A central argument behind the Bayh-Dole Act presumed that firms had no incentives to invest in downstream R&D aimed at developing university inventions committed to the public domain. The empirical evidence on university patenting and licensing is partly at odds with the premises of this argument. Non-exclusive licensing of university patents has been common and lucrative, and in the area of biomedical technologies university patents and licensing restrictions may be a hindrance to downstream R&D, rather than a stimulus. The paper presents a model of R&D competition based on a university invention where appropriability conditions are defined by the patentability of downstream innovations and imitation opportunities. A comparison of equilibria under “open access” to university inventions and under “university patenting” shows that only under restrictive conditions the latter regime results in increased R&D investment and social welfare. In general, university licensing royalties are therefore a poor gauge of social welfare gains from university patenting.
:Users/Miguel/Dropbox/Escola/Artigos/Mazzoleni\_2006\_The Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Downstream R&D Investment and Social Welfare.pdf:pdf
%0 Journal Article
%1 Mazzoleni2006
%A Mazzoleni, Roberto
%D 2006
%J The Journal of Technology Transfer
%K Act,R\&D Bayh-Dole competition,downstream innovation,university patents
%N 4
%P 431--441
%R 10.1007/s10961-006-0004-x
%T The Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Downstream R&D Investment and Social Welfare
%U http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10961-006-0004-x
%V 31
%X A central argument behind the Bayh-Dole Act presumed that firms had no incentives to invest in downstream R&D aimed at developing university inventions committed to the public domain. The empirical evidence on university patenting and licensing is partly at odds with the premises of this argument. Non-exclusive licensing of university patents has been common and lucrative, and in the area of biomedical technologies university patents and licensing restrictions may be a hindrance to downstream R&D, rather than a stimulus. The paper presents a model of R&D competition based on a university invention where appropriability conditions are defined by the patentability of downstream innovations and imitation opportunities. A comparison of equilibria under “open access” to university inventions and under “university patenting” shows that only under restrictive conditions the latter regime results in increased R&D investment and social welfare. In general, university licensing royalties are therefore a poor gauge of social welfare gains from university patenting.
@article{Mazzoleni2006,
abstract = {A central argument behind the Bayh-Dole Act presumed that firms had no incentives to invest in downstream R\&D aimed at developing university inventions committed to the public domain. The empirical evidence on university patenting and licensing is partly at odds with the premises of this argument. Non-exclusive licensing of university patents has been common and lucrative, and in the area of biomedical technologies university patents and licensing restrictions may be a hindrance to downstream R\&D, rather than a stimulus. The paper presents a model of R\&D competition based on a university invention where appropriability conditions are defined by the patentability of downstream innovations and imitation opportunities. A comparison of equilibria under “open access” to university inventions and under “university patenting” shows that only under restrictive conditions the latter regime results in increased R\&D investment and social welfare. In general, university licensing royalties are therefore a poor gauge of social welfare gains from university patenting.},
added-at = {2012-02-27T06:11:36.000+0100},
author = {Mazzoleni, Roberto},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/238c0d4646f77f94db39cd710dccb9483/kamil205},
doi = {10.1007/s10961-006-0004-x},
file = {:Users/Miguel/Dropbox/Escola/Artigos/Mazzoleni\_2006\_The Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Downstream R\&D Investment and Social Welfare.pdf:pdf},
interhash = {cb3936646fa2ef82b4d07eed14017951},
intrahash = {38c0d4646f77f94db39cd710dccb9483},
issn = {0892-9912},
journal = {The Journal of Technology Transfer},
keywords = {Act,R\&D Bayh-Dole competition,downstream innovation,university patents},
month = jul,
number = 4,
pages = {431--441},
timestamp = {2012-02-27T06:11:36.000+0100},
title = {{The Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Downstream R\&D Investment and Social Welfare}},
url = {http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10961-006-0004-x},
volume = 31,
year = 2006
}