%0 Book Section %1 anderson_place_1988 %A Anderson, J. R. %A VanLehn, K. %B Architectures for intelligence: The Twenty-second Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition %C Hillsdale (NJ) %D 1988 %I Lawrence Elrbaum Associates %K %P 1--24 %T The place of cognitive architectures in a rational analysis %X chapter: the basic goal of a theorist in specifying a cognitive architecture is to specify the mind's principles of organization and operation / make some claims about the role of architectures generally in psychological theory, . . . by taking as examples three of the architectures which figure prominently at Carnegie Mellon University / the Soar architecture of Laird, Newell, and Rosenbloom (1987) / ACT* adaptive character of thought architecture (Anderson, 1983) and the PDP parallel distributed processing architecture of McClelland and Rumelhart 1986 /// now that there are numerous candidates for cognitive architectures, one is naturally led to ask which might be the correct one or the most correct one / in actual practice one sees proponents of a particular architecture arguing for that architecture by reference to . . . what is called signature phenomena / these are empirical phenomena that are particularly clear manifestations of the purported underlying mechanisms / argue that the purported signature phenomena tell us a lot about the world in which the human lives / turn to the issue of the consequences of this point for the role of cognitive architectures (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved):

@inbook{anderson_place_1988, abstract = {chapter: the basic goal of a theorist in specifying a cognitive architecture is to specify the mind's principles of organization and operation / make some claims about the role of architectures generally in psychological theory, . . . by taking as examples three of the architectures which figure prominently at Carnegie Mellon University / the Soar architecture of Laird, Newell, and Rosenbloom (1987) / {ACT*} [adaptive character of thought] architecture {(Anderson,} 1983) and the {PDP} [parallel distributed processing] architecture of {McClelland} and Rumelhart [1986] /// now that there are numerous candidates for cognitive architectures, one is naturally led to ask which might be the correct one or the most correct one / in actual practice one sees proponents of a particular architecture arguing for that architecture by reference to . . . [what is called] signature phenomena / these are empirical phenomena that are particularly clear manifestations of the purported underlying mechanisms / argue that the purported signature phenomena tell us a lot about the world in which the human lives / turn to the issue of the consequences of this point for the role of cognitive architectures {(PsycINFO} Database Record (c) 2002 {APA,} all rights reserved):}, added-at = {2009-06-04T20:41:39.000+0200}, address = {Hillsdale {(NJ)}}, author = {Anderson, J. R. and {VanLehn}, K.}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2896e36eed618b265eedbe8b369839bb9/quesada}, booktitle = {Architectures for intelligence: The Twenty-second Carnegie Mellon Symposium on Cognition}, interhash = {973137e490cf2f9142934b1da051b7fd}, intrahash = {896e36eed618b265eedbe8b369839bb9}, keywords = {}, pages = {1--24}, publisher = {Lawrence Elrbaum Associates}, timestamp = {2009-06-04T20:41:39.000+0200}, title = {The place of cognitive architectures in a rational analysis}, year = 1988 }