p values, hypothesis tests, and likelihood: implications for epidemiology of a neglected historical debate.
American journal of epidemiology, 137 (5):
485-96; discussion 497-501 (March 1993)3698<m:linebreak></m:linebreak>Mesures de contrast.Abstract
It is not generally appreciated that the p value, as conceived by R. A. Fisher, is not compatible with the Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test in which it has become embedded. The p value was meant to be a flexible inferential measure, whereas the hypothesis test was a rule for behavior, not inference. The combination of the two methods has led to a reinterpretation of the p value simultaneously as an öbserved error rate" and as a measure of evidence. Both of these interpretations are problematic, and their combination has obscured the important differences between Neyman and Fisher on the nature of the scientific method and inhibited our understanding of the philosophic implications of the basic methods in use today. An analysis using another method promoted by Fisher, mathematical likelihood, shows that the p value substantially overstates the evidence against the null hypothesis. Likelihood makes clearer the distinction between error rates and inferential evidence and is a quantitative tool for expressing evidential strength that is more appropriate for the purposes of epidemiology than the p value.