A rational agent revises its goals if something changes in its mental state. In this paper, we

propose (i) a general framework based on classical propositional logic, to represent changes in

the mental state of the agent after the acquisition of new information and/or after the arising

of new desires; (ii) fundamental postulates that the function which generates the goal set must

obey; and (iii) properties that this function must have to guarantee both the agent's maximal

satisfaction and the consistency of the goal set.

1

@inproceedings{pereira07bnaic, author = {da Costa Pereira, C. and Tettamanzi, A.}, title = {Towards a Framework for Goal Revision}, booktitle = {18th BeNeLux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, BNAIC'06}, address = {Namur, Belgium}, year = {2006}, pages = {99--106}, url = {http://www.dti.unimi.it/~pereira/bnaic2006_cameraready.pdf}, keywords = {goal revision}, abstract = {A rational agent revises its goals if something changes in its mental state. In this paper, we

propose (i) a general framework based on classical propositional logic, to represent changes in

the mental state of the agent after the acquisition of new information and/or after the arising

of new desires; (ii) fundamental postulates that the function which generates the goal set must

obey; and (iii) properties that this function must have to guarantee both the agent's maximal

satisfaction and the consistency of the goal set.

1} }

%0 = inproceedings %A = da Costa Pereira, C. and Tettamanzi, A. %B = 18th BeNeLux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, BNAIC'06 %C = Namur, Belgium %D = 2006 %T = Towards a Framework for Goal Revision %U = http://www.dti.unimi.it/~pereira/bnaic2006_cameraready.pdf