We present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to "rock-scissors-paper"-type cyclic dominance of the three strategies, cooperate, defect, and loner. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice, this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatiotemporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two-, and three-strategy states which either are in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior.
%0 Journal Article
%1 Szabo:2002p4268
%A Szabó, G
%A Hauert, C
%D 2002
%J Phys Rev Lett
%K imported
%N 11
%P 118101
%T Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games
%V 89
%X We present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to "rock-scissors-paper"-type cyclic dominance of the three strategies, cooperate, defect, and loner. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice, this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatiotemporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two-, and three-strategy states which either are in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior.
@article{Szabo:2002p4268,
abstract = {We present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to "rock-scissors-paper"-type cyclic dominance of the three strategies, cooperate, defect, and loner. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice, this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatiotemporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two-, and three-strategy states which either are in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior.},
added-at = {2009-02-08T16:38:56.000+0100},
author = {Szab{\'o}, G and Hauert, C},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2981c06267cdfeb50ffb478344e0922a6/svsegbro},
date-added = {2008-07-10 17:08:03 +0200},
date-modified = {2008-08-08 17:07:09 +0200},
interhash = {175f94ac9559cd014f64b686347e0db7},
intrahash = {981c06267cdfeb50ffb478344e0922a6},
journal = {Phys Rev Lett},
keywords = {imported},
local-url = {file://localhost/Users/sven/Documents/Papers/2002/Szab%C3%B3/Phys%20Rev%20Lett%202002%20Szab%C3%B3.pdf},
number = 11,
pages = 118101,
rating = {0},
read = {Yes},
timestamp = {2009-02-08T16:39:00.000+0100},
title = {Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games},
uri = {papers://B7B184F3-8CE5-4C43-B61C-B7952DE67982/Paper/p4268},
volume = 89,
year = 2002
}