http://www.bibsonomy.org/burst/user/kperezlopez/CSS739BibSonomy BuRST Feed for /user/kperezlopez/CSS7392008-10-16T06:52:10+02:00Munger explores the role that culture plays in defining choices, as for example, those faced by one being recruited to terrorism. He spends most of the paper defining culture, its meaning and origins, using game theory illustrations of his ideas. He discusses the differences between “institutions,” which are long-lived and entrenched, regardless of whether or not they are optimal, and “organizations,” which are the always-optimal responses to the system embodied by the institutions. At the end of the article, he shows how this explains why terrorism may be a rational organizational response to the one’s institutional situation, and how it shapes the incentives of the game we play with terrorists.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2493d114a483004f9aa65dafc4f2a218d/kperezlopezkperezlopez2006-04-29T21:40:47+02:00CSS739 terrorism club_goods recruitment culture <span style="color:#555555;">Michael <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Munger">Munger</a> </span><em>November2005. </em>Sat Apr 29 21:40:47 CEST 2006 NovemberPreference Modification vs. Incentive Manipulation as Tools of Terrorist Recruitment: the Role of Cultures2005CSS739 terrorism club_goods recruitment culture 15Terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry. Only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics. This weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free-riding or defection from the weaker side. There are two (nonexclusive) answers: (1) Atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation, even if it results in the recruit’s own death (2) Create a set of incentives that reward loyalty, by giving access to excludable near-public (“club“) goods. Culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions. Culture is defined here as the set of “inherited” beliefs, attitudes, and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders, to understand themselves and to communicate with each other. The primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive, or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation. The difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism. If terrorists are selected for having unusual (cooperative, from the perspective of the terror group) preferences, then recruitment must be disrupted somehow. If, on the other hand, terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods, then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods. Keywords: Terrorism; culture; ideology; commitment; club goods.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2d822ccb51a1c7fb8fef0074a599b01a1/kperezlopezkperezlopez2006-04-20T20:10:30+02:00CSS739 Islamist recruitment terrorist <span style="color:#555555;">Michael <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Taarnby">Taarnby</a> </span><em>January2005. </em>Thu Apr 20 20:10:30 CEST 2006Jens Chr. Skous Vej 3, 8000 aarhus, DenmarkTaarnbyJanuary57Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Trends and PerspectivesResearch report2005CSS739 Islamist recruitment terrorist Describes 4 models of recruitment: net, funnel, infection, and seed crystal. Lays out recrutiment approaches on a 2-dimensional scale: proximate-mediate crossed with public-private channels. Categorizes the 4 quadrants of this 2D scale in terms of the likely model that it would apply to. Interesting analysis.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2246c12068b2bcc7f7d8b8b27331a976a/kperezlopezkperezlopez2006-04-20T20:04:16+02:00CSS739 recruitment terrorist <span style="color:#555555;">Scott <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Gerwehr">Gerwehr</a> und Sara <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Daly">Daly</a> </span><em>chapter 5, </em><em>Seite73-89. </em><em>McGraw-Hill, </em>(<em>2005</em>)Thu Apr 20 20:04:16 CEST 2006The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook 573-89Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitmentresearch report2005CSS739 recruitment terrorist This article "details various models al-Qaida may be using to attract new members; approaches to recruitment; characteristics of potential recruits; and nodes-centers of activity, such as mosques, universities, and charities-where al-Qaida’s recruiters seek new members and where potential recruits are likely to become acquainted with the radical jihadist world view."