%0 Journal Article %1 40 %A Keefer, Philip %A Knack, Stephen %D 2007 %J Review of Economics & Statistics %K *file-import-10-10-22 --, aspects, development, economic, economics, expenditures, finance, funds, government, investment, investments, of, policy, projects, public, research, %N 3 %P 566--572 %T BOONDOGGLES, RENT-SEEKING, AND POLITICAL CHECKS AND BALANCES: PUBLIC INVESTMENT UNDER UNACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENTS %V 89 %X We show that public investment is dramatically higher in countries with low-quality governance and limited political checks and balances or no competitive elections. This result is robust to a number of specifications. The most plausible interpretation of these results is that these governments use public investment as a vehicle to increase their rent-seeking. This evidence suggests that efforts to increase public investment in countries with weak governance, or to measure the growth effects of productive public investment using only observed measures of public investment, should be undertaken with caution. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Review of Economics & Statistics is the property of MIT Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

@article{40, abstract = {We show that public investment is dramatically higher in countries with low-quality governance and limited political checks and balances or no competitive elections. This result is robust to a number of specifications. The most plausible interpretation of these results is that these governments use public investment as a vehicle to increase their rent-seeking. This evidence suggests that efforts to increase public investment in countries with weak governance, or to measure the growth effects of productive public investment using only observed measures of public investment, should be undertaken with caution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Review of Economics \& Statistics is the property of MIT Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)}, added-at = {2010-10-22T08:07:39.000+0200}, author = {Keefer, Philip and Knack, Stephen}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/28969f0418ae5fbc4b7fd3e8eaba16a7f/davidorosco}, citeulike-article-id = {8066915}, interhash = {13163c387f3ef35f95270f8014423a08}, intrahash = {8969f0418ae5fbc4b7fd3e8eaba16a7f}, journal = {Review of Economics \& Statistics}, keywords = {*file-import-10-10-22 --, aspects, development, economic, economics, expenditures, finance, funds, government, investment, investments, of, policy, projects, public, research,}, number = 3, pages = {566--572}, posted-at = {2010-10-22 06:40:29}, priority = {5}, timestamp = {2010-10-22T08:07:40.000+0200}, title = {BOONDOGGLES, RENT-SEEKING, AND POLITICAL CHECKS AND BALANCES: PUBLIC INVESTMENT UNDER UNACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENTS}, volume = 89, year = 2007 }