In this paper, I discuss several arguments against non-therapeutic mutilation. Interventions into bodily integrity, which do not serve a therapeutic purpose and are not regarded as aesthetically acceptable by the majority, e.g. tongue splitting, branding and flesh stapling, are now practised, but, however, are still seen as a kind of 'aberration' that ought not to be allowed. I reject several arguments for a possible ban on these body modifications. I find the common pathologisation of body modifications, Kant's argument of duties to oneself and the objection from irrationality all wanting. In conclusion, I see no convincing support for prohibition of voluntary mutilations.
Anorexia nervosa is often chronic, with one of the highest death rates for psychological conditions. Law can compel treatment, but is rarely invoked, at least formally (though the strategic possibilities of orders confers internal authority within the clinical setting). Instead, 'control' (or management) is exercised diffusely, through disciplinary practices embedded in everyday clinic life, such as daily routines of eating and washing, behavioural 'contracts', regular surveillance and measuring, interactions with staff, visits and activities.
This article critically evaluates the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency’s announcement, in March 2008, that GlaxoSmithKline would not face prosecution for deliberately withholding trial data, which revealed not only that Seroxat was ineffective at treating childhood depression but also that it increased the risk of suicidal behaviour in this patient group. The decision not to prosecute followed a four and a half year investigation and was taken on the grounds that the law at the relevant time was insufficiently clear. This article assesses the existence of significant gaps in the duty of candour which had been assumed to exist between drugs companies and the regulator, and reflects upon what this episode tells us about the robustness, or otherwise, of the UK’s regulation of medicines.
Introduction: In The Netherlands, physicians have to be convinced that the patient suffers unbearably and hopelessly before granting a request for euthanasia. The extent to which general practitioners (GPs), consulted physicians and members of the euthanasia review committees judge this criterion similarly was evaluated.
The subject raises issues as to the extent to which it is proper to treat adults with psychiatric or psychological disorders with radical surgery, particularly where the appropriate diagnosis and treatment of the underlying disorder is uncertain or disputed; the limitations which ought to be placed upon consent as a means of rendering surgery lawful and whether the criminal law ought to have a place in controlling operations provided by qualified surgeons upon competent adults with their consent.
Whether treatment decision-making capacity can be meaningfully applied to patients with a diagnosis of "personality disorder" is examined. Patients presenting to a psychiatric emergency clinic with threats of self-harm are considered, two having been assessed and reviewed in detail. It was found that capacity can be meaningfully assessed in such patients, although the process is more complex than in patients with diagnoses of a more conventional kind. The process of assessing capacity in such patients is very time-consuming and may become, in itself, a therapeutic intervention.
THE IDEA THAT our Western conception of mental health and illness might be shaping the expression of illnesses in other cultures is rarely discussed in the professional literature. Many modern mental-health practitioners and researchers believe that the scientific standing of our drugs, our illness categories and our theories of the mind have put the field beyond the influence of endlessly shifting cultural trends and beliefs. After all, we now have machines that can literally watch the mind at work. We can change the chemistry of the brain in a variety of interesting ways and we can examine DNA sequences for abnormalities. The assumption is that these remarkable scientific advances have allowed modern-day practitioners to avoid the blind spots and cultural biases of their predecessors.
In the Netherlands, euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are considered acceptable medical practices in specific circumstances. The majority of cases of euthanasia and PAS involve patients suffering from cancer. However, in 1994 the Dutch Supreme Court in the so-called Chabot-case ruled that “the seriousness of the suffering of the patient does not depend on the cause of the suffering”, thereby rejecting a distinction between physical (or somatic) and mental suffering. This opened the way for further debate about the acceptability of PAS in cases of serious and refractory mental illness. An important objection against offering PAS to mentally ill patients is that this might reinforce loss of hope, and demoralization. Based on an analysis of a reported case, this argument is evaluated. It is argued that offering PAS to a patient with a mental illness who suffers unbearably, enduringly and without prospect of relief does not necessarily imply taking away hope and can be eth...
No country has a blanket policy of mandatory psychiatric review but the specialty contributes in circumstances of exclusive mental disorder or when there is doubt regarding capacity and sound judgement. The absence of a mandatory role for psychiatrists means that reversible psychopathology may be missed. As a result, the patient's decision to end his/her life may be more informed by treatable mental disorder than by his/her lifelong preferences.