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<biblioentry xreflabel="solove2008" id="solove2008">
   <authorgroup>
       <author><firstname>Daniel</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Solove</surname></author> 
   </authorgroup>
<citetitle pubwork="article">Data Mining and the Security&#45;Liberty Debate</citetitle>
   <citetitle pubwork="journal">University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle>

   <volumenum>74</volumenum> 


   <pubdate>2008</pubdate>  
   <abstract>
      <para>In this essay&#44; written for a symposium on surveillance for the University of Chicago Law Review&#44; I examine some common difficulties in the way that liberty is balanced against security in the context of data mining. Countless discussions about the trade&#45;offs between security and liberty begin by taking a security proposal and then weighing it against what it would cost our civil liberties. Often&#44; the liberty interests are cast as individual rights and balanced against the security interests&#44; which are cast in terms of the safety of society as a whole. Courts and commentators defer to the government&#39;s assertions about the effectiveness of the security interest. In the context of data mining&#44; the liberty interest is limited by narrow understandings of privacy that neglect to account for many privacy problems. As a result&#44; the balancing concludes with a victory in favor of the security interest. But as I argue&#44; important dimensions of data mining&#39;s security benefits require more scrutiny&#44; and the privacy concerns are significantly greater than currently acknowledged. These problems have undermined the balancing process and skewed the results toward the security side of the scale.
      </para>
   </abstract>
</biblioentry>
<biblioentry xreflabel="Sol_2007b" id="Sol_2007b">
   <authorgroup>
       <author><firstname>Daniel</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Solove</surname></author> 
   </authorgroup>
<citetitle pubwork="article">&#39;I&#39;ve Got Nothing to Hide&#39; and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy</citetitle>
   <citetitle pubwork="journal">San Diego Law Review</citetitle>

   <volumenum>44</volumenum> 

   <artpagenums>745 pp.</artpagenums> 
   <pubdate>2007</pubdate>  

</biblioentry>
<biblioentry xreflabel="solove07privacymisunderstandings" id="solove07privacymisunderstandings">
   <authorgroup>
       <author><firstname>Daniel</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Solove</surname></author> 
   </authorgroup>
<citetitle pubwork="article">&#39;I&#39;ve Got Nothing to Hide&#39; and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy</citetitle>
   <citetitle pubwork="journal">San Diego Law Review&#44; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper</citetitle>

   <volumenum>44</volumenum> 


   <pubdate>2007</pubdate>  

</biblioentry>
<biblioentry xreflabel="Solove2007ign" id="Solove2007ign">
   <authorgroup>
       <author><firstname>Daniel</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Solove</surname></author> 
   </authorgroup>
<citetitle pubwork="article">I&#39;ve got nothing to hide and other misunderstandings of privacy</citetitle>
   <citetitle pubwork="journal">San Diego Law Review</citetitle>

   <volumenum>44</volumenum> 

   <artpagenums>745</artpagenums> 
   <pubdate>2007</pubdate>  
   <abstract>
      <para> In this short essay&#44; written for a symposium in the San Diego Law Review&#44; Professor Daniel Solove examines the nothing to hide argument. When asked about government surveillance and data mining&#44; many people respond by declaring: &#34;I&#39;ve got nothing to hide.&#34; According to the nothing to hide argument&#44; there is no threat to privacy unless the government uncovers unlawful activity&#44; in which case a person has no legitimate justification to claim that it remain private. The nothing to hide argument and its variants are quite prevalent&#44; and thus are worth addressing. In this essay&#44; Solove critiques the nothing to hide argument and exposes its faulty underpinnings.
      </para>
   </abstract>
</biblioentry>
<biblioentry xreflabel="solove2007vgn" id="solove2007vgn">
   <authorgroup>
       <author><firstname>Daniel</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Solove</surname></author> 
   </authorgroup>
<citetitle pubwork="article">&#8220;I&#8217;VE GOT NOTHING TO HIDE&#8221; AND OTHER MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF PRIVACY</citetitle>
   <citetitle pubwork="journal">San Diego Law Review</citetitle>

   <volumenum>44</volumenum> 

   <artpagenums>745</artpagenums> 
   <pubdate>2007</pubdate>  
   <abstract>
      <para> In this short essay&#44; written for a symposium in the San Diego Law Review&#44; Professor Daniel Solove examines the nothing to hide argument. When asked about government surveillance and data mining&#44; many people respond by declaring: &#34;I&#39;ve got nothing to hide.&#34; According to the nothing to hide argument&#44; there is no threat to privacy unless the government uncovers unlawful activity&#44; in which case a person has no legitimate justification to claim that it remain private. The nothing to hide argument and its variants are quite prevalent&#44; and thus are worth addressing. In this essay&#44; Solove critiques the nothing to hide argument and exposes its faulty underpinnings.
      </para>
   </abstract>
</biblioentry>
<biblioentry xreflabel="Solove_2005" id="Solove_2005">
   <authorgroup>
       <author><firstname>Daniel</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Solove</surname></author> 
   </authorgroup>
<citetitle pubwork="article">A Taxonomy of Privacy</citetitle>
   <citetitle pubwork="journal">University of Pennsylvania Law Review</citetitle>

   <volumenum>154</volumenum> 

   <artpagenums>477 pp.</artpagenums> 
   <pubdate>2006</pubdate>  
   <abstract>
      <para> Privacy is a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means. As one commentator has observed&#44; privacy suffers from an embarrassment of meanings. Privacy is far too vague a concept to guide adjudication and lawmaking&#44; as abstract incantations of the importance of privacy do not fare well when pitted against more concretely&#45;stated countervailing interests.&#10;In 1960&#44; the famous torts scholar William Prosser attempted to make sense of the landscape of privacy law by identifying four different interests. But Prosser focused only on tort law&#44; and the law of information privacy is significantly more vast and complex&#44; extending to Fourth Amendment law&#44; the constitutional right to information privacy&#44; evidentiary privileges&#44; dozens of federal privacy statutes&#44; and hundreds of state statutes. Moreover&#44; Prosser wrote over 40 years ago&#44; and new technologies have given rise to a panoply of new privacy harms.&#10;A new taxonomy to understand privacy violations is thus sorely needed. This article develops a taxonomy to identify privacy problems in a comprehensive and concrete manner. It endeavors to guide the law toward a more coherent understanding of privacy and to serve as a framework for the future development of the field of privacy law.
      </para>
   </abstract>
</biblioentry>
<biblioentry xreflabel="solove05" id="solove05">
   <authorgroup>
       <author><firstname>Daniel</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Solove</surname></author> 
   </authorgroup>
<citetitle pubwork="article">A Taxonomy of Privacy</citetitle>
   <citetitle pubwork="journal">University of Pennsylvania Law Review</citetitle>

   <volumenum>154</volumenum> 


   <pubdate>2005</pubdate>  

</biblioentry>
<biblioentry xreflabel="Sol_Hoo_2006" id="Sol_Hoo_2006">
   <authorgroup>
       <author><firstname>Daniel</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Solove</surname></author>
       <author><firstname>Chris</firstname><othername role="mi">J.</othername><surname>Hoofnagle</surname></author> 
   </authorgroup>
<citetitle pubwork="article">A Model Regime of Privacy Protection</citetitle>
   <citetitle pubwork="journal">GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper</citetitle>


   <edition>Version 3.0</edition> 

   <pubdate>2006</pubdate>  
   <abstract>
      <para> A series of major security breaches at companies with sensitive personal information has sparked significant attention to the problems with privacy protection in the United States. Currently&#44; the privacy protections in the United States are riddled with gaps and weak spots. Although most industrialized nations have comprehensive data protection laws&#44; the United States has maintained a sectoral approach where certain industries are covered and others are not. In particular&#44; emerging companies known as &#34;commercial data brokers&#34; have frequently slipped through the cracks of U.S. privacy law. In this article&#44; the authors propose a Model Privacy Regime to address the problems in the privacy protection in the United States&#44; with a particular focus on commercial data brokers. Since the United States is unlikely to shift radically from its sectoral approach to a comprehensive data protection regime&#44; the Model Regime aims to patch up the holes in existing privacy regulation and improve and extend it. In other words&#44; the goal of the Model Regime is to build upon the existing foundation of U.S. privacy law&#44; not to propose an alternative foundation. The authors believe that the sectoral approach in the United States can be improved by applying the Fair Information Practices &#45; principles that require the entities that collect personal data to extend certain rights to data subjects. The Fair Information Practices are very general principles&#44; and they are often spoken about in a rather abstract manner. In contrast&#44; the Model Regime demonstrates specific ways that they can be incorporated into privacy regulation in the United States. 
      </para>
   </abstract>
</biblioentry>
</bibliography>
