Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation
K. Rasler, and W. Thompson. International Studies Quarterly, 50 (1):
145--167(2006)
Abstract
After bringing together independent information on contested territory, rivalries, and conflict-escalation (militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and war), we examine the timing of the temporal ordering of these three processes. Contrary to conventional expectations, we find the contested territory/militarized dispute rivalry ordering to be rare. Rivalries and contested territory often begin at the same time. Next, after setting up a unified model, we find the triadic combination of contested territory, contiguity, and strategic rivalry to be a strong explanatory combination for MIDs and war over time (1919-1992). We also control for other explanatory factors such as mixed regime-type and major power status. These findings provide strong support for arguments such as S.A. Vasquez's steps-to-war theory that specify these sources of conflict-escalation.
%0 Journal Article
%1 RaslerThompson:2006
%A Rasler, Karen A.
%A Thompson, William R.
%D 2006
%J International Studies Quarterly
%K rivalry security strategy
%N 1
%P 145--167
%T Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation
%V 50
%X After bringing together independent information on contested territory, rivalries, and conflict-escalation (militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and war), we examine the timing of the temporal ordering of these three processes. Contrary to conventional expectations, we find the contested territory/militarized dispute rivalry ordering to be rare. Rivalries and contested territory often begin at the same time. Next, after setting up a unified model, we find the triadic combination of contested territory, contiguity, and strategic rivalry to be a strong explanatory combination for MIDs and war over time (1919-1992). We also control for other explanatory factors such as mixed regime-type and major power status. These findings provide strong support for arguments such as S.A. Vasquez's steps-to-war theory that specify these sources of conflict-escalation.
@article{RaslerThompson:2006,
abstract = {After bringing together independent information on contested territory, rivalries, and conflict-escalation (militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and war), we examine the timing of the temporal ordering of these three processes. Contrary to conventional expectations, we find the contested territory/militarized dispute rivalry ordering to be rare. Rivalries and contested territory often begin at the same time. Next, after setting up a unified model, we find the triadic combination of contested territory, contiguity, and strategic rivalry to be a strong explanatory combination for MIDs and war over time (1919-1992). We also control for other explanatory factors such as mixed regime-type and major power status. These findings provide strong support for arguments such as S.A. Vasquez's steps-to-war theory that specify these sources of conflict-escalation.},
added-at = {2010-03-02T17:25:53.000+0100},
affiliation = {Indiana University},
author = {Rasler, Karen A. and Thompson, William R.},
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biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20bcb3db1fd9dcb4ce75d95bbbab73ab6/jrennstich},
date-added = {2008-09-05 14:51:09 -0400},
date-modified = {2010-02-28 21:03:35 -0500},
interhash = {5e5ce76943cc9400b3126b0fc6af4f89},
intrahash = {0bcb3db1fd9dcb4ce75d95bbbab73ab6},
journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
keywords = {rivalry security strategy},
number = 1,
pages = {145--167},
rating = {0},
timestamp = {2010-03-06T17:36:39.000+0100},
title = {Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation},
volume = 50,
year = 2006
}