BibSonomyburst/user/nwyattBibSonomy RSS feed for /user/nwyatt2012-02-15T08:39:57+01:00http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/28ce2c6527acd871347890472cc563fd9/nwyattnwyatt2010-03-12T06:01:21+01:00belief de-dicto de-re de-se imported <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Maier">Emar Maier</a> </span><em>Linguistics and Philosophy</em> <em>32(5):429--474</em> (<em>October 2009</em>)Fri Mar 12 06:01:21 CET 2010Linguistics and Philosophy#oct#5429--474Presupposing acquaintance: a unified semantics for de dicto, de re and de se belief reports322009belief de-dicto de-re de-se imported This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto, de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classicaltheory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involvesa modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relationsas second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary.The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specificsubclass of de se reports characterized by special ‘de se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmaticresolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequateoutput truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic systemto the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals.SpringerLink - Journal Articlehttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/203d6b31d6b311aa6144ba8d7dc6b801c/nwyattnwyatt2009-10-29T22:29:06+01:00compositionality language <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Pagin">Peter Pagin</a> </span><em>Mind</em> <em>118(471):713-737</em> (<em>2009</em>)Thu Oct 29 22:29:06 CET 2009Mind471713-737{Compositionality, Understanding, and Proofs}1182009compositionality language The principle of semantic compositionality, as Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore have emphasized, imposes constraints on theories of meaning that it is hard to meet with psychological or epistemic accounts. Here, I argue that this general tendency is exemplified in Michael Dummett's account of meaning. On that account, the so-called manifestability requirement has the effect that the speaker who understands a sentence s must be able to tell whether or not s satisfies central semantic conditions. This requirement is not met by truth-conditional accounts of meaning. On Dummett's view, it is met by a proof conditional account: understanding amounts to knowledge of what counts as a proof of a sentence. A speaker is supposed always to be capable of deciding whether or not a given object is a proof of a given sentence she understands. This requirement comes into conflict with compositionality. If meaning is compositionally determined, then all you need for understanding a sentence is what you get from combining your understanding of the parts according to the mode of composition. But that knowledge is not always sufficient for recognizing any proof at all of a given sentence. Dummett's proof-theoretic argument to the contrary is mistaken. Compositionality, Understanding, and Proofs -- Pagin 118 (471): 713 -- Mindhttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/25f26327b4c04532a330aceb93b001726/nwyattnwyatt2009-04-20T00:32:22+02:00language pragmatics <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Stalnaker">Robert C. Stalnaker</a> </span><em>Synthese</em> <em>22(1):272--289</em> (<em>December 1970</em>)Mon Apr 20 00:32:22 CEST 2009SyntheseDec1272--289Pragmatics221970language pragmatics http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27c15367f67644ad105f63d8d0805265c/nwyattnwyatt2009-04-19T19:16:43+02:00logic-history modal-logic <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Wyatt">Nicole Wyatt</a> </span><em>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</em> (<em>2000</em>)Sun Apr 19 19:16:43 CEST 2009Australasian Journal of Philosophy196-212Did Duns Scotus invent possible worlds semantics?782000logic-history modal-logic 2000 Did Duns Scotus invent possible worlds semantics? AJP « percievehttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27335742a46b9589c8d8bc06eb102e6f7/nwyattnwyatt2009-04-19T19:16:11+02:00logical-pluralism <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Wyatt">Nicole Wyatt</a> </span><em>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</em> (<em>2004</em>)Sun Apr 19 19:16:11 CEST 2009Australasian Journal of Philosophy409-420What are Beall and Restall pluralists about?822004logical-pluralism Beall and Restall reject pluralism about metaphysical modality. The paper argues that they cannot coherently do so while maintaining their pluralism about first-order logic.2004 What are Beall and Restall pluralists about? AJP « percievehttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c1d8d84e0890c76d1d81020fa6483bea/nwyattnwyatt2009-03-06T06:58:56+01:00attitudes language meaning reference <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Anderson">C. Anthony Anderson</a>, and <a href="/author/Owens">Joseph Owens</a> (Eds.). </span><em>Center for the Study of Language and Information, </em>(<em>1990</em>)Fri Mar 06 06:58:56 CET 2009Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind1990attitudes language meaning reference http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23f9b033086186eaffbf9707608346ec9/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-27T19:12:23+01:00empty-names names reference rigid-designator <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Wyatt">Nicole Wyatt</a> </span><em>Dialogue</em> (<em>2007</em>)Fri Feb 27 19:12:23 CET 2009Dialogue663-81Pragmatics of empty names462007empty-names names reference rigid-designator Fred Adams and collaborators advocate a view on which empty-name sentences semantically encode incomplete propositions, but which can be used to conversationally implicate descriptive propositions. This account has come under criticism recently from Marga Reimer and Anthony Everett. Reimer correctly observes that their account does not pass a natural test for conversational implicatures, namely, that an explanation of our intuitions in terms of implicature should be such that we upon hearing it recognize it to be roughly correct. Everett argues that the implicature view provides an explanation of only some of our intuitions, and is in fact incompatible with others, especially those concerning the modal profile of sentences containing empty names. I offer a pragmatist treatment of empty names based upon the recognition that the Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated is not exhaustive, and argue that such a solution avoids both Everett’s and Reimer’s criticisms.2007 Pragmatics of empty names Dialogue « percievehttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2411d0c3a35d961686de81c7608b4589e/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:07:48+01:00SpeechAct <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Searle">John R. Searle</a> </span><em>Cambridge University Press, </em><em>Cambridge, UK., </em>(<em>1969</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:07:48 CET 2009Cambridge, UK.Speech Acts1969SpeechAct http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/25c80e958e951663c221b36160a554b8d/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:07:48+01:00MacKinnon Pornography SpeechAct women <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/MacKinnon">Catharine A. MacKinnon</a> </span><em>Feminism Unmodified, </em><em>Harvard University Press, </em><em>Cambridge, Mass, </em>(<em>1987</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:07:48 CET 2009Cambridge, MassFeminism Unmodified146-162Not a moral issue1987MacKinnon Pornography SpeechAct women http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24811ba5b9540f9c75e5d3f3f8c3a421d/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:07:47+01:00MacKinnon Pornography SpeechAct women <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/MacKinnon">Catharine A. MacKinnon</a> </span><em>Feminism Unmodified, </em><em>Harvard University Press, </em><em>Cambridge, Mass, </em>(<em>1987</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:07:47 CET 2009Cambridge, MassFeminism Unmodified163-197Francis {B}iddle's Sister1987MacKinnon Pornography SpeechAct women http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2d2738f7d0faf3beab87fec42af6f59d8/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:07:47+01:00SpeechAct convention meaning <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Davidson">Donald Davidson</a> </span><em>Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, </em><em>Oxford University Press, </em>(<em>1984</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:07:47 CET 2009Inquiries into Truth and InterpretationCommunication and Convention1984SpeechAct convention meaning http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2f145088661029d04e54c1d159df89af4/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:07:46+01:00SpeechAct <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Austin">J. L. Austin</a> </span><em>Harvard University Press, </em><em>Cambridge, Mass., </em>(<em>1975</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:07:46 CET 2009Cambridge, Mass.How to do things with words1975SpeechAct http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c873c204551a95af9fb546819bca1d2c/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:05:05+01:00SpeechAct <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Strawson">P. F. Strawson</a> </span><em>Philosophical Review</em> (<em>1964</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:05:05 CET 2009Philosophical Review431-Intention and Convention in Speech Acts731964SpeechAct http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/224d83c8aeee116e18478bd0762427cb1/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:05:04+01:00Conversation Ethics FreeSpeech Harm Langton MacKinnon Pornography SpeechAct <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/McGowan">Mary Kate McGowan</a> </span><em>Philosophy and Public Affairs</em> <em>31(2):155-189</em> (<em>Spring 2003</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:05:04 CET 2009Philosophy and Public AffairsSpring2155-189Conversational Exercitives and the Force of Pornography312003Conversation Ethics FreeSpeech Harm Langton MacKinnon Pornography SpeechAct MacKinnon has claimed that pornography both subordinates and silences women and it is unclear how pornography (mere pictures and words) could do either. Austin has shown that speech can constitute action and, since pornography is treated as speech by our courts, some theorists, such as Langton, defend the coherence of MacKinnon's claims by offering a speech act analysis of pornography. I here present five challenges to Langton's analysis. Each is motivated by the theory of speech acts on which her analysis rests. I then present a previously overlooked sort of speech act, the conversational exercitive, and demonstrate that it enables Langton to avoid the five challenges and thus affords a better speech act model for her purposes. I also present some of the challenges remaining for the revised speech act model offered here.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/26599873d32301b45bd78a90d2afb0a3b/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:05:04+01:00Mackinnon Pornography SocialPhilosophy SpeechAct women <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/McGowan">Mary Kate McGowan</a> </span><em>Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy</em> <em>20(3):22-49</em> (<em>Summer 2005</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:05:04 CET 2009Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist PhilosophySummer322-49One Pornography: MacKinnon, Speech Acts, and False Construction202005Mackinnon Pornography SocialPhilosophy SpeechAct women Although others have focused on Catharine MacKinnon's claim that pornography subordinates and silences women, I here focus on her claim that pornography constructs women's nature and that this construction is, in some sense, false. Since it is unclear how pornography, as speech, can construct facts and how constructed facts can nevertheless be false, MacKinnon's claim requires elucidation. Appealing to speech act theory, I introduce an analysis of the erroneous verdictive and use it to make sense of MacKinnon's constructionist claims. I also show that the erroneous verdictive is of more general interest.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/25d112af7bf9b6b32bcd6f9e55391e030/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:05:03+01:00Mackinnon Pornography SocialPhilosophy SpeechAct <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Langton">Rae Langton</a> </span><em>Philosophy and Public Affairs</em> <em>22(4):293-330</em> (<em>Fall 1993</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:05:03 CET 2009Philosophy and Public AffairsFall4293-330Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts221993Mackinnon Pornography SocialPhilosophy SpeechAct Pornography is speech, according to the law. Pornography is a kind of act, according to anti-pornography feminist Catherine MacKinnon. Put these together, and pornography is a kind of speech act. Feminist claims that pornography subordinates and silences women have been dismissed as confused and incoherent, but interpreted in the light of Austinian speech act theory the claims are coherent, but interpreted in the light of Austinian speech act theory the claims are coherent and plausible. Pornography subordinates because it is a kind of illocutionary act: it ranks women, legitimates discriminatory behavior towards them, deprives them of powers. Pornography silences because it prevents women from making certain illocutionary acts: it makes certain speech acts unspeakable.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20a4071832a92c2867783f790a1488b35/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:05:03+01:00Langton MacKinnon Pornography SocialPhilosophy SpeechAct <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Jacobson">Daniel Jacobson</a> </span><em>Philosophy and Public Affairs</em> (<em>1995</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:05:03 CET 2009Philosophy and Public Affairs64-79Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton241995Langton MacKinnon Pornography SocialPhilosophy SpeechAct http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20460111eecced618a8c1f71054f0352a/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:05:02+01:00Action Ethics Freedom Hornsby Langton Laws Speech <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Jacobson">Daniel Jacobson</a> </span><em>Legal Theory</em> <em>7(2):179-201</em> (<em>June 2001</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:05:02 CET 2009Legal TheoryJune2179-201Speech and Action: Replies to Hornsby and Langton72001Action Ethics Freedom Hornsby Langton Laws Speech Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton defend a "silencing argument" for the censorship of pornography, which purports to rest on liberal premises. This argument suggests that pornography might violate women's speech rights by making it impossible for them to refuse sex. However, the silencing argument is fatally flawed; it is neither liberal nor cogent. Their most recent version of the argument, which concedes that in their central scenario women can refuse sex, and can refuse it by performing a speech act, but, nevertheless, denies that women thereby perform "the illocutionary act of refusal," is futile.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2103e97814f71cd576686826e3d4bf965/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:05:02+01:00Austin Ethics FreeSpeech Law LegalTheory MacKinnon <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Hornsby">Jennifer Hornsby</a>, and <a href="/author/Langton">Rae Langton</a> </span><em>Legal Theory</em> <em>4(1):21-37</em> (<em>March 1998</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:05:02 CET 2009Legal TheoryMarch121-37Free Speech and Illocution41998Austin Ethics FreeSpeech Law LegalTheory MacKinnon We argue that, in the context of discussions of free speech, speech must include illocution (in J.L. Austin's sense); and we explain why some feminist writers (e.g., C. MacKinnon) have been led to take the notion of silencing seriously. We rebut arguments of D. Jacobson (in Phil and Pub Aff 64) who held that a free speech argument against pornography is bound to fail. We indicate how our view of speech relates to understandings of the justification of free speech; and we show that, contrary to Jacobson's claims, J.S. Mill would endorse our own view that free speech includes free illocution.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/296c50006f86cfe1b42a76de38357f4dd/nwyattnwyatt2009-02-11T01:05:01+01:00derogatory meaning <span class="authorEditorList"><a href="/author/Hornsby">Jennifer Hornsby</a> </span><em>Midwest Studies in Philosophy</em> <em>25(1):128-141</em> (<em>2001</em>)Wed Feb 11 01:05:01 CET 2009Midwest Studies in Philosophy1128-141Meaning and Uselessness: How to Think about Derogatory Words252001derogatory meaning