This paper introduces an integrative negotiation mechanism, which
enables agents to choose any attitude from the extremes of self-interested
and fully cooperative to those that are partially self-interested
and partially cooperative. Experimental work verifies this mechanism
and explores the question whether it always improves the social welfare
to have an agent be completely cooperative. It is found that it is
good for the organization to have agents being partially cooperative
in their local negotiation with other agents rather than being fully
cooperative, in order to deal more effectively with the uncertainty
of not having a more informed view of the state of the entire agent
organization.
%0 Conference Paper
%1 Zhang:2003:iat
%A Zhang, Xiaqin
%A Lesser, V.
%A Wagner, T.
%B IAT'03: Proc. Int'l Conf. on Intelligent Agent
Technology
%D 2003
%I IEEE Press
%K agent allocation; complex conflict cooperation; integrative interest; multi-agent multiagent negotiation; ogranizational resolution; resource self system; systems; task thesis
%P 140--146
%R 10.1109/IAT.2003.1241060
%T Integrative negotiation in complex organizational agent systems
%X This paper introduces an integrative negotiation mechanism, which
enables agents to choose any attitude from the extremes of self-interested
and fully cooperative to those that are partially self-interested
and partially cooperative. Experimental work verifies this mechanism
and explores the question whether it always improves the social welfare
to have an agent be completely cooperative. It is found that it is
good for the organization to have agents being partially cooperative
in their local negotiation with other agents rather than being fully
cooperative, in order to deal more effectively with the uncertainty
of not having a more informed view of the state of the entire agent
organization.
@inproceedings{Zhang:2003:iat,
abstract = {This paper introduces an integrative negotiation mechanism, which
enables agents to choose any attitude from the extremes of self-interested
and fully cooperative to those that are partially self-interested
and partially cooperative. Experimental work verifies this mechanism
and explores the question whether it always improves the social welfare
to have an agent be completely cooperative. It is found that it is
good for the organization to have agents being partially cooperative
in their local negotiation with other agents rather than being fully
cooperative, in order to deal more effectively with the uncertainty
of not having a more informed view of the state of the entire agent
organization.},
added-at = {2017-03-16T11:50:55.000+0100},
author = {Zhang, Xiaqin and Lesser, V. and Wagner, T.},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27fb01b068f32a9b39aad05a966dc8940/krevelen},
booktitle = {IAT'03: Proc. Int'l Conf. on Intelligent Agent
Technology},
doi = {10.1109/IAT.2003.1241060},
interhash = {7d46b4225139ce9eda0c1357a42e1712},
intrahash = {7fb01b068f32a9b39aad05a966dc8940},
keywords = {agent allocation; complex conflict cooperation; integrative interest; multi-agent multiagent negotiation; ogranizational resolution; resource self system; systems; task thesis},
month = oct,
owner = {Rick},
pages = {140--146},
publisher = {IEEE Press},
timestamp = {2017-03-16T11:54:14.000+0100},
title = {Integrative negotiation in complex organizational agent systems},
year = 2003
}