How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absense of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information
either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler�s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.
%0 Book
%1 lievrouw2006hnm
%A Lievrouw, L.A.
%A Livingstone, S.M.
%D 2006
%I Sage Publications
%K -freedom bureaucracy censorship medgov media new_media non-democratic_politics pressefreiheit
%T Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Social Consequences of ICTs
%U http://www.brookings.edu/global/gi2006_guriev.pdf
%X How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absense of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information
either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler�s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.
@book{lievrouw2006hnm,
abstract = {How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absense of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to gather information
either from a centralized agency such as a secret service or a decentralized source such as media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler�s choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.},
added-at = {2008-03-25T06:38:08.000+0100},
author = {Lievrouw, L.A. and Livingstone, S.M.},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/264d2e692a16d14b11a9bddd83097770f/afeld},
description = {medgov},
interhash = {ee701c3fda104837b9da6d811f047f72},
intrahash = {64d2e692a16d14b11a9bddd83097770f},
keywords = {-freedom bureaucracy censorship medgov media new_media non-democratic_politics pressefreiheit},
publisher = {Sage Publications},
timestamp = {2008-03-25T06:38:14.000+0100},
title = {{Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Social Consequences of ICTs}},
url = {http://www.brookings.edu/global/gi2006_guriev.pdf},
year = 2006
}