http://www.bibsonomy.org/burst/user/dawinciBibSonomy BuRST Feed for /user/dawinci2008-07-26T22:52:15+02:00http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2daf3f7363f09c7ed066c8f571cfc7ba7/dawincidawinci2008-07-18T20:18:40+02:00identity identity_management_systems identity_management <span style="color:#555555;"> <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/EU">EU</a> </span><em>19960-2002-10. </em><em>Unabh&#228;ngiges Landeszentrum f&#252;r Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein, </em><em>September2003. </em>Fri Jul 18 20:18:40 CEST 2008September19960-2002-10Identity Management Systems (IMS): Identification and Comparison Study2003identity identity_management_systems identity_management This study shows that a user-controllable IMS is plausible and probable from a sociological perspective, already possible as of today on a basis of Europe-wide regulations, and technically presumably copeable. Considering the use of IMS in fields of operation such as e-commerce and e-government by means of future scenarios, we conclude that many workflows would work more effectively based on IMS while integrating a better privacy level than up to now. The evaluation of currently available applications and studies of concepts respectively prototypes of identity management anticipates the path which technological development will pursue. Thereby experts expect complicated usability of Identity Management Applications, an inadequate level of computer security and privacy, and also lengthy standardisation processes as main bottlenecks for developing a society-wide Identity Management System.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/283f3f09ec0f4d1f0c8713b12476a3509/dawincidawinci2008-07-18T20:02:32+02:00identity ME sociology psychology I <span style="color:#555555;">George H. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Mead">Mead</a> </span><em>University of Chicago Press, </em><em>London, </em>(<em>1934</em>)Fri Jul 18 20:02:32 CEST 2008LondonMind, Self and Society1934identity ME sociology psychology I http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e7a1db711170a1f4248a085931e14b83/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T18:28:34+02:00trust <span style="color:#555555;">Partha <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Dasgupta">Dasgupta</a> </span><em>chapter 4, </em><em>page49--72. </em><em>Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, </em><em>electronic edition, </em>(<em>2000</em>)Thu Jul 17 18:28:34 CEST 2008Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations4electronic49--72Trust as a Commodity2000trust http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20fbef71216f80fa83e3217401159fba8/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T18:03:25+02:00identity pseudonym reputation <span style="color:#555555;">Eric J. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Friedman">Friedman</a> and Paul <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Resnick">Resnick</a> </span><em>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</em><em>10(2):173--199</em>(<em>2001</em>)Thu Jul 17 18:03:25 CEST 2008Journal of Economics and Management Strategy2173--199The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms102001identity pseudonym reputation We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain cheap pseudonyms", something which is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences. A large degree of cooperation can still emerge, through a convention in which newcomers "pay their dues" by accepting poor treatment from players who have established positive reputations. One might hope for an open society where newcomers are treated well, but there is an inherent social cost in making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can sustain significantly more cooperation than the dues-paying equilibrium in a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which players have finite lives and the ability to change their identities, and there is a small but nonvanishing probability of mistakes. Although one could remove the inefficiency of mistreating newcomers by disallowing anonymity, this is not practical or desirable in a wide variety of transactions. We discuss the use of entry fees, which permits newcomers to be trusted but excludes some players with low payoffs, thus introducing a different inefficiency. We also discuss the use of free but unreplaceable pseudonyms, and describe a mechanism which implements them using standard encryption techniques, which could be practically implemented in electronic transactions.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2608101f27e50af1d0e40af0f4021f209/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T18:00:50+02:00PRIME privacy identity management <span style="color:#555555;">Marit <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Hansen">Hansen</a> and Ronald <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Leenes">Leenes</a> and Jan <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Schallaböck">Schallab&#246;ck</a> </span><em>European Community, </em><em>June2007. </em>Thu Jul 17 18:00:50 CEST 2008Version 1.0electronicallyJunePRIME White Paper V22007PRIME privacy identity management http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2f110364c8cf809cfc05f68ab1da16dca/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T17:58:14+02:00feedback_scheme e-commerce reputation_systems reputation security rating feedback <span style="color:#555555;">Roslan <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Ismail">Ismail</a> </span><em>Queensland University of Technology, Information Security Research Centre, </em><em>November2004. </em>Thu Jul 17 17:58:14 CEST 2008NovemberSecurity of Reputation Systems2004feedback_scheme e-commerce reputation_systems reputation security rating feedback Reputation systems have the potential of improving the quality of on-line markets by identifying fraudulent users and subsequently dealing with these users can be prevented. The behaviour of participants involved in e-commerce can be recorded and then this information made available to potential transaction partners to make decisions to choose a suitable counterpart. Unfortunately current reputation systems suffer from various vulnerabilities. Solutions for many of these problems will be discussed. One of the major threats is that of unfair feedback. A large number of negative or positive feedbacks could be submitted to a particular user with the aim to either downgrade or upgrade the user’s reputation. As a result the produced reputation does not reflect the user’s true trustworthiness. To overcome this threat a variation of Bayesian Reputation system is proposed. The proposed scheme is based on the subjective logic framework proposed Josang et al. [65]. The impact of unfair feedback is countered through some systematic approaches proposed in the scheme. Lack of anonymity for participants leads to reluctance to provide negative feedback. A novel solution for anonymity of feedback providers is proposed to allow participants to provide negative feedback when appropriate without fear of retaliation. The solution is based on several primitive cryptographic mechanisms; e-cash, designated verifier proof and knowledge proof. In some settings it is desirable for the reputation owner to control the distribution of its own reputation and to disclose this at its discretion to the intended parties. To realize this, a solution based on a certificate mechanism is proposed. This solution allows the reputation owner to keep the certificate and to distribute its reputation while not being able to alter that information without detection. The proposed solutions cater for two modes of reputation systems: centralised and decentralised. The provision of an off-line reputation system is discussed by proposing a new solution using certificates. This is achieved through the delegation concept and a variant of digital signature schemes known as proxy signatures. The thesis presents a security architecture of reputation systems which consists of different elements to safeguard reputation systems from malicious activities. Elements incorporated into this architecture include privacy, verifiability and availability. The architecture also introduces Bayesian approach to counter security threat posed by reputation systems. This means the proposed security architecture in the thesis is a combination of two prominent approaches, namely, Bayesian and cryptographic, to provide security for reputation systems. The proposed security architecture can be used as a basic framework for further development in identifying and incorporating required elements so that a total security solution for reputation systems can be achieved.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/28be2d664a3d4fdd68496c18963e8a047/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T17:52:24+02:00pmi privilige_management_infrastructure pki ac x.509 attribute_certificates privacy anonymity <span style="color:#555555;">Vicente <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Benjumea">Benjumea</a> and Javier <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Lopez">Lopez</a> and Jos&#233; A. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Montenegro">Montenegro</a> and Jos&#233; M. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Troya">Troya</a> </span><em>Public Key Cryptography, </em><em>volume2947ofLecture Notes in Computer Science, </em><em>page402-415. </em><em>Springer, </em>(<em>2004</em>)Thu Jul 17 17:52:24 CEST 2008Public Key Cryptography402-415Lecture Notes in Computer ScienceA First Approach to Provide Anonymity in Attribute Certificates.29472004pmi privilige_management_infrastructure pki ac x.509 attribute_certificates privacy anonymity This paper focus on two security services for internet applications: authorization and anonymity. Traditional authorization solutions are not very helpful for many of the Internet applications; however, attribute certificates proposed by ITU-T seems to be well suited and provide adequate solution. On the other hand, special attention is paid to the fact that many of the operations and transactions that are part of Internet applications can be easily recorded and collected. Consequently, anonymity has become a desirable feature to be added in many cases. In this work we propose a solution to enhance the X.509 attribute certificate in such a way that it becomes a conditionally anonymous attribute certificate. Moreover, we present a protocol to obtain such certificates in a way that respects users' anonymity by using a fair blind signature scheme. We also show how to use such certificates and describe a few cases where problems could arise, identifying some open problems.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2662a91f72078302220826895810aa1be/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T17:52:01+02:00ac anonymity pmi privacy certificate X.509 attribute_certificate <span style="color:#555555;">Vicente <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Benjumea">Benjumea</a> and Seung Geol <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Choi">Choi</a> and Javier <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Lopez">Lopez</a> and Moti <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Yung">Yung</a> </span><em>Cryptology and Network Security, </em><em>volume4856ofLecture Notes in Computer Science, </em><em>page265-281. </em><em>Springer, </em>(<em>2007</em>)Thu Jul 17 17:52:01 CEST 2008Cryptology and Network Security265-281Lecture Notes in Computer ScienceAnonymity 2.0 - X.509 Extensions Supporting Privacy-Friendly Authentication.48562007ac anonymity pmi privacy certificate X.509 attribute_certificate We present a semantic extension to X.509 certificates that allows incorporating new anonymity signature schemes into the X.509 framework. This fact entails advantages to both components. On the one hand, anonymous signature schemes benefit from all the protocols and infrastructure that the X.509 framework provides. On the other hand, the X.509 framework incorporates anonymity as a very interesting new feature. This semantic extension is part of a system that provides user’s controlled anonymous authorization under the X.509 framework. Additionally, the proposal directly fits the much active Identity 2.0 effort, where anonymity is a major supplementary feature that increases the self-control of one’s identity and privacy which is at the center of the activity.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/25478b1f69b3d0fd979d314b0408bef7b/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T17:50:32+02:00reputation reputation_systems gossip privacy <span style="color:#555555;">Robert S. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Gazzale">Gazzale</a> </span><em>Williams College, Department of Economics, </em><em>August2005. </em>Thu Jul 17 17:50:32 CEST 2008AugustGiving Gossips their Due: Information Provision in Games with Private Monitoring2005reputation reputation_systems gossip privacy The ability of a long-lived seller to maintain and profit from a good reputation may induce her to provide high quality or effort despite short-run incentives to the contrary. This incentive remains in place with private monitoring, provided that buyers share their information. However, this assumption is unrealistic in environments where information sharing is costly or the beneficiaries of a buyer’s sharing are strangers. I study a simple mechanism that induces costly information provision, and may explain such behavior in environments where the incentives are not overt. Agents who possess information may share it with the community and acquire a reputation for gossiping. Reputations function in tandem: sellers provide high effort because they face agents with reputations for information sharing, and expect the outcome of their dealings will be made public, while information holders share their information as a reputation for doing so results in higher effort from sellers.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23971e7f64f638ae920f6146fc301d08b/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T17:49:05+02:00trust cryptography <span style="color:#555555;">Joseph M. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Reagle">Reagle</a> </span><em>May1996. </em>Thu Jul 17 17:49:05 CEST 2008MayTrust in a Cryptographic Economy and Digital Security Deposits: Protocols and Policies1996trust cryptography The richness and complexity of actions an Internet user may perform may soon match, or exceed, the capabilities of that person's interactions in the physical world. Transactions involving information retrieval and processing for medical, financial, professional, or entertainment purposes will exist upon a – hopefully – secure infrastructure. However, even if all underlying protocols are sound, this does not ensure that transactions in this environment are free of risk. Methods for managing the amount of risk one takes, and the amount of trust one extends to others, are still required. Historically, formal trust relationships are represented by financial and legal instruments. A contractual obligation contingent on the recovery of a security deposit demonstrates both the “encoding” of the relationship, and the incentives for compliance with (or the lack of betrayal of) that relationship. This thesis hypothesizes that many of the contemporary instruments for dealing with trust can be implemented in digital form – with perhaps greater efficacy. To accomplish this, I first focus on the concept of trust: what is trust, and how is trust represented and evaluated in the real world. I then examine how trust is represented on today's Internet, and how can trust be managed in such an environment in the near future. I argue that trust will be managed in three ways, by: a) using traditional methods like credit scoring, financial instruments, and accounting for risk in the cost of the service, b) developing cryptographic protocols which limit the need for trust, and c) displacing the risk and the direction of the trust relationships from one agent to another. Furthermore, I provide an analysis of a security deposit protocol which accomplishes (c). I conclude by focusing on policy makers’ confusion of the historical instance of a financial or trust management instrument (tool) with the operational qualities of such tools. I also address how this can affect the development of efficient tools – and consequently the market which would be dependent upon them.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/282f814872692ac6a5d78d0d801ec124a/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T17:43:00+02:00security trust_management reputation trust reputation_systems <span style="color:#555555;">Audun <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Jøsang">J&#248;sang</a> and Claudia <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Keser">Keser</a> and Theodosis <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Dimitrakos">Dimitrakos</a> </span><em>Trust Management, </em><em>volume3477ofLecture Notes in Computer Science, </em><em>page93--107. </em><em>Springer, </em><em>May2005. </em>Thu Jul 17 17:43:00 CEST 2008Trust ManagementMay93--107Lecture Notes in Computer ScienceCan We Manage Trust?34772005security trust_management reputation trust reputation_systems The term trust management suggests that trust can be managed, for example by creating trust, by assessing trustworthiness, or by determining optimal decisions based on specific levels of trust. The problem to date is that trust management in online environments is a diverse and ill defined discipline. In fact, the term trust management is being used with very different meanings in different contexts. This paper examines various approaches related to online activities where trust is relevant and where there is potential for trust management. In some cases, trust management has been defined with specific meanings. In other cases, there are well established disciplines with different names that could also be called trust management. Despite the confusion in terminology, trust management, as a general approach, represents a promising development for making online transactions more dependable, and in the long term for increasing the social capital of online communities.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/218daba5b07d8c39be618fd1bdfde1a3e/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T17:25:58+02:00models trust trust_management reputation reputation_systems <span style="color:#555555;">Jordi <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Sabater">Sabater</a> and Carles <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Sierra">Sierra</a> </span><em>Artificial Intelligence Review</em><em>24(1):33--60</em><em>September2005. </em>Thu Jul 17 17:25:58 CEST 2008Artificial Intelligence ReviewSeptember133--60Review on Computational Trust and Reputation Models242005models trust trust_management reputation reputation_systems The scientific research in the area of computational mechanisms for trust and reputation in virtual societies is a recent discipline oriented to increase the reliability and performance of electronic communities. Computer science has moved from the paradigm of isolated machines to the paradigm of networks and distributed computing. Likewise, artificial intelligence is quickly moving from the paradigm of isolated and non-situated intelligence to the paradigm of situated, social and collective intelligence. The new paradigm of the so called intelligent or autonomous agents and multi-agent systems (MAS) together with the spectacular emergence of the information society technologies (specially reflected by the popularization of electronic commerce) are responsible for the increasing interest on trust and reputation mechanisms applied to electronic societies. This review wants to offer a panoramic view on current computational trust and reputation models.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2054df2a79a891352516560ba88b652bf/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T17:17:00+02:00risk information_systems <span style="color:#555555;">Robert <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Axelrod">Axelrod</a> </span><em>University of Michigan, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, </em><em>Ann Arbor, MI 48109, </em><em>October2003. </em>Thu Jul 17 17:17:00 CEST 2008Ann Arbor, MI 48109OctoberRisk in Networked Information Systems2003risk information_systems The biggest source of risk to a networked information system is an over-reliance on recent experience to evaluate current security. Recent experience can be misleading because information networks and their environments are continually undergoing rapid change. There are several reasons why recently effective ways of managing risk to information networks may no longer be sufficient. 1. The size, diversity, and decentralization of a networked information system coupled with constant advances in information technology make tomorrow’s risks different from yesterday’s risks. 2. Typically, the doctrinal and organizational changes needed to exploit the full potential of technological advances are far from obvious, resulting in genuine surprise when these new possibilities are first realized. 3. The “arms race” between hackers and defenders has no end in sight. 4. Experience with managing risk in networked information systems comes mainly form the dealing with the constant barrage of challenges from hackers, disgruntled insiders, and other relatively low-level attacks. This everyday experience can easily distract attention and resources away from preparing for the completely different kind of challenge that could come from a major attack designed by a hostile power endowed with abundant financing, patience, creativity, and audacity. This report steps back from everyday experience to describe and illustrate twenty-eight different risks to networked information systems. The report also offers suggestions on how to mitigate identified risks (known unknowns), and how to cope with risks not yet identified (unknown unknowns). ivhttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/244adf70d956f525daef077ec4349edd8/dawincidawinci2008-07-17T15:54:37+02:00soft_security social_control e-commerce security trust reputation <span style="color:#555555;">Lars <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Rasmusson">Rasmusson</a> and Sverker <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Jansson">Jansson</a> </span><em>NSPW '96: Proceedings of the 1996 workshop on New security paradigms, </em><em>page18--25. </em><em>New York, NY, USA, </em><em>ACM, </em>(<em>1996</em>)Thu Jul 17 15:54:37 CEST 2008New York, NY, USANSPW '96: Proceedings of the 1996 workshop on New security paradigms18--25Simulated Social Control for Secure Internet Commerce1996soft_security social_control e-commerce security trust reputation In this paper we suggest that soft security such as social control has to be used to create secure open systems. Social control means that it is the participants themselves who are responsible for the security, as opposed to leaving the security to some external or global authority. Social mechanisms don't deny the existence of malicious participants. Instead they are aiming at avoiding interaction with them. This makes them more robust than hard security mechanisms such as passwords, who reveal everything if they are bypassed. We describe our work in progress of constructing a workbench to run simulations of electronic markets. By examining the success of different security mechanisms to avoid maliciously behaving actors we hope to gain insight into how to create electronic markets. The idea of creating reputations for the participants is discussed. Finally some legal aspects on using social control and reputation as security mechanisms are discussed. http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2057cab3378d54760760720796b251403/dawincidawinci2008-07-15T17:20:30+02:00trust <span style="color:#555555;">Niklas <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Luhmann">Luhmann</a> </span><em>chapter 6, </em><em>page94--107. </em><em>Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, </em><em>electronic edition, </em>(<em>2000</em>)Tue Jul 15 17:20:30 CEST 2008Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations6electronic94--107Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives2000trust http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2fd2702e4a5cd6b220f4789e96a62c511/dawincidawinci2008-07-15T16:53:47+02:00trust <span style="color:#555555;">Niklas <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Luhmann">Luhmann</a> </span><em>John Wiley and Sons Ltd., </em>(<em>1979</em>)Tue Jul 15 16:53:47 CEST 2008Trust and Power1979trust http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2fc5d1f833d8cd8c3af7988273ff51904/dawincidawinci2008-07-11T11:11:03+02:00interaction role virtual_community <span style="color:#555555;">Thomas <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Herrmann">Herrmann</a> and Isa <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Jahnke">Jahnke</a> and Kai-Uwe <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Loser">Loser</a> </span><em>Mensch \&amp; Computer 2003: Interaktion in Bewegung</em>(<em>2003</em>)Fri Jul 11 11:11:03 CEST 2008Mensch \& Computer 2003: Interaktion in Bewegung87--98 Die Unterstützung von Rollenzuweisung und Rollenübernahme: Ein Ansatz zur Gestaltung von Wissensmanagement- und CSCL-Systemen2003interaction role virtual_community Der Beitrag befasst sich aus soziologischer Sicht mit dem Rollenkonzept am Beispiel von Communities, um daraus systematisch Unterstützungen für Rollenentwicklung im Wissensmanagement und bei CSCL-Systemen abzuleiten. Die „Rolle“ ist ein geeignetes Konzept, um zu verstehen, wie Akteure interagieren, gemeinsam handeln und Wissen austauschen. Nach dem soziologischen Rollenmodell interagieren Akteure auf Basis von sozialen Rollen und nehmen für einen bestimmten Zeitraum eine Rolle ein, um mit anderen interagieren zu können. Jedes Handeln ist von Rollen geprägt und prägt die Rollen seinerseits. Aus diesem Ansatz wird die Unterstützung der Rollenentwicklung für Wissensmanagement- und CSCL-Systeme abgeleitet. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass die Informatik einen von der Soziologie abweichenden Rollenbegriff verwendet. Zur Veranschaulichung werden zunächst einige Beispiele aus einem CSCL-Evaluationsexperiment dargestellt. Anschließend wird der soziologische Rollenbegriff detaillierter beschrieben, um Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten für technische Systeme abzuleiten. Sie werden zum Abschluss am Beispiel von Rollenmechanismen erläutert, wie etwa die Rollenübernahme, die Billigung derselben, die Rollenzuweisung und den Rollenwechsel.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21d4238ec20e432811a30b5da445ded30/dawincidawinci2008-07-09T17:15:40+02:00virtual_communities interaction e-business transaction personalization e-commerce <span style="color:#555555;">Petra <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Schubert">Schubert</a> and Mark <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Ginsburg">Ginsburg</a> </span><em>Electronic Markets</em><em>10(1):45--55</em>(<em>2000</em>)Wed Jul 09 17:15:40 CEST 2008Electronic Markets145--55Virtual Communities of Transaction: The Role of Personalization in Electronic Commerce102000virtual_communities interaction e-business transaction personalization e-commerce Bringing communities of buyers and sellers together in the arena of electronic commerce stimulates three major potentials: the building of trust, the collection and effective use of community knowledge and the economic impacts of accumulated buying power. In this context, we introduce the concept of Virtual Communities of Transaction and review important personalization approaches which we may utilize in their design: collaborative filtering, data mining, and techniques to optimize the user interface and the underlying product offerings. The key contributions of this paper are the elaboration of Virtual Communities, the presentation of a categorization scheme for different types of communities, the identification of classes of member profiles, and the innovative concept of community products. We conclude with the case of the Amazon.com Recommendation Center to illustrate key design ideas and discuss an evolutionary application, the Participatory Product Catalog.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20a13aa647ea5c8e9cbafd50583987799/dawincidawinci2008-07-09T13:24:29+02:00interpersonal online_interaction impersonal sip social_information_processing <span style="color:#555555;">Joseph B. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Walther">Walther</a> </span><em>Communication Research</em><em>19(1):52--90</em>(<em>1992</em>)Wed Jul 09 13:24:29 CEST 2008Communication Research152--90Interpersonal Effects in Computer-Mediated Interaction: A Relational Perspective191992interpersonal online_interaction impersonal sip social_information_processing Several theories and much experimental research on relational tone in computer-mediated communication (CMC) points to the lack of nonverbal cues in this channel as a cause of impersonal and task-oriented messages. Field research in CMC often reports more positive relational behavior. This article examines the assumptions, methods, and findings of such research and suggests that negative relational effects are confined to narrow situational boundary conditions. Alternatively, it is suggested that communicators develop individuating impressions of others through accumulated CMC messages. Based upon these impressions, users may develop relationships and express multidimensional relational messages through verbal or textual cues. Predictions regarding these processes are suggested, and future research incorporating these points is urged.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e633290bacba0bbe2296160ea007fb31/dawincidawinci2008-07-09T12:10:41+02:00metaphor interaction media_space virtual_space place MUDs space <span style="color:#555555;">Steve <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Harrison">Harrison</a> and Paul <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Dourish">Dourish</a> </span><em>CSCW '96: Proceedings of the 1996 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work, </em><em>page67--76. </em><em>ACM, </em>(<em>1996</em>)Wed Jul 09 12:10:41 CEST 2008CSCW '96: Proceedings of the 1996 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work67--76Re-place-ing space: The role of place and space in collaborative systems. 1996metaphor interaction media_space virtual_space place MUDs space Many collaborative and communicative environments use notions of “space” and spatial organisation to facilitate and structure interaction. We argue that a focus on spatial models is misplaced. Drawing on understandings from architecture and urban design, as well as from our own research findings, we highlight the critical distinction between “space” and “place”. While designers use spatial models to support interaction,we show how it is actually a notion of “place” which frames interactive behaviour. This leads us to re-evaluate spatial systems, and discuss how “place”, rather than “space”, can support CSCW design.