Abstract
Does foreign military assistance strengthen or further weaken fragile
states facing internal confict? We address this question by estimating
how U.S. military aid affects violence and electoral participation
in Colombia. We exploit the allocation of U.S. military aid to Colombian
military bases, and compare how aid affects municipalities with and
without bases. Using detailed political violence data, we find that
U.S. military aid leads to differential increases in attacks by paramilitaries
(who collude with the military), but has no effect on guerilla attacks.
Aid increases also result in more paramilitary (but not guerrilla)
homicides during election years. Moreover, when military aid rises,
voter turnout falls more in base municipalities, especially those
that are politically contested. Our results are robust to an instrument
based on worldwide increases in U.S. military aid (excluding Latin
America). The findings suggest that foreign military assistance may
strengthen armed non-state actors, undermining domestic political
institutions.
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