Jan 2018 Several factors explain why a Eurodeterrent is attractive to some experts. By moving some French weapons to Germany and other European countries, the flexibility of the nuclear-sharing program would be preserved. Germany would not lose its status as a de facto nuclear weapon state in case of war, and a potential enemy would have to face several states that could independently deliver nuclear weapons, rather than just France and the United Kingdom. For France, Eurodeterrence would provide an opportunity to become a leader in European security. For the rest of Europe, it would offer independence from the Americans. Furthermore, a homegrown nuclear deterrent is more credible than an imported one.
There are some indicators that the Eurodeterrent is not just a thought experiment anymore. In addition to the “public debate” that was encouraged by European officials, the German Parliament has looked into the legality of such a program. The review, requested by Kiesewetter, reported that German financial support for the stationing of French nuclear weapons on German territory would indeed be legal. The timing of the review might be telling as well—it concluded merely two weeks after the election of Macron, a fierce supporter of close security cooperation between France and German