The Claimant seeks three declarations, namely: i) A declaration that it would not be unlawful, on the grounds of necessity, for Mr Nicklinson's GP, or another doctor, to terminate or assist the termination of Mr Nicklinson's life. ii) Further or alternatively, a declaration that the current law of murder and/or of assisted suicide is incompatible with Mr Nicklinson's right to respect for private life under Article 8, contrary to sections 1 and 6 Human Rights Act 1998, in so far as it criminalises voluntary active euthanasia and/or assisted suicide. iii) Further or alternatively, a declaration that existing domestic law and practice fail adequately to regulate the practice of active euthanasia (both voluntary and involuntary), in breach of Article 2.
The claim that the legislation infringes Ms. Taylor’s equality rights begins with the fact that the law does not prohibit suicide. However, persons who are physically disabled such that they cannot commit suicide without help are denied that option, because s. 241(b) prohibits assisted suicide. The provisions regarding assisted suicide have a more burdensome effect on persons with physical disabilities than on able-bodied persons, and thereby create, in effect, a distinction based on physical disability. The impact of the distinction is felt particularly acutely by persons such as Ms. Taylor, who are grievously and irremediably ill, physically disabled or soon to become so, mentally competent, and who wish to have some control over their circumstances at the end of their lives. The distinction is discriminatory, under the test explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Withler, because it perpetuates disadvantage.
We give Martin permission to appeal against the DPP, although we do not consider that the appeal has any real prospect of success. Our reason for giving permission is the first of the “two other compelling reasons” advanced in the application for permission to appeal. More particularly, we consider that our approach to the role of the DPP and to the decision in Purdy in relation to s2 of the Suicide Act raises questions of sufficient significance to merit consideration by the Court of Appeal.
[2013] IEHC 2 In the 75 years since the Constitution was enacted both this Court and the Supreme Court have been required to examine a vast proliferation of issues in a huge corpus of case-law. Over that period few cases have emerged which are more tragic or which present more difficult or profound questions than the issues presented for adjudication here. At the heart of this application lie novel and difficult questions as to whether constitutional provisions which guarantee personal liberty and autonomy in Article 40 of the Constitution are interfered with by a statutory prohibition which prohibits even a citizen in deep personal distress and afflicted by a terminal and degenerative illness to avail of an assisted suicide and, if they do, whether such an absolute statutory prohibition passes a proportionality test.