most flack for corruption.
	Chinese consultants in my office have spoken to me many times of
	what they perceive as the distinctly lower ethical standards of local
	firms. This may simply be their pride talking, or just empty gossip.
	Although given how close many of our Chinese consultants are to Chinese
	journalists, they’d be in a position to hear about anything that
	happens.
	
	
	
	Now, allow me to pose a hypothetical scenario. If you’re MNC X, and
	you want to buy some coverage savaging your bitter competitor, MNC
	Y, in the China market, which of the two following PR firms would
	you use to arrange it?
	
	
	
	The SOX compliant multinational PR firm with public company accounting
	requirements and an international reputation to protect or, 
	
	The privately held, locally owned firm with no international reputation
	or financial disclosure obligations. 
	
	Simple risk management suggests the latter would be a better choice.
	Now perhaps, was this to actually happen, it would be a case of a
	wicked MNC leading an otherwise chaste Chinese PR company down the
	dark path of corruption. More likely, it would be willing buyer/willing
	seller. Furthermore, I’d be shocked Smurf blue to hear that Chinese
	companies, forever battling their own corruption demons, would turn
	up their noses at these methods. I don’t think they’d need to learn
	the trick from foreign MNCs.
	
	
	
	In case you are wondering, although I think it’s a bad idea, I don’t
	feel that the transportation claim is corrupt. Media corruption thrives
	in the dark, when its influence is hidden. The transportation claim
	is completely matter-of-fact and auditable. You can follow the trail,
	from our cost estimate for events to our invoices to clients to the
	list of exactly which journalists showed up at a press event, and
	their sign-in signatures. It’s never guaranteed us good coverage,
	or even attendance at events. Frankly, I think it’s a desperate waste
	of money, and it will be a good day for the maturity of Chinese media
	when it is abolished. But that will only happen when the Chinese
	media decide for themselves to abolish it, or when all companies
	with PR efforts in China, both local and foreign, decide to abolish
	it together. It would take a company with a large risk appetite indeed
	to unilaterally decide no longer offer the transportation claim,
	especially while their competitors still did.
	
	
	
	Is my position hypocrisy? Or rationalization? Maybe.
	
	
	
	What is this Media of which You Speak?
	
	I have been working in China for just over a year, and I, as an individual,
	am not an expert on the Chinese media. But I have been involved in
	media-related work, one way or another, for thirteen years, my graduate
	degree is in media studies, and I work in an industry whose stock
	in trade is an understanding of media. With that disclosure, you
	may take the following observations as you will.
	
	
	
	The problem with Chinese media is not that it is being corrupted by
	ne’er-do-well foreign MNCs or PR firms. Rather, it is that the Chinese
	media are in transition from explicit state control to something
	subtler and more reflective of modern Chinese society. It has become
	something that isn’t developed country media, but which looks like
	it from a distance. Bound up in this transition are the ongoing changes
	in China’s media regulations as the government tries to figure out
	what it wants Chinese media to be, and shifting public expectations
	of what role the media should play in Chinese society. The tremors
	of this transition have been documented in Chinese media, overseas
	media and, not least, by the China blogging community. An interesting
	recent example includes ESWN’s post on fraudsters representing themselves
	as journalists.
	
	
	If all this seems like a recipe for confusion…it is. This shows in,
	yes, the opportunities for corruption and, more mundanely, in how
	the media relate to authority, to multinationals and, of course,
	to PR firms.
	
	
	
	There is a relationship aspect to PR work everywhere. It’s formalized.
	We call it, surprisingly enough, “media relations”. An ability to
	build good relationships with journalists is one of our marketable
	skills. Here in China, our relationships with journalists are especially
	cozy. Not corrupt, mind you, just cozy.
	
	
	
	This coziness isn’t unique to China any more than media corruption
	or the influence of corporate or state parent organizations. Anyone
	who thinks that the US, for example, is immune to this hasn’t been
	following the salacious Plamegate affair. This has done wonders to
	illuminate the shameful coziness that greases the operations of both
	the Washington DC press corps and the spin-obsessed White House.
	But in China this coziness is more pervasive.
	
	
	
	Although I never did PR in the US, I did do it in Singapore, which
	also has state-controlled media often accused of pliancy. Even in
	Singapore, no matter how good my personal relationships with journalists
	were (and they were pretty good), there was often an adversarial
	quality to the professional relationship. That wasn’t necessarily
	expressed in hostility or bad press, but in healthy skepticism, tough
	questions, and wariness of spin. All qualities of a decent press
	corps.
	
	
	
	Here in China I find, on average, that it is much easier for us to
	control a line of questioning or set it in advance, review coverage
	and quotes before they go to press, suggest themes and anticipate
	the tone of stories. Journalists here often expect us to package
	stories quite completely for them, giving us yet more room to set
	the agenda. We have stenographers at most media events, and send
	complete transcripts of press conferences and round tables to the
	journalists who attend them, often on the same day. It is expected
	that we will do this. When we can package a story more completely,
	we can dictate its tone more effectively. Among my Chinese team members,
	the nickname for pliant journalists is “rabbits”. Not the image of
	ferocity.
	
	
	
	Now, I want to stress two important things. First, relationships are
	not a red carpet. We flacks in China are not excused from having
	to come up with good pitches and interesting events. And we’re not
	immune to bad press, by any stretch of the imagination. We also have
	real PR challenges that are unique to doing business in China. It’s
	just that the relationships are more central to how we work. In the
	land of guanxi, this is not so surprising.
	
	
	
	Second, and most important, my observations above are industry generalizations.
	I know many extremely bright and motivated Chinese journalists who
	take real pride in their work. They are capable of asking dynamite
	questions, picking up killer angles, and writing hard-hitting and
	intelligent stories. Chinese journalists have suffered and died for
	their commitment to their work, and for their integrity and many
	are worthy of the highest respect. (Contrary to what you might think,
	most PR people are news junkies and really appreciate dynamite journalism,
	as long as it isn’t causing trouble for our own clients.) Even many
	of the “rabbits” are good, smart people working in an established
	system. Please do not interpret my observations as a condemnation
	of Chinese journalists.
	
	
	
	Some Chinese media pliancy may simply be a result of a wildly booming
	industry that is hungry for content. The seller of a product that
	is in high demand, such as particular content, exerts more control.
	That’s why Hollywood publicists can dictate question lists for stars,
	whereas corporate flacks like me seldom can. But I think some of
	it also descends from the Chinese media’s recent legacy of control
	and management from above. Chinese media are still evolving their
	editorial standards and modes of operation. PR firms, multinationals
	and Chinese firms will all figure out how best to operate and achieve
	their goals in this environment. That might be cynical, and you don’t
	have to like it, but it isn’t corrupt. Ruthlessly separating my preferences
	as a media consumer from my objectives as a PR pro, I am under no
	obligation to tell a journalist to ask tougher questions of my client.
	
	
	
	Mouthpieces or Watchdogs?
	
	What does China want from its media? Let me return to the idea that
	started it all off: the relationship between free speech and corruption.
	The media can be a potent weapon in fighting corruption, given the
	space to do so. A few years ago, Jiang Zemin appeared to recognize
	this when he cited media as one of the country’s great tools in its
	perennial war against corruption. Of course the media themselves
	were fighting their own corruption demons in ways that went far beyond
	low-rent payola for good coverage, as 2004 busts of senior editorial
	staff from the well known Southern Metropolis News and Nanfang Daily
	Group showed.
	
	
	
	But beyond media’s own corruption problems, counting on them to help
	unmask corruption demands independence and a culture of enterprise
	that needs room to grow. The current government seems to have different
	ideas, as this recent article from The Economist (subscription) reports:
	
	
	
	The Chinese government&#039;s increasingly hardline stance is encapsulated
	in Document 16, promulgated this spring. Among other things, this
	banned the practice of yidi baodao, or “reports from non-local places”,
	with journalists travelling to distant cities where, free of their
	local minders, they could write harder-hitting stories about corrupt
	local officials or social unrest. “This was the best hope for China
	developing an open press,” says Mr [Nicolas] Becquelin [of human-rights
	group HRIC]. In Hong Kong, papers critical of China, like Apple Daily,
	are complaining that advertisers are fleeing because of threats to
	their mainland businesses. Journalists there are suddenly finding
	it harder to get visas for travel to the mainland.
	
	
	These regulations were also covered nicely by the invaluable Chinese
	media blog, Danwei.
	
	
	Even more worrying, some suggest that anti-corruption drives in China
	are simply tools to clean out the lingering remnants of the previous
	power structure and, bizarrely, to implement monetary policy, as
	suggested by this Asia Times Online article. So, even in their role
	as corruption fighters, the Chinese media face the specter of being
	cynically deployed tools of state policy.
	
	
	Media can, of course, be effective weapons against corruption, whether
	that’s corruption in government, business or within their own industry.
	Even if, for no other reason than fulfilling their own business objectives
	by attracting eyeballs, most publications love nothing more than
	to break a big scandal wide open.
	
	
	But that will never happen here unless the government can decide what
	role the media should fill in society: mouthpieces or watchdogs.
	They can’t be both. You can’t state-manage a media industry to effectiveness
	as anti-corruption crusaders, and keep it muzzled at the same time.
	You have to do the opposite. Give them space, in the form of freedom
	of the press, which is just another way of saying freedom of speech.
	That will help to lift the veil on corruption everywhere including,
	yes, in the media itself.
	
	
	So when we arrogant foreigners rail against the restrictions on the
	Chinese media, we aren’t ignoring the problem of corruption in the
	media, or anywhere else. In fact, we are advocating for the unleashing
	of China’s most potent weapon against corruption.
	
	
	A truly free media. 
	
	Filed under: China, PR &amp; Media (Old)</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.05.18" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="William Moss"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c2a53c370cf8baeb2bb5c97129e6dcc0/acf"><title>WaPo's Ed Cody on media bribery in China</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c2a53c370cf8baeb2bb5c97129e6dcc0/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>PR&amp;media corruption Shanghai PR Public_Relations fun blog Chinese_media China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;William &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Moss&#034;&gt;Moss&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Imagethief (Blog)&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;29.01.8:14 AM20070129. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own, not those of his&lt;span class=&#034;info&#034;&gt;...&lt;span&gt;Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own, not those of his agency. For more information see &amp;#196;bout Imagethief&amp;quot;, below.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
		    .
	    &lt;/em&gt;</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/PR&amp;media"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/corruption"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Shanghai"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/PR"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Public_Relations"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/fun"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/blog"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Chinese_media"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c2a53c370cf8baeb2bb5c97129e6dcc0/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2c2a53c370cf8baeb2bb5c97129e6dcc0/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://news.imagethief.com/blogs/china/archive/2007/01/29/8308.aspx"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Imagethief (Blog)</swrc:journal><swrc:month>29.01.8:14 AM</swrc:month><swrc:note>Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer
	working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own,
	not those of his agency. For more information see &#034;About Imagethief&#034;,
	below.</swrc:note><swrc:title>WaPo&#039;s Ed Cody on media bribery in China</swrc:title><swrc:year>20070129</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>PR&amp;media corruption Shanghai PR Public_Relations fun blog Chinese_media China </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>How did I miss this?
	
	
	The Washington Post&#039;s Ed Cody has written a fascinating story (via
	David Wolf&#039;s Silicon Hutong) about a syndrome we in the PR business
	in China run into regularly: the practice of media extortion in China.
	I can&#039;t comment extensively right now, but this is a very real issue.
	Cody gets into the history and consequences of the practice:
	
	
	In many ways, blackmail journalism grew naturally out of a system
	in which Communist Party censors control the news rigorously, barring
	reports that could be seen as unfavorable to the party or contrary
	to the government&#039;s political goals. If the ruling party distorts
	the news for political reasons, blackmailing reporters have concluded,
	why wouldn&#039;t they do it themselves for financial reasons?
	
	
	In addition, local party officials, long used to manipulating information,
	have been complicit in the payoff system when it suits their needs.
	In the everybody-does-it atmosphere, even non-reporters have found
	ways to get in on the take by posing as journalists.
	
	
	After the August 2005 mine disaster, for instance, reporters and their
	friends in Henan province dispatched a flurry of cellphone messages
	as soon as they heard the news -- not because they were eager to
	report on it, but because they knew local officials would be eager
	to hush it up.
	
	
	By the time Fan Youfeng of the Henan Business News arrived at the
	mine, in a village in Jiliao county, local officials said they had
	already given money to so many reporters and phony reporters that
	the coffers were dry. But still more people showed up, Fan wrote,
	and the officials sought more cash, pressing the mine owners to chip
	in.
	
	
	Journalists and poseurs lined up to get their handouts, he said, with
	some pushing and jumping the queue. Over several days, the extortionists
	carried away 200,000 yuan, or more than $25,000, he reported, quoting
	officials and a list signed by those who got the cash.
	
	
	Encouraged by Ma, his editor, Fan wrote a story for the Henan Business
	News about what had happened. It was the first open discussion of
	what had become a widespread if secretive practice, Ma said with
	a note of pride.
	
	
	As a result, however, an official from the central government propaganda
	department visited from Beijing and accused Ma of publishing an &#034;inappropriate&#034;
	and &#034;false&#034; story. The newspaper was suspended for a month, Ma was
	forced to retire and Fan was reprimanded, Ma said. The death toll
	from the mine disaster was never reported, he added.
	
	
	Don&#039;t miss David&#039;s own post on this issue. David is a former colleague
	of mine and veteran of public relations in China. David explains
	how companies fall into this trap and lays down a very clear policy
	for avoiding it. He writes:
	
	
	There&#039;s only one way to avoid [falling into this trap]:
	
	
	Repeat after me:
	
	
	&#034;No matter what my PR people, my PR agency, or anyone else tells me,
	OUR COMPANY WILL NEVER PAY FOR COVERAGE, either directly or indirectly.&#034;
	
	
	I wonder how many of our agencies follow that very sound advice.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.05.18" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="William Moss"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21a8a60f49c879210d41db2d279ebe324/acf"><title>Behind the China Firewall</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21a8a60f49c879210d41db2d279ebe324/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>media_markets magazine censorship online_censorship internet China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;Charles &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/McCullagh&#034;&gt;McCullagh&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Magazine Publishers of America&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;20060315&lt;/em&gt;)</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/media_markets"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/magazine"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/censorship"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/online_censorship"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/internet"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21a8a60f49c879210d41db2d279ebe324/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/21a8a60f49c879210d41db2d279ebe324/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.magazine.org/international/031606.html"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Magazine Publishers of America</swrc:journal><swrc:title>Behind the China Firewall</swrc:title><swrc:year>20060315</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>media_markets magazine censorship online_censorship internet China </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>China has been much in the news of late and not only for buying US
	debt or pulling Asia out of a recession. China is under immense media
	scrutiny because of recent disclosures that Google, under pressure
	from the Chinese government, is removing (e.g. censoring) on its
	Chinese search engine certain words such as Falun Gong, Tibet, democracy
	and the like. So serious were these disclosures that Congress summoned
	Google, Yahoo, and MSN to Washington to berate Google in particular
	for such un-American activity, suggesting in a sense that the search
	engines and technology companies do what the US government and more
	than 100,000 international businesses in China have failed to do:
	insist the Chinese government embrace the tenets of free speech and
	a free press.
	
	
	That this Google news would come as a surprise to Congress is no particular
	surprise. But it should not be a surprise to even a chest-thumping
	general public or to the media. Harvard’s Open Net Initiative (ONI)
	has probably provided the most thorough critique of the lengths to
	which China has gone to police the online behavior of its fast-growing
	population of Internet users. The ONI reported in 2005 that “China’s
	Internet filtering is the most sophisticated effort of its kind in
	the world. Compared to similar efforts in other states, China’s filtering
	system is pervasive, sophisticated and effective. It comprises multiple
	levels of legal regulation and technical control. It involved numerous
	state agencies and thousands of public and private personnel. It
	censors content transmitted through multiple methods, including Web
	pages, Web logs, on-line discussion forums, university bulletin board
	systems, and email messages.
	
	
	“Our testing found efforts to prevent access to a wide range of sensitive
	material, from pornography to religious material to political dissent.
	Chinese citizens seeking access to Web sites containing content relating
	to Taiwanese and Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the Dalai Lama,
	the Tiananmen Square incident, opposition political parties, or a
	variety of anti-Communist movements will frequently find themselves
	blocked.”
	
	
	The Open Net Initiative provides a detailed analysis of the pervasiveness
	of Internet control in China. The report concludes that “China operates
	the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching
	system of Internet filtering in the world. The implications for this
	distorted on-line information environment for China’s users are profound
	and disturbing.” IEEE Spectrum has also looked very carefully at
	Internet censorship in China.
	
	
	The magazine poses this question: “Could the (Chinese) government
	open the floodgates to the waves of information washing up on every
	shore yet keep out the ideas it was afraid of, such as ones about
	sexuality, democracy, religious expression, and Taiwanese independence?”
	Spectrum answers the question in the affirmative. It also reminds
	us that “China’s experiment in cyberspace censorship is about to
	take a dramatic turn. A massive upgrade to the country Internet will
	soon give China robust, state-of-the-art infrastructure easily on
	par with anything in the developed world. New technology will likely
	give the Chinese authorities more censorship power at the router
	level, making censorship more a matter of politics than technology.
	
	
	I hear from many, inside and outside China that the best answer to
	censorship is a technical solution. In the long term that might very
	well be true, though short term, considering Chinese wealth, access
	to the newest technology, and a 50,000 strong Internet police force
	operating in 700 cities, the government appears to have the upper
	hand. (The Internet in the U.S. is also highly centralized and could
	be censored much as it is in China).
	
	
	After the U.S. Congress called Google and others on the carpet, the
	media reported that this issue extends far beyond China and Google,
	Yahoo, Cisco, and Microsoft. Xeni Jardin writes in the New York Times
	that SmartFilter, a product from Secure Computing, a California company,
	has been used by Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the United
	Arab Emirates. “It has also been used by state-controlled providers
	in Iran, even though American companies are banned from selling products
	there (Secure Computing denies selling products or updates to Iran,
	which is probably using pirated versions.)
	
	
	Other filtering products, such as Websense, have been used in Iran
	and Yemen ostensibly to filter offensive content and that aimed at
	converting Muslims. Myanmar uses a filtering product from an American
	company and Singapore uses one from a British firm. Western filtering
	products appear to be used everywhere the government restricts free
	speech, and not just in China. Jardin recommends that filtering technologies
	be put on the United States Munitions List, a list of products for
	which exporters have to file papers with the State Department. But
	the horse appears to have already left the barn.
	
	
	
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	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
	
	
	China’s Shadow Side
	
	
	Every development, good or bad (depending on one’s point of view),
	has a shadow side. Spectrum has reported and many others have observed
	that Internet traffic is outpacing capacity, so the Internet is becoming
	somewhat of a bottleneck to the country’s push for greater industrialization.
	When Internet transactions are slowed down by the censors, business
	suffers. And this is just one of the dilemmas facing Chinese leaders.
	Despite such sophisticated technology this system works best when
	self-censorship is practiced by the population. 
	
	
	China has presented to international companies something of a choice
	that might be applauded by the 17th century determinist Thomas Hobbes:
	If you want to do business in the PRC, you must abide by our rules,
	even if they run counter to your own traditions and business practices.
	Though it’s not my intent to give the Chinese government wiggle room
	under the wings of Hobbes, the philosopher is emphatic about a strong
	social order being the only way the keep in check unruly nature,
	which is man. Whether we like it or not, China has not been meek
	about its position. At the FIPP conference in New York in May 2005
	a Chinese delegate raised questions about the disputed Newsweek article
	regarding the desecration of the Koran by Americans. The delegate
	asked, in effect, what is the proper balance between the social order
	and the social good and the public’s right to know. I am not sure
	whether the question was answered to his satisfaction. Nonetheless,
	his question accurately frames the media policy of the Chinese government.
	
	
	Censorship in China is serious business. Violators, real or imagined,
	are put in jail and some are killed. Newspaper and other media outlets
	are regular shut down. The list of banned words and topics seem to
	grow by the day. Recently the New York Times reported that a group
	of prominent Chinese officials, senior scholars, and retired publishers
	denounced the closing down of Freezing Point, a popular news journal.
	(Click here for more.) They considered this move as a violation of
	China’s guarantee of free speech. The letter read: At the turning
	point in our history from a totalitarian to a constitutional system,
	depriving the public of freedom of speech will bring disaster for
	our social and political transition and give rise to group confrontation
	and social unrest. Experience has proved that allowing a free flow
	of ideas can improve stability and alleviate social problems.”
	
	
	David Barboza reported in the New York Times that Chinese Internet
	police are very adept at blocking and deleting phrases such as “human
	rights” and “free speech” from online bulletin boards, but in most
	respects the Web in China is unregulated. He writes that “Chinese
	entrepreneurs who started out brazenly selling downloadable pirated
	music and movies from online storefronts have extended their product
	lines—peddling drugs and sex, stolen cars, firearms and even organs
	for transplanting.”
	
	
	As Xiao Qiang, director of China Internet Project at the graduate
	school of the University of California, Berkeley notes, “Outside
	of politics, China is as free as anywhere. You can find porn just
	about anywhere on the Internet.” 
	
	
	China has about 110 million Internet users and is expected to surpass
	the U.S.( 130 million users) in a year or so. China’s size and the
	rapid growth of its Internet population makes long-term policing
	very difficult. So do the muckrakers! Reuters reported that Li Xinde,
	a self-styled Internet investigative reporter, exposes corrupt officials
	and injustice on his China Public Opinion Survellience Net. According
	to Reuters he uses 49 blogs to slip past censors. “It’s what Chairman
	Mao called sparrow tactics, Li said. “You stay small and independent,
	you move around a lot, and you choose when to strike and when to
	run.”
	
	
	
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	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
	
	
	Reforming the Media Landscape
	
	
	The New York Times writer Joseph Kahan notes that though most of the
	signers of the letter cited above are retired, a collective letter
	from respected elder statesmen can often help mobilize opinion within
	a ruling party. Though Chinese President Hu Jintao has seemed to
	favor tighter media controls, such as practiced in Cuba and North
	Korea, he has solicited support from liberal elements. This is the
	dance that is China.
	
	
	There exists more than one parallel media universe in China. In 2003
	the government announced plans to reform its media of 2000 newspapers
	and 9000 magazines. According to China Daily in less than five months
	the edicts has affected 1,452 Party and government newspapers, 673
	had been suspended from publication. Perhaps the most important move
	was to eliminate over time the so-called “command-subscriptions”
	where in effect people were ordered to subscribe. 
	
	
	Reforming China’s media landscape is easier said than done. Over a
	half-century the government spread media licenses around its thirty-one
	provinces and among Communist Party powers and trade and industrial
	groups (with Beijing getting the lion’s share). Publications tended
	to be of low-production quality, boring, and often unread. China’s
	next step was to organize the stronger publishing and media units
	into larger units with scale. Concurrently international magazines
	continued to enter China with most of the global advertising revenues
	going to Western brands such as Cosmopolitan and Elle. However, domestic
	Chinese brands, especially in business and women’s lifestyle made
	significant progress. The business magazine CAIJING has been censored
	and closed down on more than one occasion for criticizing the government
	(Better targets are corrupt businessmen and questionable consumer
	products). The magazine has vocal supporters in and outside China—including
	the Wall Street Journal.
	
	
	One often forgets that Western magazines have been in China in quantity
	for at least twenty years (International Data Group enjoys that honor).
	Since 1995 most major Western publishers have a presence in China.
	Indeed, the women’s, fashion, lifestyle, men’s and special interested
	categories are quite filled and mature. It is hard to find room on
	the newsstands for another automotive title. In other words the market
	has segmented along expected lines as it has done in so many other
	countries—only faster. But big brands always matter. Vogue was introduced
	last September to considerable fanfare and success. Rolling Stone
	will launch shortly a China edition. The safe, lifestyle sector has
	been a bonanza for international publishers. 
	
	
	But there is no such a thing as linear development in China, especially
	in regard to the media business. Many publishing companies, including
	some American firms, have been in the queue a long time waiting for
	government approval. Media regulations change frequently in China,
	are often ignored, and are frequently used as a means of giving or
	not giving a publishing license to an international company. 
	
	
	Just when the talk in late 2005 was about China opening up its media
	to outside investment and ownership, the door seemed to close a little.
	Basically the State Council, which is China’s Cabinet, issued a directive
	that non-public capital cannot set up and operate a news agency,
	a newspaper, a publishing house, a radio station, or a TV station.
	The regulation is extensive, including audio and video programs,
	and Internet news sites. The regulation appears to limit any control
	of content in the various media. At the same time the government
	seemed to throw its doors wide open to outside investment in museums,
	entertainment venues, and travel and culture services. China-watchers
	suggest the government wants investment in these cultural venues
	in advance of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
	
	
	We know that the 2005 announcement was simply a re-statement of existing
	regulations that have been ignored or flouted through the pervasive
	gray market. We have reported in the past that the government is
	very unhappy with the blatant (and illegal) license leasing. However
	interpreted, this directive was not good news for international television
	content providers eager to tap the China market. The government seems
	confident that no matter the hurdle, foreign media companies will
	still be lining up in Beijing for operating licenses.
	
	
	This perception is probably accurate though there is considerable
	discontent about how China manages its license approval process.
	
	
	As recent as January 2006 Qi Yongfeng, an official of the powerful
	National Development and Reform Commission was quoted as saying that
	the ongoing restructuring of the Chinese publishing industry is virtually
	at a stalemate. He cites a number of reasons for this. The Chinese
	had planned to designate all but a few Communist Party publications
	as “for-profit,” and they would no longer enjoy government funding.
	Apparently many publishers have resisted this, reluctant to give
	up the government subsidy.
	
	
	The government has not made clear how these new, for-profit entities
	are to be managed. On paper these businesses were to be governed
	by law and not by Party edict. Since the government requires state-run
	publishing entities to retain majority ownership, this makes it very
	difficult to attract outside investment. Perhaps more to the point:
	the restructuring of the industry required a massive investment in
	staff and infrastructure and the government was not able to underwrite
	this. In effect many companies were cast adrift without the necessary
	funding or expertise to prosper.
	
	
	In China one never knows when comments are official or unofficial.
	Nonetheless these remarks are strong evidence that many Chinese publishers
	have been reluctant to embrace restructuring because they see no
	immediate benefit. (Click here for more) 
	
	
	I know plenty of people and reputable companies who have access to
	legitimate licenses. The Chinese government is becoming increasingly
	concerned with the prospects of a newly introduced brand being financially
	successful. The last thing the country needs are more under-funded,
	unprofitable media businesses. As noted the China magazine market
	is now very competitive and most niches are either filled or filling
	up fast. China is woefully lacking in experienced publishing people
	and this dearth is sending the price of talent sky-high. 
	
	
	Publishing in China is now very much about rapid brand-building, multi-platform
	publishing, and sustainable competitive strategies. China is now
	experimenting with granting licenses to well-established and financially-sound
	Chinese publishing companies that can in turn transfer them to international
	companies with the tacit agreement of GAPP, the license approval
	body, without the usual delays and red tape. Whether this is due
	to a realization that the current licensing system is neither convenient
	nor sustainable, we will probably never know. But it does suggest
	the government is willing to try a different approach. This effort
	will likely become more public if it is successful.
	
	
	China is a country of few laws and many exceptions. If something works,
	it often becomes policy and law. Many international media companies
	in China should not be able to exist. But they do. And this is China.
	
	
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	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
	
	
	
	The Map and the Territory
	
	What is most bewildering about China is that the map never seems to
	fit the territory. China is a Communist country that is demonstrably
	brutal in repressing free speech. International publishers will rightly
	say they don’t make the rules and are obliged to operate within Chinese
	law. There are those, including some in the U.S. Congress, who suggest
	large media companies in particular should make China a cause celebre,
	insisting on certain rules of conduct. Unfortunately there is absolutely
	no evidence that the Chinese government would respond favorably to
	such assertiveness. China doesn’t need Google.
	
	
	The Chinese government is not unfamiliar with glasnost and perestroika
	and the consequences of the breakup of the Soviet Union. They see
	that period as representing too much democracy much too fast. “Breakup”
	is the operative word. China seems very fearful of the rural/urban
	split, which is how the economy is developing. Thus the attempts
	to suppress news of the 2005 riots in rural China! 
	
	
	Beneath a roaring economy, a Byzantine welter of government regulations,
	and very real censorship is a growing middle class: 300 million strong,
	mainly spread out over the urban axis from Beijing, to Shanghai,
	and to Guangzhou. This is the reading room for so many Western and
	upscale Chinese lifestyle magazines. Consumers in this region are
	consuming products in much the same way as their Western counterpart.
	Young couples are moving into apartments that need to be beautified.
	Shelter, design, and décor magazines will surely be the next hot
	category in China. Children in urban settings have assumed an exaggerated
	importance, spurred by the one-child, one-family rule. They are not
	called “little emperors” for nothing and will need all the accoutrements
	that their Western counterparts enjoy. Baby, parenting and financial
	planning magazines won’t be far behind. Nor will health magazines,
	following in the footsteps of Prevention magazine, already well-positioned
	in China.
	
	
	China is experiencing a very aggressive consumerism, fanned by the
	government because it’s in the interest of the state. The Chinese
	consumer marketplace is a dizzying spectacle of products. Advertising
	is not immune from consumerism. Procter &amp; Gamble has been taken to
	task for overstating the benefits of Pantene shampoo. This is a rare
	example in
	
	
	China of a genuine consumer protest movement presumably for the common
	good. On the other hand, the Chinese consumer has to develop a more
	subtle understanding of the language of advertising, appreciating
	the role of metaphor. And international marketers should be aware
	that the Chinese consumer is collecting marketing savvy at a fast
	clip. UPS has done extensive research on what American products the
	Chinese would or wouldn’t buy. The research indicates that consumers
	are very interested in American-made consumer electronics products
	and fashion items. Conversely, they have little interest in alcoholic
	beverages and cigarettes coming from the U.S. (though advertising
	for American liquors dot the urban landscapes). The research indicates
	that in terms of overall purchasing behavior, sensitivity to price
	and importance of brand, Chinese consumers are very similar to their
	Western counterparts.
	
	
	When asked why his company Danfoss, a Danish manufacture of compressors,
	values, and motion controls, recently decided to invest much more
	heavily in China, CEO Jorgen M. Clausen underscored the availability
	of expensive consumer items even in rural areas. “Something that
	particularly caught my eye was a refrigerator with inverters that
	control the speed of the motor and thus saves energy—a luxury category
	one wouldn’t even find in a Danish town.” (Click here for more)
	
	
	Just consider some of the economic facts recently reported in China.
	The country has become the largest market for Bentley. Best Buy opened
	its first store. Kraft just shifted production from Australia to
	China. China produces 60% of the world’s ceramic products. Warner
	Bros. moved a design center from London to Shanghai. Wal-Mart has
	at least 52 stores in China. And the country’s foreign exchange reserves
	reached US $818.9 billion (Click here for more)
	
	
	Go to the site listed and see how international China has become.
	In many areas of production China has become the center of the world.
	China is fast developing the world’s largest middle class. No wonder
	more international companies see China not just as an important area
	of investment but as a second home market, to borrow a phrase from
	Jorgen Clausen. 
	
	
	China remains the elephant in the room and we are the blind men each
	getting a limited sense of a large canvas. One can certainly object
	on ethical grounds to doing business in China. But one must acknowledge
	with as much certainty the salutary effects from the 100,000 international
	companies operating in China. A large and growing middle class, interested
	in the spoils of work, has developed and this has been one hallmark
	of a country’s stability since the Industrial Revolution. F. Scott
	Fitzgerald, the American writer, advised his readers to hold a number
	of contradictory thoughts in their heads at the same time, maintaining
	the tension of contradictions. One might try the same exercise with
	China, but increase the contradictions by a factor of ten.
	
	
	Publishers and direct marketers have a lot to offer China. In large
	measure China remains a command information economy with the Post
	Office being the ineffectual center of subscription marketing. This
	is an area that offers considerable promise. Likewise, China lacks
	in the truest sense a national distribution system, though numerous
	initiatives are underway. Distribution and advertisings are sectors
	where foreign ownership is encouraged and can reach 100%.
	
	
	Late last year Hachette Distribution Services (HDS) took over a majority
	stake in Huadao, the operating company based in Shanghai, indicating
	HDS will be more aggressive in the sector. HDS is well-equipped to
	produce what is desperately needed in China: strong management and
	a reliable system to track and report back sales data. 
	
	
	China is forcing publishers, domestic and foreign, to scramble. Much
	of the low-hanging fruit has been picked. The push now is to identity
	and reach the hundred high-growth, second-tier cities that marketers
	are hungry for. If introduction of the Western media promotes democracy
	and cultivates a middle class, which has been the conventional wisdom,
	then publishers have a distinct stake in investing in national magazine
	distribution and subscription marketing system. 
	
	
	A Chinese friend wrote that a “great socialist idea would be to give
	everyone the equal right, at equal price, to buy anywhere any time
	all the magazine and book titles published in China. My speech to
	the Chinese people is that they have to move away from a poor retail
	distribution system to more subscriptions and digital products.”
	He adds that to a degree China should (and perhaps must) leap-frog
	over the antiquated distribution systems and move briskly to digital
	delivery of content and subscription offers. Given the rate that
	China is developing its Web infrastructure and the number of Internet
	users the Internet can become an important content delivery system.
	And the country is already wired for this.
	
	
	Perhaps the kindest view of China’s press and foreign ownership restrictions
	is to look at the country from the perspective of other developing
	nations. Though India has been a rambunctious democracy for sixty
	years, it has only recently loosed it restrictions on foreign ownership
	of news content. But we are talking ownership, not censorship. After
	the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia moved fairly quickly to permit
	joint ventures, in the Western sense, often using these agreements
	as ways to get hard currency and/or industrial components (I recall
	a publishing company that gave the Russian partner a sausage factory
	as its contribution). And only in the last few years did Brazil make
	it possible for an international publisher to enter a bona fide joint
	venture agreement.
	
	
	Some would argue that Russia moved too quickly to restructure state-owned
	business because Communist Party members just put on their democratic
	hats. China has chosen a more cautious path: maintain a one-party
	government but restructure the business environment. Though in practice
	the regulation can be interpreted in many ways, the Chinese government
	restricts foreign ownership of content. That’s the bullet a publisher
	must bite when entering China. In most instances, due to self-censorship
	and the lifestyle focus of most international titles, content ownership
	is not a big deal. The government simply won’t permit hard-hitting,
	critical news or business magazines into China. The government will
	tolerate a certain amount of criticism from the domestic press—and
	gets it—but not from foreigners. No one expects that to change any
	time soon. To be sure this edict has as much to do with history and
	the Chinese psyche as with censorship.
	
	
	I recall launching Novii Fermer (New Farmer) in Russia with the late
	Bob Rodale. This was in 1989 and he saw a huge opportunity with the
	expected collapse of the large, unmanageable state and collective
	farms. The magazine would be an instrument of change, bringing about
	a generation of new farmers (He died before that dream could be fulfilled.
	(Click here for more)
	
	
	But one had that sense in Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
	That is not the sense one has when entering China. Obviously international
	companies are contributing extensively to China, but the compact
	is very different. The Chinese government, too aware of its history
	and the tendency of the country to pull apart, has no such fantasies
	as glasnost and perestroika. The restructuring that does take place
	will be in the industrial and business sector, not the foundations
	of government. 
	
	
	By some estimates magazine advertising revenues for China in 2005
	were more than $770 US million. As noted, most of this goes to the
	big international brands. Publishers are in China to extend the brand,
	project a lifestyle and sensibility readily embraced by the middle
	class, and to make money. Perhaps that’s enough. Given the complexity
	of the situation, the international dependence on the China market,
	and the global consequence of any government missteps in the PRC,
	perhaps we should leave it to the Chinese (and American politicians)
	to lecture their government.
	
	
	I think it was George Green, President of Hearst Magazines International—and
	a keen student of China, who said that America’s greatest contribution
	to international publishing is our emphasis on empowerment and self-sufficiency.
	These traits in its citizenry, after all, have a lot to do with America’s
	success. Moreover, the traits stand in sharp contrast to the Communist
	collective, which the Chinese entrepreneur seems to be running away
	from. 
	
	
	We should probably be pleased that most international magazines in
	China are filled with all sorts of “revolutionary” products and ideas
	that help, inform, and cultivate the country’s important middle class,
	offering a kind of transformation from within.
	
	
	Richard Madsen writes in The Consumer Revolution in Urban China of
	the power of consumerism to transform China but adds: “The novelty
	of the first stages of the consumer revolution will wear out. The
	freshness of consumer freedom is maintained by the constantly increasing
	production of new and different commodities.”
	
	
	Madsen fears moral and emotional anarchy if rising expectations outstrip
	the capacity of the economy to deliver. While he is probably over-reacting,
	he does underscore how influential international businesses have
	been in changing the consumer psychology in China during the last
	twenty years.
	
	
	Every country goes through its “Age of Narcissism.” China is no exception.
	
	
	Charles McCullagh
	
	cmccullagh@magazine.org
	
	March 15, 2006</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.05.30" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Charles McCullagh"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2cbc229ccfd2af14d737df436cc7bc8df/acf"><title>Resentment over Tibet eases - outpouring of help shifts mood in China</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2cbc229ccfd2af14d737df436cc7bc8df/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>resentment disaster help news Tibet earthquake Carrefour Sichuan Japan China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;Edward &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Cody&#034;&gt;Cody&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Washington Post&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;20080527&lt;/em&gt;)</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/resentment"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/disaster"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/help"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/news"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Tibet"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/earthquake"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Carrefour"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Sichuan"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Japan"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2cbc229ccfd2af14d737df436cc7bc8df/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2cbc229ccfd2af14d737df436cc7bc8df/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/26/AR2008052601814.html?hpid=artslot"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Washington Post</swrc:journal><swrc:title>Resentment over Tibet eases - outpouring of help shifts mood in China</swrc:title><swrc:year>20080527</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>resentment disaster help news Tibet earthquake Carrefour Sichuan Japan China </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>BEIJING, May 26 -- An unprecedented and politically significant flood
	of foreign aid has been pledged to China since the devastating Sichuan
	earthquake, ranging from a $50 million Saudi Arabian check to crates
	of cellphones from Nokia.
	
	The outpouring of goodwill has been interpreted by many Chinese as
	a welcome demonstration of their new status as a major power with
	friends around the world. But to a large degree, it has also dissipated
	a sour, nationalistic mood that had swollen up in response to foreign
	criticism of a harsh Chinese security crackdown after Tibetan riots
	in March. 
	
	
	&#034;This is making up for a lot of the bad feelings of recent months,&#034;
	said Shi Yinhong, a foreign affairs specialist at Renmin University&#039;s
	International Relations Institute. 
	
	
	When the earthquake struck May 12, killing more than 65,000 people
	and leaving millions homeless, the Foreign Ministry rejected immediate
	offers of assistance by foreign rescue teams. The reaction was in
	line with China&#039;s traditionally wary attitude toward foreign involvement
	in internal affairs. 
	
	
	But several days later, the ministry announced a reversal, and specialists
	from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Russia and Singapore were allowed
	in. Some reports said People&#039;s Liberation Army soldiers in the disaster
	zone displayed hostility toward the Japanese team. But broad public
	opinion seemed to welcome the group despite lingering resentment
	here over Japanese atrocities in World War II. &#034;Although the Japanese
	group did not save any lives, Chinese people praised them and no
	one mentioned the unpleasant history with Japan,&#034; noted Li Datong,
	a senior magazine editor who was dismissed over an essay dealing
	with World War II. More significantly, perhaps, Foreign Ministry
	spokesmen were appealing for help from anywhere abroad within a week
	of the quake, particularly for tents to provide temporary housing
	to the countless Sichuan residents who will be living in camps for
	what promises to be a long rebuilding period. 
	
	
	The new stand was in sharp contrast to that of neighboring Burma,
	an ally whose leaders were declining aid for victims of a cyclone
	on May 2-3. It was also a departure for China, which typically accepts
	only small amounts of aid in times of crisis. In response to its
	appeals, China has received more than $158 million in cash and $35
	million in goods so far from foreign governments. In addition, international
	and regional organizations have pledged nearly $12 million in cash
	and $700,000 in goods. 
	
	
	Perhaps just as significantly, the list of donor countries spans the
	globe, reinforcing the idea that China has integrated into the rest
	of the world and forged friendly relations with most other governments.
	This had been a central theme of the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing.
	But it was overshadowed in part by the tension over Tibet and protests
	against the Olympic torch relay -- a shadow that now seems to be
	receding. &#034;I think the Chinese government feels this reaction to
	the earthquake is a good development that can bring back a good Olympic
	spirit,&#034; Shi said. &#034;The Chinese government will learn something from
	this experience,&#034; Li added. &#034;As time goes by, it is not impossible
	that the Dalai Lama will appear in the Olympic ceremony.&#034; 
	
	
	Saudi Arabia, which donated $50 million in cash and another $10 million
	in goods, has been the most forthcoming foreign government. The Bush
	administration has given $2.8 million so far and announced plans
	to donate more as relief plans progress. U.S. satellites have been
	providing imagery of earthquake damage, the U.S. Embassy said, and
	U.S. military transports flew into Sichuan with relief supplies.
	In addition, the American Red Cross has promised to provide more
	than $10 million to its Chinese counterpart, and U.S. companies operating
	in China have pledged about $34 million. 
	
	
	Other foreign companies in China also have offered to help, including
	Finnish firm Nokia, which has sent cellphones to the quake zone.
	Carrefour, the French supermarket chain that was widely attacked
	during the Tibet crisis, sent tents, food and water. In all, the
	Commerce Ministry said, foreign companies in China have pledged more
	than $280 million in money and goods. The number of donor governments
	has reached almost 80, the Foreign Ministry said, and continues to
	grow. India, for instance, has pledged $5 million and Tonga $50,000.
	Norway said it would send $4.1 million in cash and goods and Nigeria
	offered $2 million. 
	
	
	President Hu Jintao expressed public thanks for the foreign assistance.
	In the same spirit, Premier Wen Jiabao went out of his way to be
	photographed amid the earthquake ruins with the visiting U.N. secretary
	general, Ban Ki-moon. Falling in line, the Communist Party&#039;s propaganda
	apparatus signaled the official mood had changed, producing friendly
	comments in an official news media that only a few weeks ago was
	bristling at foreign governments and foreign journalists for the
	way they viewed Tibet. 
	
	
	Part of the shift was also due to generally favorable coverage in
	the foreign news media of the party&#039;s swift response to the disaster.
	Internet commentators who had bitterly criticized CNN over its Tibet
	coverage, for instance, switched gears and started praising the U.S.-based
	news network for its moving earthquake coverage, Li pointed out.
	&#034;With more and more aid from the international community for disaster
	relief, the Chinese people have got a chance to see how the country
	has been integrated with the rest of the world,&#034; said a commentary
	from the official New China News Agency. &#034;This has also made it a
	necessity for the people of this country to understand what such
	integration means,&#034; it continued. &#034;While appreciating the humanitarian
	spirit displayed by foreigners who help us save lives and relieve
	the damage caused by this earthquake, China and the Chinese feel
	evermore the obligation they have to the making of a harmonious world.&#034;
	
	
	
	Shift on One-Child Policy
	
	Chinese officials said Monday that families with a child killed, severely
	injured or disabled in the Sichuan earthquake would be exempted from
	the country&#039;s one-child policy. Officials have not been able to estimate
	how many children were among the more than 65,000 killed. In large
	parts of rural China, most families are already allowed a second
	child, especially if the first was a girl.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.05.28" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Edward Cody"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23331c99299a6300bc655abc0941c1f57/acf"><title>CNNIC Releases 2007 Survey Report on China Weblog Market Number of Blog Writers Reaches 47 million Equaling One Fourth of Total Netizens</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23331c99299a6300bc655abc0941c1f57/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>netizens internet_user blogging blog internet China statistics </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt; &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/CNNIC&#034;&gt;CNNIC&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Website, &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;21. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;2007/12/272007. &lt;/em&gt;</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/netizens"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/internet_user"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/blogging"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/blog"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/internet"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/statistics"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23331c99299a6300bc655abc0941c1f57/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/23331c99299a6300bc655abc0941c1f57/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#TechnicalReport"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.cnnic.net.cn/html/Dir/2007/12/27/4954.htm"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:institution><swrc:Organization swrc:name="China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC)"/></swrc:institution><swrc:month>2007/12/27</swrc:month><swrc:number>21</swrc:number><swrc:title>CNNIC Releases 2007 Survey Report on China Weblog Market Number of
	Blog Writers Reaches 47 million Equaling One Fourth of Total Netizens</swrc:title><swrc:type>Website</swrc:type><swrc:year>2007</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>netizens internet_user blogging blog internet China statistics </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>On Dec. 26th, 2007, CNNIC published “the Survey Report on Blogs in
	China 2007”. According to the report, by the end of Nov. 2007, the
	number of blog spaces has reached 72.82 million in China, and with
	47 million blog writers, it is reaching one fourth of the total netizens.
	This indicates the rapid growth of the blog market in China. 
	
	
	The survey statistics show that by the end of Nov. 2007, the number
	of blog spaces has reached 72.82 million in China, while that of
	blog writers has totaled 47 million, which means that one out of
	every 30 Chinese, or one out of four netizens writes blogs. Also,
	the active blog writers have taken up 36% of the total blog writers,
	approximately 17 million, and the number of valid blog spaces of
	the active blog users is 28.75 million. 
	
	
	By the end of 2006, the number of blog writers was 17.5 million, and
	within one year the increasement reached nearly 30 million, indicating
	the large-scale growth in number of the blog writer group. However,
	as indicated by the survey, the future growth of the blogs will slow
	down: 65% of the investigated said they only registered one blog,
	and showed little tendency to register another in half a year; only
	11% of the investigated said they would definitely register a blog
	in the future half a year. 
	
	
	The survey also indicates that the blog covers almost all the areas
	of people’s daily life, including the cultural, military, economic,
	tourist, living areas, etc. therefore the blog has also become the
	important channel for people to obtain information. Among the blog
	writers surveyed in this report, the male gender take up 43% while
	the female is 57%, which is contrary to the traditional gender ratio
	of 55:45 (male: female) among netizens, and shows a higher popularity
	of blogs among female users. 
	
	
	In terms of major content the blogs covered, 47% of the blogs are
	written about the inner monologues or record of emotions of the writers.
	Next are the narration of daily life, personal interests and hobbies.
	Most of the blogs are for the writers to record their own life status
	and conduct self demonstration, with the blogs having a more and
	more obvious tendency of self-media attributes. 
	
	
	The survey also finds that among the motives for reading blogs, entertainment
	comes first, which is reported to occupy 43% of the surveyed. It
	will become one of the directions for further probing of the profitable
	blog model to make full use of the participative, interactive, and
	circulative characteristics of the blog and dig out the entertainment
	value of blogs. 
	
	
	In addition, although blogs have become an important information channel,
	the readers obviously have more confident in online news than in
	blog content. 63% of the surveyed said they trust more in the online
	news while only 20% have more trust in the blog content. This shows
	that compared to online news, the blog content at present calls for
	improvement in its credibility. And as a kind of transmission media,
	the blogs need the self discipline of the blog writers in order to
	raise the credibility. 
	
	
	The survey shows, in terms of the methods that blog writers choose
	to access most frequently visited blogs, the primary choice is through
	the links on the blogs and through the browser bookmarks. 12% of
	the blog writers directly key in the blog addresses in the address
	bar, which means 5.64 million blog writers browse their blogs directly
	by keying in the addresses of the blogs. Judging from the accessing
	habits, the market of individual domain names looks optimistic in
	the blog area. 
	
	
	Meanwhile, 66% of the surveyed expressed interests in using the individual
	domain names. And as many as 31% of the surveyed said that if a blog
	website offers the simple or customized blog domain names at 10 yuan/name,
	they would consider changing the blog platforms. So for the 1 yuan
	registration price of .CN domain names, the individual .CN domain
	names would have a lot to commit itself to in the blog area. 
	
	
	The function that blog writers use most frequently is the upload/display
	function of pictures, also with a high frequency in using music and
	videos on the blog. Among the new functions or tools the writers
	mostly long for, the blog writers wish the most is to expand the
	storage of the blogs space, and being provided with the customized
	design models of the blog. Meanwhile，10% of the writers responded
	that they are willing to buy the blog space service. This indicates
	that the functions of blogs have set apart from the monotone written
	record, and headed for multi-functions. 
	
	
	With the continuous progress in Internet technology, the continuous
	expansion of Internet cyberspace, and the continuous raise in networking
	speed, the future blogs will include various technologies such as
	character, images, audio, video, flash, etc., combing the instant
	messaging, social network, online shopping and etc., demonstrating
	having the tendency of becoming the all-around personal space which
	cover all aspects of information of the blog writer. 
	
	
	China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the state network
	information center of China, was founded as a non-profit organization
	on Jun. 3rd 1997. 
	
	CNNIC takes orders from the Ministry of Information Industry (MII)
	to conduct daily business, while it was administratively operated
	by Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). Computer Network Information
	Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences takes the responsibility of
	running and administrating CNNIC. CNNIC Steering Committee..</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.06.01" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name=" CNNIC"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a5ffb08fd2418345bc7ebfcf1c8ba86a/acf"><title>Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a5ffb08fd2418345bc7ebfcf1c8ba86a/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>netizens internet_user internet China statistics </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt; &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/CNNIC&#034;&gt;CNNIC&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Website, &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;21. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;20080601, 17:122008. &lt;/em&gt;</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/netizens"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/internet_user"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/internet"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/statistics"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a5ffb08fd2418345bc7ebfcf1c8ba86a/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2a5ffb08fd2418345bc7ebfcf1c8ba86a/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#TechnicalReport"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2008/2/29/104126.pdf"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:institution><swrc:Organization swrc:name="China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC)"/></swrc:institution><swrc:month>20080601, 17:12</swrc:month><swrc:number>21</swrc:number><swrc:title>Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China</swrc:title><swrc:type>Website</swrc:type><swrc:year>2008</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>netizens internet_user internet China statistics </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>By December 2007, the total of netizens in China had increased to
	210 million, with a
	
	sharp increase of 73 million in the year of 2007, at an annual growth
	rate of 53.3%.
	
	The Internet is gradually diffusing among resident at different levels.
	Out of the new
	
	netizens in 2007, netizens aged below 18 and netizens aged above 30
	showed a
	
	relatively fast increase. Netizens with the education background of
	secondary school
	
	and below grew relatively fast and low-income groups have started
	to accept the
	
	Internet increasingly. The rural groups who will access the Internet
	grew relatively
	
	fast.
	
	The current 16% of the Internet penetration rate in China is 3.1 percentage
	points
	
	lower than the average global standard of 19.1%
	
	In view of access methods, broadband netizens have reached 163 million
	and mobile
	
	phone netizens 50.40 million, both of which have been in a rapid growth.
	
	In view of regions, Beijing and Shanghai have a higher Internet penetration
	rate,
	
	being respectively 46.6% and 45.8%. In terms of increase volume, Guangdong
	
	observes the biggest increase due to the driving factor of the increasing
	mobile
	
	phone netizens, with an increase of 15.05 million in one year.
	
	
	China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the state network
	information center of China, was founded as a non-profit organization
	on Jun. 3rd 1997. 
	
	CNNIC takes orders from the Ministry of Information Industry (MII)
	to conduct daily business, while it was administratively operated
	by Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). Computer Network Information
	Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences takes the responsibility of
	running and administrating CNNIC. CNNIC Steering Committee..</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.06.01" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name=" CNNIC"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24485999a10c6624220fc1e0a3f7099d9/acf"><title>IT Outsourcing in China: How China's Five Emerging Drivers are changing the Technology Landscape and IT Industry</title><description>alt</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24485999a10c6624220fc1e0a3f7099d9/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>BIS Outsourcing IS IT China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;S. &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Chan&#034;&gt;Chan&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Outsourcing Institute. China Trends \&amp;amp; Opportunities&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;2009&lt;/em&gt;)</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/BIS"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Outsourcing"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/IS"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/IT"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24485999a10c6624220fc1e0a3f7099d9/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/24485999a10c6624220fc1e0a3f7099d9/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>The Outsourcing Institute. China Trends \&amp; Opportunities</swrc:journal><swrc:pages>--</swrc:pages><swrc:title>IT Outsourcing in China: How China&#039;s Five Emerging Drivers are changing
	the Technology Landscape and IT Industry</swrc:title><swrc:year>2009</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>BIS Outsourcing IS IT China </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>China is in a remarkable position to become an IT outsourcing superpower
	in less than five years? time. Recent fundamental changes and trends
	also will accelerate the growth of the China IT services industry.
	Let?s take a look at the statistics. According to Gartner Dataquest,
	a U.S.-based research firm, IT services revenue in China is projected
	to reach $8.9 billion in 2006, a compound annual growth rate of 19.6
	percent. Another report from IDC, also a U.S.-based researcher, states
	that China?s IT services market has grown nearly 42 percent a year
	since 1997.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.04.27" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="test1" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="S. Chan"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/211f3f98a88aed7dcba5696885c2c1e6e/acf"><title>SARS News Coverage and Its Determinants in China and the US</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/211f3f98a88aed7dcba5696885c2c1e6e/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>frame_analysis framing chinese_media SARS xinhua China comparative_studies US_media </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;C.E. &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Beaudoin&#034;&gt;Beaudoin&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;International Communication Gazette&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;69(6):509&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;2007&lt;/em&gt;)</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/frame_analysis"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/framing"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/chinese_media"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/SARS"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/xinhua"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/comparative_studies"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/US_media"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/211f3f98a88aed7dcba5696885c2c1e6e/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/211f3f98a88aed7dcba5696885c2c1e6e/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>International Communication Gazette</swrc:journal><swrc:number>6</swrc:number><swrc:pages>509</swrc:pages><swrc:title>{SARS News Coverage and Its Determinants in China and the US}</swrc:title><swrc:volume>69</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2007</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>frame_analysis framing chinese_media SARS xinhua China comparative_studies US_media </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, 1440
	Canal St., Suite 2315, TW19, New Orleans, LA 70112, USA, beaudoin@
	tulane.edu
	
	
	/ This study investigates the prevalence of news frames in SARS news
	coverage from the Xinhua News Agency and the Associated Press (AP),
	as well as whether the frames were predicted by news environment
	and the SARS timeline. Factor analysis supported four frame dimensions:
	attribution of responsibility, human interest, economic consequences
	and severity. Frame prevalence was considered in terms of, first,
	the story as the unit of analysis and, second, word count as the
	unit of analysis. For both types of measurement, attribution of responsibility
	and severity frames were more common in AP. For economic consequences,
	story frame prevalence was higher in AP, while word frame prevalence
	was higher in Xinhua. For both types of measurement, economic consequences
	decreased over time, while attribution of responsibility and severity
	increased. Attribution of responsibility and human interest frames
	increased more over time in AP, while the severity frame increased
	more over time in Xinhua.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.05.04" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="af" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="10.1177/1748048507082839" swrc:key="doi"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="C.E. Beaudoin"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29aa8d6528e71b63ea7de9e61d5030556/acf"><title>Mass Media Reform in China: Toward a New Analytical Framework</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29aa8d6528e71b63ea7de9e61d5030556/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>market-oriented party-state media_commercialization non-state_actors media_reform Chinese_media China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;R. &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Akhavan-Majid&#034;&gt;Akhavan-Majid&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;International Communication Gazette&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;66(6):553&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;2004&lt;/em&gt;)</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/market-oriented"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/party-state"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/media_commercialization"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/non-state_actors"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/media_reform"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Chinese_media"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29aa8d6528e71b63ea7de9e61d5030556/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/29aa8d6528e71b63ea7de9e61d5030556/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>International Communication Gazette</swrc:journal><swrc:number>6</swrc:number><swrc:pages>553</swrc:pages><swrc:title>{Mass Media Reform in China: Toward a New Analytical Framework}</swrc:title><swrc:volume>66</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2004</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>market-oriented party-state media_commercialization non-state_actors media_reform Chinese_media China </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Department of Mass Communications, St Cloud State University, rmajid@stcloudstate.edu
	
	
	Historically, analyses of change in mass media systems have tended
	to draw upon a ‘dissident vs state’ framework, derived largely from
	the western historical experience. In the case of China, a ‘state
	vs market’ scenario has been superimposed on this basic framework,
	in the context of which the Chinese Communist party-state is often
	portrayed as a monolithic entity intent on promoting market-oriented
	reform in China’s economic base, while keeping a tight grip on the
	country’s mass media system and political superstructure. These dominant
	analytical frameworks tend to mask a number of important dynamics
	unique to Chinese history and society, that have played a significant
	role in the mass media transformation process. The purpose of this
	article is to outline a new conceptual framework incorporating these
	unique dynamics. In particular, it is the contention of this article
	that many of the changes in China’s mass media system during the
	post-Mao period have been achieved by non-state actors, not in an
	adversarial process vis-à-vis the state, but through what may be
	called ‘creative renegotiation and expansion’ of new policy openings
	initiated by the state. The success of these non-state actors, furthermore,
	has been due to three major systemic factors: (1) the increasing
	‘deideologization’ of the Chinese society set in motion by Deng’s
	pragmatic policies; (2) the gradual functional shift on the part
	of the local party cadres and bureaucratic authorities from ideological
	supervision to entrepreneurial collaboration with private investors;
	and (3) the increasingly common core of interest created by the media’s
	commercialization among the party cadres, bureaucratic bodies and
	media entrepreneurs and managers in extracting profits from the media.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.05.04" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="10.1177/0016549204047576" swrc:key="doi"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="R. Akhavan-Majid"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21a61c72ec839bcbc4a59b34b74673ba5/acf"><title>Chinesischer Journalist zu vier Jahren Haft verurteilt</title><description>May08</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21a61c72ec839bcbc4a59b34b74673ba5/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-06-01T16:51:41+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>prison chinese_media corruption Haft journalist China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt; &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/AFP&#034;&gt;AFP&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;AFP&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;May15.05.2008. &lt;/em&gt;</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/prison"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/chinese_media"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/corruption"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Haft"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/journalist"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21a61c72ec839bcbc4a59b34b74673ba5/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/21a61c72ec839bcbc4a59b34b74673ba5/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.newsroom.de/news/detail/455218"/><swrc:date>Sun Jun 01 16:51:41 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>AFP</swrc:journal><swrc:month>May</swrc:month><swrc:organization><swrc:Organization swrc:name="newsroom"/></swrc:organization><swrc:title>Chinesischer Journalist zu vier Jahren Haft verurteilt</swrc:title><swrc:year>15.05.2008</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>prison chinese_media corruption Haft journalist China </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Qi Chonghuai war im Juni 2007 in der östlichen Provinz Shandong verhaftet
	worden. Er hatte Artikel über die Umsiedlung der Landbevölkerung
	und Umweltschäden veröffentlicht, von denen nach Angaben seines Anwalts
	einige sogar auf Websites der Regierung und der amtlichen Nachrichtenagentur
	Xinhua zu lesen waren.
	
	
	Peking, 15. Mai (AFP) - Ein für kritische Berichte bekannter chinesischer
	Journalist ist zu einer vierjährigen Gefängnisstrafe verurteilt worden.
	Qi Chonghuai seien Erpressung und Betrug vorgeworfen worden, sagte
	seine Ehefrau am Donnerstag der Nachrichtenagentur AFP. Ihr Mann
	habe zwar gelegentlich Bargeld von Unternehmen oder Parteien angenommen,
	über die er geschrieben habe, dies sei aber eine &#034;verbreitete Praxis&#034;
	in China. Das Urteil sei übertrieben, da ihr Mann kein Verbrechen
	begangen, sondern höchstens moralisch fragwürdig gehandelt habe.
	Ein ehemaliger Kollege ihres Mannes, He Yanjie, sei zu zwei Jahren
	Haft wegen Erpressung verurteilt worden. 
	
	
	Qi war im Juni 2007 in der östlichen Provinz Shandong verhaftet worden.
	Er hatte Artikel über die Umsiedlung der Landbevölkerung und Umweltschäden
	veröffentlicht, von denen nach Angaben seines Anwalts einige sogar
	auf Websites der Regierung und der amtlichen Nachrichtenagentur Xinhua
	zu lesen waren. Die Organisation Reporter ohne Grenzen verurteilte
	den Gerichtsbeschluss. Wenige Monate vor den Olympischen Spielen
	sei dies ein weiteres Beispiel für die fehlende Toleranz auf Seiten
	der Regierung für kritische Autoren und Journalisten, erklärte die
	Organisation.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.05.17" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="[afeld]" swrc:key="markedentry"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="afeld" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name=" AFP"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23e43b2121331ee9d43591a40756aeac5/acf"><title>Deutsch-chinesische Wissenschaftskooperationen: : Situation und Entwicklung einiger Institutionen der Wissenschaftsfoerderung</title><description>alt</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23e43b2121331ee9d43591a40756aeac5/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-05-04T09:42:00+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>Internationale_Kooperation Wissenschaftleraustausch Volksrepublik_China Wissenschaftliche_Einrichtung Wissenschaftspolitik China Studentenaustausch </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;Ulrich &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Steinmueller&#034;&gt;Steinmueller&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Migration und Integration von Auslandschinesen in Deutschland, &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;2, &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;Harrassowitz, &lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;Wiesbaden, &lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;2005&lt;/em&gt;)</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Internationale_Kooperation"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Wissenschaftleraustausch"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Volksrepublik_China"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Wissenschaftliche_Einrichtung"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Wissenschaftspolitik"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Studentenaustausch"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23e43b2121331ee9d43591a40756aeac5/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/23e43b2121331ee9d43591a40756aeac5/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#InCollection"/><swrc:date>Sun May 04 09:42:00 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:address>Wiesbaden</swrc:address><swrc:booktitle>Migration und Integration von Auslandschinesen in Deutschland</swrc:booktitle><swrc:number>2</swrc:number><swrc:pages>143--154</swrc:pages><swrc:publisher><swrc:Organization swrc:name="Harrassowitz"/></swrc:publisher><swrc:title>Deutsch-chinesische Wissenschaftskooperationen: : Situation und Entwicklung einiger Institutionen der Wissenschaftsfoerderung</swrc:title><swrc:year>2005</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>Internationale_Kooperation Wissenschaftleraustausch Volksrepublik_China Wissenschaftliche_Einrichtung Wissenschaftspolitik China Studentenaustausch </swrc:keywords><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.04.27" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="3-447-05163-9" swrc:key="issn"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="test1" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Ulrich Steinmueller"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author><swrc:editor><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Hui Wen"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Groeling Che"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:editor></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/22067516bd49a75278375d6ee702079a1/acf"><title>Examination of Characteristics of News Media under Censorship: A Content Analysis of Selected Chinese Newspapers SARS Coverage</title><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/22067516bd49a75278375d6ee702079a1/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-05-04T04:28:05+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>party_press political guangzhou_daily chinese_media censorship media_policy medgov southern_weekend propaganda Parteipresse China content_analysis </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;E. &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Zhang&#034;&gt;Zhang&lt;/a&gt;  und K. &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Fleming&#034;&gt;Fleming&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Asian Journal of Communication&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;15(3):319--339&lt;/em&gt;(&lt;em&gt;2005&lt;/em&gt;)</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/party_press"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/political"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/guangzhou_daily"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/chinese_media"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/censorship"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/media_policy"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/medgov"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/southern_weekend"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/propaganda"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Parteipresse"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/content_analysis"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/22067516bd49a75278375d6ee702079a1/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/22067516bd49a75278375d6ee702079a1/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01292980500261639"/><swrc:date>Sun May 04 04:28:05 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Asian Journal of Communication</swrc:journal><swrc:number>3</swrc:number><swrc:pages>319--339</swrc:pages><swrc:publisher><swrc:Organization swrc:name="Routledge"/></swrc:publisher><swrc:title>{Examination of Characteristics of News Media under Censorship: A Content Analysis of Selected Chinese Newspapers SARS Coverage}</swrc:title><swrc:volume>15</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2005</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>party_press political guangzhou_daily chinese_media censorship media_policy medgov southern_weekend propaganda Parteipresse China content_analysis </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>This study examines the characteristics of the Chinese print media
	under censorship on their coverage of the disease of Severe Acute
	Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). With Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm&#039;s
	four theories of the press (Four theories of the press, Urbana &amp;
	Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1963) and Shoemaker and Reese&#039;s
	hierarchy model of influences on media content (Mediating the message:
	Theories of influence on mass media content, New York: Longman, 1996),
	the authors conduct a content analysis of the coverage of SARS in
	front pages of the Guangzhou Daily and all pages of the Southern
	Weekend, respectively, from December 2002 to June 2003 and from February
	to June 2003. The rationale of choosing these two data sets is that
	they are both important Chinese newspapers in southern China&#039;s Guangdong
	province where SARS presumably originated. Siebert, Peterson, and
	Schramm (1963) summarized three ways in which the Soviet Communist
	Party and government controlled the content of media: (1) its departments
	of propaganda at various levels appointed editors; (2) the Party,
	through propaganda departments, issued directives for media content;
	and (3) the Party reviewed and criticized the press. Our content
	analysis of the selected newspapers from December of 2002 to June
	2003 reveals that the political pressure during this period influenced
	the newspaper content via three factors, and that the three factors
	mainly match the three ways concluded by Siebert et al. (1963). Therefore,
	this study concludes that this three-way model can still be applied
	to the analysis of the Chinese media system under political influence.
	However, in addition to the content analysis, the authors believe
	the information from Chinese editors and journalists about their
	views of the newspaper coverage of SARS would enhance the strengths
	of this study.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.04.27" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="test1" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="E. Zhang"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="K. Fleming"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/223792fec81e4c60ab7bb20e70629de2a/acf"><title>Die Lage der Umwelt in China: Jahrzehntelang wurde ruecksichtslos die Umwelt verschmutzt. Jetzt zwingen die immensen Schaeden zum Kurswechsel ; es entsteht ein grosser Markt fuer gruene Technologien</title><description>alt</description><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/223792fec81e4c60ab7bb20e70629de2a/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-05-04T04:27:43+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>Umweltschutz Umweltschaeden Umwelttechnik Energieversorgung Umwelt Luftverunreinigung Export China </dc:subject><content:encoded>&lt;span style=&#034;color:#555555;&#034;&gt;Eva &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Sternfeld&#034;&gt;Sternfeld&lt;/a&gt;  und Christoph von &lt;a href=&#034;http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Waldersee&#034;&gt;Waldersee&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;em&gt;Internationale Politik&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;60(12):52--64&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt;December2005. &lt;/em&gt;</content:encoded><taxo:topics><rdf:Bag><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Umweltschutz"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Umweltschaeden"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Umwelttechnik"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Energieversorgung"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Umwelt"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Luftverunreinigung"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/Export"/><rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/tag/China"/></rdf:Bag></taxo:topics><burst:publication><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/223792fec81e4c60ab7bb20e70629de2a/acf"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/223792fec81e4c60ab7bb20e70629de2a/acf"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><swrc:date>Sun May 04 04:27:43 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Internationale Politik</swrc:journal><swrc:month>December</swrc:month><swrc:number>12</swrc:number><swrc:pages>52--64</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Die Lage der Umwelt in China: Jahrzehntelang wurde ruecksichtslos die Umwelt verschmutzt. Jetzt zwingen die immensen Schaeden zum Kurswechsel ; es entsteht ein grosser Markt fuer gruene Technologien</swrc:title><swrc:volume>60</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2005</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>Umweltschutz Umweltschaeden Umwelttechnik Energieversorgung Umwelt Luftverunreinigung Export China </swrc:keywords><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2008.04.27" swrc:key="timestamp"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="test1" swrc:key="owner"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Eva Sternfeld"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Christoph von Waldersee"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></burst:publication></item><item rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/294dddbe8f08694a5ac53569c9502e746/acf"><title>Media &#226;Schizophrenia&#226; in China</title><link>http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/294dddbe8f08694a5ac53569c9502e746/acf</link><dc:creator>acf</dc:creator><dc:date>2008-05-04T04:10:01+02:00</dc:date><dc:subject>party_press control chinese_media Entertainment medgov internet china </dc:subject><