http://www.bibsonomy.org/burst/user/torstenschuenemannBibSonomy BuRST Feed for /user/torstenschuenemann2008-05-15T04:56:05+02:00http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2b7c2114c840b126ea77d1301181df2d5/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2008-05-12T17:42:51+02:00Computer Forschung Internet <span style="color:#555555;">Harald <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Weinreich">Weinreich</a> und Hartmut <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Obendorf">Obendorf</a> und Eelco <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Herder">Herder</a> und Matthias <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Mayer">Mayer</a> </span><em>ACM Trans. Web</em><em>2(1):1--31</em>(<em>2008</em>)New York, NY, USAACM Trans. Web11--31Not quite the average: An empirical study of Web use22008ComputerForschungInternethttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24235589a1fc9ed729c441baacc64b175/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Joseph <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Feller">Feller</a> </span><em>MITPress, London, </em>(<em>2005</em>)Perspectives on Free and Open Source SoftwarePerspectives on Free and Open Source Software2005OpenSourcehttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2abf7f7aafe6f5c191306f5b028d3c2f5/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Daniel <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Nepelski">Nepelski</a> und Bent <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Nowack">Nowack</a> und Sushmita <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Swaminathan">Swaminathan</a> </span><em>Wochenbericht</em><em>73(38):521-526</em>(<em>2006</em>) <em>available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/diw/diwwob/73-38-1.html . </em>Wochenberichtavailable at http://ideas.repec.org/a/diw/diwwob/73-38-1.html38521-526Firmeninternes Fachwissen beg{\&#034;u}nstigt Einsatz von Open-Source-Software732006OpenSourcehttp://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2cec0ae236693e11e4b34d6419fa9110a/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Daniel J. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Solove">Solove</a> </span><em>San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, No. #, 2007</em>(<em>2007</em>)San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, No. #, 2007&#034;I&#039;ve Got Nothing to Hide&#034; and Other Misunderstandings of PrivacyAccepted Paper Series2007OpenSourceIn this short essay, written for a symposium in the San Diego Law Review, Professor Daniel Solove examines the &#034;nothing to hide&#034; argument. When asked about government surveillance and data mining, many people respond by declaring: &#034;I&#039;ve got nothing to hide.&#034; According to the &#034;nothing to hide&#034; argument, there is no threat to privacy unless the government uncovers unlawful activity, in which case a person has no legitimate justification to claim that it remain private. The &#034;nothing to hide&#034; argument and its variants are quite prevalent, and thus are worth addressing. In this essay, Solove critiques the &#034;nothing to hide&#034; argument and exposes its faulty underpinnings.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24da9f7131f44ccece9d77c85a7ded1d2/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Eric Von <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Hippel">Hippel</a> </span><em>SSRN eLibrary</em>(<em>2002</em>)SSRN eLibraryOpen Source Projects as Horizontal Innovation Networks - By and For UsersWorking Paper Series2002OpenSourceInnovation development, production, distribution and consumption networks can be built up horizontally -- with actors consisting only of innovation users (more precisely, &#034;user/self-manufacturers&#034;). &#034;Free&#034; and &#034;open source&#034; software projects are examples of such networks, and examples can be found in the case of physical products as well. User innovation networks can function entirely independently of manufacturers when (1) at least some users have sufficient incentive to innovate, (2) at least some users have an incentive to voluntarily reveal their innovations, and (3) diffusion of innovations by users is low cost and can compete with commercial production and distribution. When only the first two conditions hold, a pattern of user innovation and trial and improvement will occur within user networks, followed by commercial manufacturer and distribution of innovations that prove to be of general interest. In this paper we explore the empirical evidence related to each of these matters and conclude that conditions favorable to user innovation networks are often present in the economy.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/232d41008bca3c5aca2b3eea87c1a40e1/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Margit <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Osterloh">Osterloh</a> und Sandra G. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Rota">Rota</a> </span><em>SSRN eLibrary</em>(<em>2004</em>)SSRN eLibraryOpen Source Software Development - Just Another Case of Collective Invention?Working Paper Series2004OpenSourceDoes Open Source (OS) represent a new innovation model, and under what conditions can it be employed in other than the software development context? OS is a term for software published under licence that does not give any private intellectual property rights to the developers. They invest private resources in inventions that are then fed into a common pool by contributing to a public good. A look into history shows that OS isn&#039;t a unique example of an innovation model which Allen called &#039;collective invention&#039; (Allen 1983). In the second half of the nineteenth century iron-making companies in Britain&#039;s Cleveland district willingly shared their innovations in blast furnace design (Allen 1983). Other examples include the enhancement of steam engine design after 1800 (Nuvolari 2002) and the search for a dominant design in the flat panel display industry (Spencer 2003). Even though OS shares many similarities with these other cases of collective invention, there are two major differences. Firstly, collective invention regimes rarely seem to survive after the development of a dominant design (see e.g. Meyer 2002). In OS, this problem is solved with the institutional innovation of OS licences. Rather than just giving up their intellectual property rights, OS developers use these licenses to ensure that their innovations remain common property for all times (O&#039;Mahony 2003). Secondly, the problem of enforcing the rules of cooperation established in these licenses is solved in a rather informal, decentralised way. Enforcing the rules of cooperation establishes a public good of a second order (Elster 1989). In the Open Source context, the contribution to the second order public good can only be explained by the presence of a sufficient number of norm-based intrinsically motivated contributors who are willing to carry the private costs of rule enforcement. We show that the governance mechanisms used in OS projects are especially well suited not to crowd out this special kind of motivation. We conclude that OS differentiates itself from other cases of collective invention by its success in solving the second order social dilemma of rule development and enforcement, which depends on institutional as well as motivational factors.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29ea9a6dc63d40e54dba6325ef35b4363/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Nicholas <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Economides">Economides</a> und Evangelos <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Katsamakas">Katsamakas</a> </span><em>SSRN eLibrary</em>(<em>2005</em>)SSRN eLibraryTwo-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software IndustryWorking Paper Series2005OpenSourceTechnology platforms, such as Microsoft Windows, are the hubs of technology industries. We develop a framework to characterize the optimal two-sided pricing strategy of a platform firm, that is, the pricing strategy towards the direct users of the platform as well as towards firms offering applications that are complementary to the platform. We compare industry structures based on a proprietary platform (such as Windows) with those based on an open-source platform (such as Linux) and analyze the structure of competition and industry implications in terms of pricing, sales, profitability, and social welfare. We find that, when the platform is proprietary, the equilibrium prices for the platform, the applications, and the platform access fee for applications may be below marginal cost, and we characterize demand conditions that lead to this. The proprietary applications sector of an industry based on an open source platform may be more profitable than the total profits of a proprietary platform industry. When users have a strong preference for application variety, the total profits of the proprietary industry are larger than the total profits of an industry based on an open source platform. The variety of applications is larger when the platform is open source. When a system based on an open source platform with an independent proprietary application competes with a proprietary system, the proprietary system is likely to dominate the open source platform industry both in terms of market share and profitability. This may explain the dominance of Microsoft in the market for PC operating systems.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a53eb04e5f38f30c0b5c70d9ac8ca714/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Georg Von <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Krogh">Krogh</a> und Sebastian <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Spaeth">Spaeth</a> und Karim R. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Lakhani">Lakhani</a> </span><em>SSRN eLibrary</em>(<em>2003</em>)SSRN eLibraryCommunity, Joining, and Specialization in Open Source Software Innovation: A Case StudyWorking Paper Series2003OpenSourceThis paper develops an inductive theory of the open source software innovation process by focusing on the creation of Freenet, a project aimed at developing a decentralized and anonymous peer-to-peer electronic file sharing network. We are particularly interested in the strategies and processes by which new people join the existing community of software developers and how they initially contribute code. Analyzing date from multiple sources on the Freenet software development process, we generate the constructs of &#034;joining script&#034;, &#034;specialization&#034;, &#034;contribution barriers&#034;, and &#034;feature gifts&#034;, and propose relationships among these. Implications for theory and research are discussed.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2925933afced01c8886f5d9d5c128dc91/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Justin P. <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Johnson">Johnson</a> </span><em>SSRN eLibrary</em>(<em>2004</em>)SSRN eLibrary{Collaboration, Peer Review and Open Source Software}Working Paper Series2004OpenSourceOpen source software development may be superior to proprietary development because the open source organizational form naturally minimizes transactions costs associated with privately distributed information, thereby avoiding certain agency problems. This manifests itself in the ability of open source communities to encourage collaborative sharing of ideas and critical peer review. When these activities are important, the open source organizational form endogenously may do better than a proprietary organizational form. The desire to improve quality by circumventing such agency concerns may induce the founder of a software project to choose the open source form even though doing so foregoes potential profits, and this effect is magnified when there is an existing competing closed source project. The types of software best suited to open source development are identified.http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/290279a94eac7c295c464bb08aaca6bf3/torstenschuenemanntorstenschuenemann2007-12-08T13:01:42+01:00OpenSource <span style="color:#555555;">Andrea <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Bonaccorsi">Bonaccorsi</a> und Cristina <a href="http://www.bibsonomy.org/author/Rossi">Rossi</a> </span><em>SSRN eLibrary</em>(<em>2005</em>)SSRN eLibrary{Intrinsic Motivations and Profit-Oriented Firms in Open Source Software: Do Firms Practise What They Preach?}Working Paper Series2005OpenSourceA growing body of economic literature is exploring the incentives of the agents involved in the Open Source movement. However, most empirical analyses focus on individual developers and neglect firms that do business with Open Source software (Open Source firms). This paper contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the incentives of firms that engage in Open Source activities. Data on firms&#039; motivations were collected by a large-scale survey conducted on 146 Italian companies supplying Open Source (OS) solutions and show that intrinsic, community-based incentives do play a role. Nevertheless, these positive attitudes towards the values of the OS community, which are quite surprising by profit-oriented firms, are not in general put into practise. Discrepancy between attitudes and behaviours is a widely investigated phenomenon in social psychology literature. We explore its pattern in our sample, find that it does not concern all the respondents, and single out a group of firms adopting a more consistent behaviour. Our results are in line with the literature on individual motivations in organisations and Open Source business models.