Abstract
Since September 11th 2001, the United States and the international
community have initiated over 50 different policies designed to
deny or disrupt suspected terrorist organizations the financial
means they use to operate. With little concrete information on the
nature of terrorist financial infrastructures, policy analysts have
conducted little systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of these
policies. This dissertation seeks to begin such an evaluation by
examining modern terrorist financing and counter-finance policies
through an in-depth narrative as well as computer simulation. The
background of terrorist financing is developed through three case
studies, examining the methods and functions of financial systems
by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and the Tamil Tigers of Elam (LTTE).
With that background, an in-depth case study of al Qaeda and its
affiliates' financial infrastructures is conducted, noting key similarities,
differences and developments between its fiscal operations and those
of other terrorist groups. That case study is used to inform a computer
simulation regarding al Qaeda's ability to collect and use money
for terrorist operations. The simulation finds that completely stopping
the flow of money to terrorist organizations is impossible. Furthermore,
it finds that in the short term, the most effective policy at decreasing
terrorist funding is to attack a terrorist group's capacity to collect
funds—arresting financiers, shutting down front or shell businesses
and closing false charities are examples. In the long term, undermining
the appeal of al Qaeda's ideology is key to reducing terror money
supply. Passing better laws, better enforcement of those laws and
increasing law enforcement presence are moderately effective policies,
while increasing the length or severity of punishment for financing
terror was found to be the least effective. The dissertation concludes
with a list of policy recommendations, including better integrating
counter-finance policies within the broader counter-terrorism strategy,
defining clear short- and long-term goals regarding terror money,
finding and exploiting secondary and tertiary effects of targeting
terrorists' finances, and viewing terrorist finances as a source
of intelligence as well as a target to be attacked.
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