<rdf:RDF xmlns:community="http://www.bibsonomy.org/ontologies/2008/05/community#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" xmlns:admin="http://webns.net/mvcb/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:syn="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/" xmlns:cc="http://web.resource.org/cc/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" xmlns:swrc="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#" xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xml:base="http://www.bibsonomy.org/concept/user/yish/brain"><owl:Ontology rdf:about=""><rdfs:comment>BibSonomy publications for /concept/user/yish/brain</rdfs:comment><owl:imports rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology/portal"/></owl:Ontology><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/28a1f2f2b36ec43bdb0949376714ce981/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/28a1f2f2b36ec43bdb0949376714ce981/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.yorku.ca/mar/Spreng%20Mar%20et%20al%20in%20press_JOCN_core%20network_final%20revision"/><swrc:date>Fri May 30 05:30:00 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience</swrc:journal><swrc:title>The common neural basis of autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, theory of mind and the default mode: a quantitative meta-analysis</swrc:title><swrc:year>in press</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>neuroscience metaanalysis narrative neuropsychology review mythesis cognitive </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>A core brain network has been proposed to underlie a number of different processes, including remembering, prospection, navigation and theory-of-mind (Buckner RL, Carroll DC. 2007. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11: 49–57). This purported network—medial prefrontal, medial temporal, and medial and lateral parietal regions—is similar to that observed during default-mode processing and has been argued to represent self projection (Buckner &amp; Carroll, 2007) or scene-construction (Hassabis D. Maguire EA. 2007. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11: 299-306). To date, no systematic and quantitative demonstration of evidence for this common network has been presented. Using the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) approach, we conducted four separate quantitative meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies on: (a) autobiographical memory, (b) navigation, (c) theory-of-mind, and (d) default mode. A conjunction analysis between these domains demonstrated a high degree of correspondence. We compared these findings to a separate ALE analysis of prospection studies and found additional correspondence. Across all domains, and consistent with the proposed network, correspondence was found within the medial temporal lobe, precuneus, posterior cingulate, retrosplenial cortex and the temporoparietal junction. Additionally, this study revealed that the core network extends to lateral prefrontal and occipital cortices. Autobiographical memory, prospection, theory-of-mind and default mode demonstrated further reliable involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex and lateral temporal cortices. Autobiographical memory and theory-of-mind, previously studied as distinct, exhibited the most extensive functional overlap.
These findings represent quantitative evidence for a core network underlying a variety of cognitive domains.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="R Nathan Spreng"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Raymond A. Mar"/></rdf:_2><rdf:_3><swrc:Person swrc:name="Alice S.N. Kim"/></rdf:_3></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2f1520eb0556c1a70e2d57b3b027fe45d/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2f1520eb0556c1a70e2d57b3b027fe45d/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.12.013"/><swrc:date>Tue May 27 18:10:04 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Neuroimage</swrc:journal><swrc:number>3</swrc:number><swrc:pages>1002-1015</swrc:pages><swrc:publisher><swrc:Organization swrc:name="Elsevier"/></swrc:publisher><swrc:title>Language in context: emergent features of word, sentence, and narrative comprehension</swrc:title><swrc:volume>25</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2005</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>neuropsychology magnetic brain narrative resonance context FMRI neuroscience reading imaging human Functional mythesis </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Context exerts a powerful effect on cognitive performance and is clearly important for language processing, where lexical, sentential, and narrative contexts should differentially engage neural systems that support lexical, compositional, and discourse level semantics. Equally important, but thus far unexplored, is the role of context within narrative, as cognitive demands evolve and brain activity changes dynamically as subjects process different narrative segments. In this study, we used fMRI to examine the impact of context, comparing responses to a single, linguistically matched set of texts when these were differentially presented as random word lists, unconnected sentences and coherent narratives. We found emergent, context-dependent patterns of brain activity in each condition. Perisylvian language areas were always active, consistent with their supporting core linguistic computations. Sentence processing was associated with expanded activation of the frontal operculum and temporal poles. The same stimuli presented as narrative evoked robust responses in extrasylvian areas within both hemispheres, including precuneus, medial prefrontal, and dorsal temporo-parieto-occipital cortices. The right hemisphere was increasingly active as contextual complexity increased, maximal at the narrative level. Furthermore, brain activity was dynamically modulated as subjects processed different narrative segments: left hemisphere activity was more prominent at the onset, and right hemisphere more prominent at the resolution of a story, at which point, it may support a coherent representation of the narrative as a whole. These results underscore the importance of studying language in an ecologically valid context, suggesting a neural model for the processing of discourse.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jiang Xu"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Stefan Kemeny"/></rdf:_2><rdf:_3><swrc:Person swrc:name="Grace Park"/></rdf:_3><rdf:_4><swrc:Person swrc:name="Carol Frattali"/></rdf:_4><rdf:_5><swrc:Person swrc:name="Allen Braun"/></rdf:_5></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/245c646d5d83188871b9f0badbc36164c/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/245c646d5d83188871b9f0badbc36164c/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#InCollection"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.yorku.ca/mar/Mar%20et%20al%202008_van%20Peer%20Chapter_uncorrected%20proof.pdf"/><swrc:date>Tue May 27 16:58:17 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:booktitle>Directions in Empirical Literary Studies: In honor of Willie van Peer</swrc:booktitle><swrc:publisher><swrc:Organization swrc:name="John Benjamins"/></swrc:publisher><swrc:title>Effects of reading on knowledge, social abilities, and selfhood: Theory and empirical studies</swrc:title><swrc:year>in press</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>theory-of-mind psychology personality neuroscience simulation reading narrative empathy fiction neuropsychology change </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Reading exhibits a principle of expertise: the more one does it the more skilled one is likely to become both in the activity and in content knowledge. Our experiences with text lead to the acquisition of both vocabulary and general 
knowledge. Research from our group examines how reading can have other outcomes. With a starting point of fiction as an entryway into simulations of social interactions, we review empirical studies of how the reading of fiction can
improve empathy and other social abilities, and prompt changes in personality.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Raymond Mar"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Maja Djikic"/></rdf:_2><rdf:_3><swrc:Person swrc:name="Keith Oatley"/></rdf:_3></rdf:Seq></swrc:author><swrc:editor><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="In S. Zyngier"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="M. Bortolussi"/></rdf:_2><rdf:_3><swrc:Person swrc:name="A. Chesnokova"/></rdf:_3><rdf:_4><swrc:Person swrc:name="&amp; J. Auracher"/></rdf:_4></rdf:Seq></swrc:editor></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/280f493c0a1a4089a3b6a462f51c1f022/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/280f493c0a1a4089a3b6a462f51c1f022/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/psci/2004/00000015/00000001/art00001"/><swrc:date>Sun Apr 27 20:18:21 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Psychological Science</swrc:journal><swrc:number>1</swrc:number><swrc:pages>1-7</swrc:pages><swrc:title>How the Brain Processes Causal Inferences in Text</swrc:title><swrc:volume>15</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2004</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>discourse neurocognition situated mythesis narrative abstraction neuroscience </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Theoretical models of text processing, such as the construction-integration framework, pose fundamental questions about causal inference making that are not easily addressed by behavioral studies. In particular, a common result is that causal relatedness has a different effect on text reading times than on memory for the text: Whereas reading times increase linearly as causal relatedness decreases, memory for the text is best for events that are related by a moderate degree of causal relatedness and is poorer for events with low and high relatedness. Our functional magnetic resonance imaging study of the processing of two-sentence passages that varied in their degree of causal relatedness suggests that the inference process can be analyzed into two components, generation and integration, that are subserved by two large-scale cortical networks (a reasoning system in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the right-hemisphere language areas). These two cortical networks, which are distinguishable from the classical left-hemisphere language areas, approximately correspond to the two functional relations observed in the behavioral results.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Robert A. Mason"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Marcel Adam Just"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/25ffcee84f26f84a703451e7762b357dc/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/25ffcee84f26f84a703451e7762b357dc/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#InCollection"/><swrc:date>Sun Apr 27 14:35:12 CEST 2008</swrc:date><swrc:booktitle>Cognitive Psychology and Information Processing: An Introduction</swrc:booktitle><swrc:pages>489-523</swrc:pages><swrc:publisher><swrc:Organization swrc:name="Lawrence Erlbaum Associates"/></swrc:publisher><swrc:title>Pattern Recognition</swrc:title><swrc:year>1979</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>information mythesis pattern neuroscience recognition cognition psychology processing </swrc:keywords><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="James F. Juola"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author><swrc:editor><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="R. Lachman"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="J. Lachman"/></rdf:_2><rdf:_3><swrc:Person swrc:name="E.C. Butterfield"/></rdf:_3></rdf:Seq></swrc:editor></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27ec6a73ed2f1b1cbcf6776c3718a60dc/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/27ec6a73ed2f1b1cbcf6776c3718a60dc/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://individual.utoronto.ca/jingfeng1107/FengSpencePratt2007.pdf"/><swrc:date>Wed Oct 03 11:15:59 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Psychological Science</swrc:journal><swrc:number>10</swrc:number><swrc:pages>850-855</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Playing an Action Video Game Reduces Gender Difference in Spatial Cognition</swrc:title><swrc:volume>18</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2007</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>cognition girls mathematical skills rotation attention neuroscience spatial mental cognitive learning neuropsychology games gender psychology </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>We demonstrate a previously unknown gender difference in the distribution of spatial attention, a basic capacity that supports higher-level spatial cognition. More remarkably, we found that playing an action video game can virtually eliminate this gender difference in spatial attention and simultaneously decrease the gender disparity in mental rotation ability, a higher-level process in spatial cognition. After only 10 hr of training with an action video game, subjects realized substantial gains in both spatial attention and mental rotation, with women benefiting more than men. Control subjects who played a non-action game showed no improvement. Given that superior spatial skills are important in the mathematical and engineering sciences, these findings have practical implications for attracting men and women to these fields.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jing Feng"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Ian Spence"/></rdf:_2><rdf:_3><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jay Pratt"/></rdf:_3></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a33a2f38e99a485b7da931eaa2e30ae7/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2a33a2f38e99a485b7da931eaa2e30ae7/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.nedprod.com/Niall_stuff/powerrules/Dunbar_1998.pdf"/><swrc:date>Thu Sep 06 00:58:53 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>brain</swrc:journal><swrc:pages>10</swrc:pages><swrc:title>The Social Brain Hypothesis</swrc:title><swrc:volume>9</swrc:volume><swrc:year>1998</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>brain neuropsychology cognition social evolutionary neuroscience size </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Conventional wisdom over the past 160 years in the cognitive and neurosciences has assumed that brains evolved to process factual information about the world. Most attention has therefore been focused on such features as pattern recognition, color vision, and speech perception. By extension, it was assumed that brains evolved to deal with essentially ecological problem-solving tasks.

An alternative hypothesis offered during the late 1980s was that primates’ large brains reflect the computational
demands of the complex social systems that characterize the
order.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="R.I.M. Dunbar"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/219b91e84e7ed0ffbf87fdd6ab6c00e35/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/219b91e84e7ed0ffbf87fdd6ab6c00e35/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://psych.colorado.edu/~tito/sp03/7536/Adolphs_TICS_1999.PDF"/><swrc:date>Thu Sep 06 00:54:28 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Trends Cogn Science</swrc:journal><swrc:number>12</swrc:number><swrc:pages>469-479</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Social cognition and the human brain.</swrc:title><swrc:volume>3</swrc:volume><swrc:year>1999</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>cognition social neuropsychology size neuroscience brain </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Humans are exceedingly social animals, but the neural underpinnings of social
cognition and behavior are not well understood. Studies in humans and other primates
have pointed to several structures that play a key role in guiding social behaviors: the
amygdala, ventromedial frontal cortices, and right somatosensory-related cortex,
among others. These structures appear to mediate between perceptual representations
of socially relevant stimuli, such as the sight of conspecifics, and retrieval of knowledge
(or elicitation of behaviors) that such stimuli can trigger. Current debates concern the
extent to which social cognition draws upon processing specialized for social
information, and the relative contributions made to social cognition by innate and
acquired knowledge.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="R. Adolphs"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c0258e861f920bf39ed76bed29ceb5fb/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2c0258e861f920bf39ed76bed29ceb5fb/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/SocialClub/Adolphs2003Cognitive.pdf"/><swrc:date>Thu Sep 06 00:51:01 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Nature Reviews | Neuroscience</swrc:journal><swrc:pages>165</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behaviour
</swrc:title><swrc:volume>4</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2003</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>neuroscience neuropsychology brain social cognitive size group </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>We are an intensely social species — it has been argued that our social nature defines what
makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field,
the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have
produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new
links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations
of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established
across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists,
anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="R. Adolphs"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a5b848d41baccf986a68b995870e2955/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2a5b848d41baccf986a68b995870e2955/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.liv.ac.uk/www/evolpsyc/carnivore_brains.pdf"/><swrc:date>Thu Sep 06 00:47:02 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Ethology</swrc:journal><swrc:number>8</swrc:number><swrc:pages>695-708</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Neocortex Size Predicts Group Size in Carnivores and Some Insectivores</swrc:title><swrc:volume>104</swrc:volume><swrc:year>1998</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>size neuropsychology brain group neocortex evolutionary social </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Neocortex size has been shown to correlate with group size in primates. Data for carnivores and insectivores are used to test the generality of this relationship. The data suggest that carnivores lie on the same grade as the primates, but that insectivores lie on a separate grade to the left of these two orders. Among the insectivores, there appears to be a distinction between the “advanced” genera (which show a relationship between group size and neocortex size) and the “basal” genera (which do not).</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="RIM Dunbar"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="J. Bever"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c8014a51492d9c9cd440f9767fac8970/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2c8014a51492d9c9cd440f9767fac8970/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~acheyne/dunbar.html"/><swrc:date>Thu Sep 06 00:43:49 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Behavioral and brain sciences</swrc:journal><swrc:number>4</swrc:number><swrc:pages>681-735</swrc:pages><swrc:publisher><swrc:Organization swrc:name="Cambridge University Press"/></swrc:publisher><swrc:title>Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans</swrc:title><swrc:volume>16</swrc:volume><swrc:year>1993</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>brain size neocortex social evolutionary neuropsychology group </swrc:keywords><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="RIM Dunbar"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/208a577102d9f9a9119320163c8944b30/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/208a577102d9f9a9119320163c8944b30/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://psych.colorado.edu/~oreilly/papers/MunakataOReilly03_devgen.pdf"/><swrc:date>Sun May 13 03:50:12 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Cognitive Studies</swrc:journal><swrc:pages>76-92</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Developmental and computational neuroscience approaches to cognition: The case of generalization</swrc:title><swrc:volume>10</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2003</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>mythesis generalization cognitive networks psychology neural computational learning cognition neuroscience </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>The ability to generalize - to abstract regularities from our experiences that can be applied to new experiences --- is fundamental to human cognition and our abilities to flexibly adapt to changing situations. However, the generalization abilities of children and adults are far from perfect, with many clear demonstrations of failures to generalize in situations that would otherwise appear to lend themselves to generalization. It seems that people require extensive experience with a domain to demonstrate good generalization, and that their generalization abilities are best when dealing with relatively concrete, familiar situations. In this paper, we argue that people&#039;s successes and failures in generalization are well characterized by neural network models. Networks of neurons connected by synaptic weights are naturally predisposed to encode information in a highly specific fashion, which does not support generalization (as has been seized upon by critics of such models). However, with sufficient experience and appropriate architectural properties, such models can develop abstract representations that support good generalization. Implications for the neural bases and development of generalization abilities are discussed. </swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Yuko Munakata"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Randall C. O’Reilly"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a06ce676bac26a66209cfbfdd0edfc2e/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2a06ce676bac26a66209cfbfdd0edfc2e/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/~raymond/mar%20in%20press_neuropsychology%20of%20narrative_corrected%20proofs.pdf"/><swrc:date>Fri Apr 27 14:00:02 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Neuropsychologia</swrc:journal><swrc:number>10</swrc:number><swrc:pages>1414-–1434</swrc:pages><swrc:title>The neuropsychology of narrative: story comprehension, story production and their interrelation (review)</swrc:title><swrc:volume>42</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2004</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>neurocognitive IJCEELL damage neuropsychology neuroscience language review neuroimaging narrative neurology CiHB mythesis frontal jime08 lobe brain dicourse </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Stories are used extensively for human communication; both the comprehension and production of oral and written narratives constitute
a fundamental part of our experience. While study of this topic has largely been the domain of cognitive psychology, neuroscience has also
made progress in uncovering the processes underlying these abilities. In an attempt to synthesize work from both literatures, this review: (1)
summarizes the current neuroimaging and patient research pertaining to narrative comprehension and production, (2) attempts to integrate
this information with the processes described by the discourse models of cognitive psychology, and (3) uses this information to examine
the possible interrelation between comprehension and production. Story comprehension appears to entail a network of frontal, temporal
and cingulate areas that support working-memory and theory-of-mind processes. The specific functions associated with these areas are
congruent with the processes proposed by cognitive models of comprehension. Moreover, these same areas appear necessary for story
production, and the causal-temporal ordering of selected information may partially account for this common ground. A basic description
of comprehension and production based solely on neuropsychological evidence is presented to complement current cognitive models, and
a number of avenues for future research are suggested.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="42" swrc:key="issue"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Raymond A. Mar"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c53ce7cc546cfae6e44bdda03519790d/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2c53ce7cc546cfae6e44bdda03519790d/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.mathematicalbrain.com/pdf/GELMANTICS05.PDF"/><swrc:date>Mon Apr 23 01:57:36 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Trends in Cognitive Sciences</swrc:journal><swrc:number>1</swrc:number><swrc:pages>6-10</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Number and language: how are they related? </swrc:title><swrc:volume>9</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2005</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>sociocognitive sociocultural cognitive number social fmri neuroscience learning culture imaging antropology psychology embodied thinking language mathematical developmental mathematics </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Does the ability to develop numerical concepts depend
on our ability to use language? We consider the role of
the vocabulary of counting words in developing numerical
concepts. We challenge the ‘bootstrapping’ theory
which claims that children move from using something
like an object-file – an attentional process for responding
to small numerosities – to a truly arithmetic one as a
result of their learning the counting words. We also
question the interpretation of recent findings from
Amazonian cultures that have very restricted number
vocabularies. Our review of data and theory, along with
neuroscientific evidence, imply that numerical concepts
have an ontogenetic origin and a neural basis that are
independent of language.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Rochel Gelman"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Brian Butterworth"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/207f4aab440ccfa9109099861ba0c9625/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/207f4aab440ccfa9109099861ba0c9625/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.mathematicalbrain.com/pdf/BUTTJCPP05.PDF"/><swrc:date>Mon Apr 23 01:56:27 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry</swrc:journal><swrc:number>1</swrc:number><swrc:pages>3-18</swrc:pages><swrc:title>The development of arithmetical abilities</swrc:title><swrc:volume>46</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2005</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>numerosity cognition cognitive number arithmetic thinking mathematics infants mathematical development neuroscience dyscalculia embodied language child </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Arithmetical skills are essential to the effective exercise of citizenship in a numerate
society. How these skills are acquired, or fail to be acquired, is of great importance not only to individual
children but to the organisation of formal education and its role in society. Method: The evidence on
the normal and abnormal developmental progression of arithmetical abilities is reviewed; in particular,
evidence for arithmetical ability arising from innate specific cognitive skills (innate numerosity) vs.
general cognitive abilities (the Piagetian view) is compared. Results: These include evidence from infancy
research, neuropsychological studies of developmental dyscalculia, neuroimaging and genetics.
The development of arithmetical abilities can be described in terms of the idea of numerosity – the
number of objects in a set. Early arithmetic is usually thought of as the effects on numerosity of
operations on sets such as set union. The child’s concept of numerosity appears to be innate, as infants,
even in the first week of life, seem to discriminate visual arrays on the basis of numerosity. Development
can be seen in terms of an increasingly sophisticated understanding of numerosity and its implications,
and in increasing skill in manipulating numerosities. The impairment in the capacity to learn arithmetic
– dyscalculia – can be interpreted in many cases as a deficit in the concept in the child’s concept of
numerosity. The neuroanatomical bases of arithmetical development and other outstanding issues are
discussed. Conclusions: The evidence broadly supports the idea of an innate specific capacity for
acquiring arithmetical skills, but the effects of the content of learning, and the timing of learning in the
course of development, requires further investigation.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Brian Butterworth"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2f29cdb2fc894cb8a87f70fc8dfae0be7/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2f29cdb2fc894cb8a87f70fc8dfae0be7/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://biology.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&amp;doi=10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097"/><swrc:date>Wed Apr 11 13:39:00 CEST 2007</swrc:date><swrc:journal>PLoS Biology</swrc:journal><swrc:number>4</swrc:number><swrc:pages>500--510</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Neural activity when people solve verbal problems with insight</swrc:title><swrc:volume>2</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2004</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>solving resoning neuropsychology brain insight neuroimaging problem </swrc:keywords><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Mark Jung-Beeman"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Edward M. Bowden"/></rdf:_2><rdf:_3><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jason Haberman"/></rdf:_3><rdf:_4><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jennifer L. Frymiare"/></rdf:_4><rdf:_5><swrc:Person swrc:name="Stella Arambel-Liu"/></rdf:_5><rdf:_6><swrc:Person swrc:name="Richard Greenblatt"/></rdf:_6><rdf:_7><swrc:Person swrc:name="Paul J. Reber"/></rdf:_7><rdf:_8><swrc:Person swrc:name="John Kounios"/></rdf:_8></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/23d72a147b777cf05ef925e20afe9c272/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/23d72a147b777cf05ef925e20afe9c272/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#InProceedings"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/sofsem/sofsem2004.html#Wiedermann04"/><swrc:date>Tue Jan 23 17:15:17 CET 2007</swrc:date><swrc:booktitle>SOFSEM</swrc:booktitle><swrc:crossref>conf/sofsem/2004</swrc:crossref><swrc:pages>361-372</swrc:pages><swrc:publisher><swrc:Organization swrc:name="Springer"/></swrc:publisher><swrc:series>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</swrc:series><swrc:title>Building a Bridge between Mirror Neurons and Theory of Embodied Cognition.</swrc:title><swrc:volume>2932</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2004</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>mind brain mirrorneurons neuroscience mirror neurons embodied cognition </swrc:keywords><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&amp;issn=0302-9743&amp;volume=2932&amp;spage=361" swrc:key="ee"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="3-540-20779-1" swrc:key="isbn"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="2004-01-08" swrc:key="date"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jirí Wiedermann"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author><swrc:editor><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Peter van Emde Boas"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jaroslav Pokorný"/></rdf:_2><rdf:_3><swrc:Person swrc:name="Mária Bieliková"/></rdf:_3><rdf:_4><swrc:Person swrc:name="Julius Stuller"/></rdf:_4></rdf:Seq></swrc:editor></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/276e33998d5fa835ba0745ee7a3610a44/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/276e33998d5fa835ba0745ee7a3610a44/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.americanscientist.org/template/AssetDetail/assetid/50770"/><swrc:date>Wed Oct 04 13:21:03 CEST 2006</swrc:date><swrc:journal>American Scientist</swrc:journal><swrc:number>3</swrc:number><swrc:title>Perceptual Pleasure and the Brain</swrc:title><swrc:volume>94</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2006</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>gamesresearch neuroimaging brain surprise information learning infovores neurology pleasure games ZPD fMRI </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>From hand-held DVD players to hundred-inch plasma screens, much of today&#039;s technology is driven by the human appetite for pleasure through visual and auditory stimulation. What creates this appetite? Neuropsychologists have found that visual input activates receptors in the parts of the brain associated with pleasure and reward, and that the brain associates new images with old while also responding strongly to new ones. Using functional MRI imaging and other findings, they are exploring how human beings are &#034;infovores&#034; whose brains love to learn. Children may enjoy Sesame Street&#039;s fast pace because they get a &#034;click of comprehension&#034; from each brief scene.</swrc:abstract><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="247-253" swrc:key="page"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:Field swrc:value="American Scientist" swrc:key="journaal"/></swrc:hasExtraField><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Irving Biederman"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Edward A. Vessel"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e90ce265d9775e0f826f94a21b27ae2d/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2e90ce265d9775e0f826f94a21b27ae2d/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8452%252819960222%2529263%253A1367%253C173%253ANSABEI%253E2.0.CO%253B2-N"/><swrc:date>Mon Sep 18 03:06:56 CEST 2006</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Proceedings: Biological Sciences</swrc:journal><swrc:number>1367</swrc:number><swrc:pages>173-177</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Neocortex Size and Behavioural Ecology in Primates</swrc:title><swrc:volume>263</swrc:volume><swrc:year>1996</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>neocortex size cognition brain primates social </swrc:keywords><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Robert A. Barton"/></rdf:_1></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description><rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2dc0ab9c5468d836df2a86c58ef0bdfa0/yish"><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.bibsonomy.org/uri/bibtex/2dc0ab9c5468d836df2a86c58ef0bdfa0/yish"/><rdf:type rdf:resource="http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#Article"/><owl:sameAs rdf:resource="http://www.psych.nmsu.edu/~jkroger/lab/courses/articles/grafman_nature_reviews_pfc.pdf"/><swrc:date>Fri Sep 08 14:44:13 CEST 2006</swrc:date><swrc:journal>Nature Reviews Neuroscience</swrc:journal><swrc:pages>139--147</swrc:pages><swrc:title>Human prefrontal cortex: processing and representational perspectives</swrc:title><swrc:volume>4</swrc:volume><swrc:year>2003</swrc:year><swrc:keywords>neuroscience cortex prefrontal perspectives Human processing representation </swrc:keywords><swrc:abstract>Through evolution, humans have acquired &#039;higher&#039; cognitive skills — such as language, reasoning and planning — and complex social behaviour. Evidence from neuropsychological and neuroimaging research indicates that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) underlies much of this higher cognition. A number of theories have been proposed for how the PFC might achieve this. Although many of these theories focus on the types of &#039;process&#039; that the PFC carries out, we argue for the validity of a representational approach to understanding PFC function.</swrc:abstract><swrc:author><rdf:Seq><rdf:_1><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jacqueline N. Wood"/></rdf:_1><rdf:_2><swrc:Person swrc:name="Jordan Grafman"/></rdf:_2></rdf:Seq></swrc:author></rdf:Description></rdf:RDF>