Abstract
The various chapter authors and I therefore hope that our collection of essays will make a
useful contribution to the re-balancing of analysis that is needed before a more complete
picture of today’s major counter-insurgency efforts can emerge. With chapters covering
counter-insurgency campaigns going back almost to the First World War and with the case
studies including several little-known operations, careful readers may notice the existence
of some fairly constant patterns of cause and effect and observe that certain air power
activities have tended always to produce the same sorts of results. They may also notice
that insurgencies have always presented air forces with the challenges that I outlined
above. Some air forces have fared better than others at overcoming those challenges and
some have made catastrophic mistakes – such as defoliating vast tracts of Vietnam to deny
insurgents sustenance and the protection of jungle canopies – that will surely never be
repeated. Most have learned some common lessons, such as the importance of exercising
forethought on the potential negative impacts of any planned operations on the morale
and empathy of the civilian population amidst which the insurgents operate. The growing
importance of civilian immunity in the western understanding of war nowadays makes
this lesson especially important. The chapters that offer recommendations on how air
forces can best contribute to current and likely future counter-insurgency operations –
Introduction
Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” 19
Corum’s and Meilinger’s chapters in particular – are highly thoughtful and insightful and
nicely round off the broadly chronological unfolding of ideas shared by the other authors.
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