Article,
Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games
Games and Economic Behavior, 61 (2): 259 - 276 (2007)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.005
Abstract
Reinforcement learners tend to repeat actions that led to satisfactory outcomes in the past, and avoid choices that resulted in unsatisfactory experiences. This behavior is one of the most widespread adaptation mechanisms in nature. In this paper we fully characterize the dynamics of one of the best known stochastic models of reinforcement learning Bush, R., Mosteller, F., 1955. Stochastic Models of Learning. Wiley & Sons, New York for 2-player 2-strategy games. We also provide some extensions for more general games and for a wider class of learning algorithms. Specifically, it is shown that the transient dynamics of Bush and Mosteller's model can be substantially different from its asymptotic behavior. It is also demonstrated that in general—and in sharp contrast to other reinforcement learning models in the literature—the asymptotic dynamics of Bush and Mosteller's model cannot be approximated using the continuous time limit version of its expected motion.
