Preparing for the Inevitable: Nuclear Signaling for Regional Nuclear Crises
O. Price. Comparative Strategy, 26 (2):
103--115(March 2007)
Abstract
Unlike the previous adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, where communications and an understanding nuclear signaling developed over decades and were generally effective, communication of intent at a time of escalating tension during a crisis between the United States and a nuclear-armed regional aggressor is likely to be complicated by myriad asymmetries, for example culture, intelligence capabilities, and doctrine. This article considers the characteristics required of successful nuclear signaling in such a context, the options currently available to the United States, and possible alternatives for the future.
%0 Journal Article
%1 Price:2007
%A Price, Owen C. W.
%D 2007
%J Comparative Strategy
%K nuclear security signalling strategic theory
%N 2
%P 103--115
%T Preparing for the Inevitable: Nuclear Signaling for Regional Nuclear Crises
%V 26
%X Unlike the previous adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, where communications and an understanding nuclear signaling developed over decades and were generally effective, communication of intent at a time of escalating tension during a crisis between the United States and a nuclear-armed regional aggressor is likely to be complicated by myriad asymmetries, for example culture, intelligence capabilities, and doctrine. This article considers the characteristics required of successful nuclear signaling in such a context, the options currently available to the United States, and possible alternatives for the future.
@article{Price:2007,
abstract = {Unlike the previous adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, where communications and an understanding nuclear signaling developed over decades and were generally effective, communication of intent at a time of escalating tension during a crisis between the United States and a nuclear-armed regional aggressor is likely to be complicated by myriad asymmetries, for example culture, intelligence capabilities, and doctrine. This article considers the characteristics required of successful nuclear signaling in such a context, the options currently available to the United States, and possible alternatives for the future.},
added-at = {2010-03-02T17:25:53.000+0100},
affiliation = {Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, USA},
author = {Price, Owen C. W.},
bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495930701341560},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/226063af670a2cd3f71b3396701e4e7a1/jrennstich},
date-added = {2008-09-05 14:51:09 -0400},
date-modified = {2010-02-28 21:03:35 -0500},
interhash = {c8abdca223ca11a8d3fff1051263f2bd},
intrahash = {26063af670a2cd3f71b3396701e4e7a1},
journal = {Comparative Strategy},
keywords = {nuclear security signalling strategic theory},
month = Mar,
number = 2,
pages = {103--115},
rating = {0},
timestamp = {2010-03-02T17:27:10.000+0100},
title = {Preparing for the Inevitable: Nuclear Signaling for Regional Nuclear Crises},
volume = 26,
year = 2007
}