BibSonomy publications for /user/acf/mediaeconomicsSun Mar 30 09:38:09 CEST 2008JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FORECASTING METHODS AND SYSTEMS116--18{A FORECASTER'S JOURNEY: CHALLENGES AND FRUSTRATIONS IN A MEDIA COMPANY}222003mediaeconomics media editing journalism Sun Mar 30 07:07:23 CEST 2008Corporate Governancemlatham@corpmon.com 291--101{Democracy and Infomediaries}112003media_policy democracy mediastudies mediaeconomics medgov We can improve our political and economic systems by redesigning our use of informational intermediaries (infomediaries). Examples of infomediaries are political parties, the news media, proxy voting advisory firms and auditors. An infomediary's source of funding influences the information it produces –"follow the money". Political campaign finance reform is one approach to redesigning our infomediary systems. This paper proposes another approach: starting a few companies with a new corporate bylaw structure designed to enhance management accountability to shareowners. Shareowners would vote annually to hire an infomediary (paid with corporate funds) to advise them on proxy voting. If this system proves effective, it can spread to existing corporations and then to the political arena.Sun Mar 30 05:23:14 CEST 2008Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly1205Rich media, poor democracy: communication politics in dubious times772000politics democracy communication_studies media_economics mediaeconomics medgov Sun Mar 30 05:19:41 CEST 2008Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterlyautumn3751Media Economics: Understanding Markets, Industries and Concepts802003mediaeconomics media_economics medienmanagement review Sun Mar 30 05:05:48 CEST 2008Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly4845Global Media Economics: Commercialization, concentration and Integration of751998media_economics mediaeconomics Sat Mar 29 15:18:31 CET 2008De Economist1107--124{Media and Economics: Uneasy Bedfellows?}1542006mediaeconomics media_governance independence mediastudies economics medgov Wilfred Dolfsma1 Contact Information and Richard Nahuis2 (1) Economics Department, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Maastricht University (MERIT), 2005/6 fellow Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS), The Netherlands (2) CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis and Utrecht School of Economics, P.O. Box 80510, 2508 GM The Hague, the NetherlandsSat Mar 29 14:55:59 CET 2008Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy83--102{The Bubble and the Media}2002corporate_governance mediaeconomics media globalization Tue Mar 25 06:53:52 CET 2008ISBN 353132845X468 pagesUnternehmensf?hrung und ?ffentlichkeitsarbeit: Grundlegung einer Theorie2004Bezugsgruppen Kommunikationswissenschaft Unternehmensethik Integrierte_Kommunikation public_relations Marktkommunikation Unternehmensfuehrung Managementprozess Organisationsverfassung Betriebswirtschaftslehre PR Stakeholder Unternehmenskommunikation Kommunikationsmanagement Kommunikationspolitik oeffentlichkeitsarbeit mediaeconomics leadership Marketing AG Tue Mar 25 06:53:52 CET 20086 thWorld Media Economics Conference, Montreal, Canada, May12--15{Media Concentration in the US and European Union: A Comparative Analysis}2004EU mediaeconomics medgov media_concentration USA Tue Mar 25 06:53:52 CET 2008Meir cites Bagdikian{Media Ownership--Does It Matter?}2000medgov media_governance media_ownership mediaeconomics Tue Mar 25 06:53:52 CET 2008{Media, Governance and Development. Challenging Convention: An Empirical Perspective}2006media_governance medgov worldbank mediaeconomics media_economics Tue Mar 25 06:53:52 CET 2008Alexander Dyck - University of Toronto Natalya Volchkova - New Economic School and CEFIR Luigi Zingales - Harvard University, NBER, and CEPR First Draft: October 2004 This Draft: September 2005{The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia}2006russian russisch mediastudies governance russia mediaeconomics medgov medien media_economics We study the effect of media coverage on corporate governance outcomes by focusing on Russia in the period 1999-2002. Russia provides a setting with multiple examples of corporate governance abuses, where traditional corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective, and where we can identify an exogenous source of news coverage arising from the presence of an investment fund, the Hermitage fund, that tried to shame companies by exposing their abuses in the international media. We find that the probability that a corporate governance abuse is reversed is affected by the coverage of the news in the Anglo-American press. The result is not due to the endogeneity of news reporting since this result holds even when we instrument media coverage with the presence of the Hermitage fund among its shareholders and the ?natural? newsworthiness of the company involved. We confirm this evidence with a case study.