We study the response of complex networks subject to attacks on vertices
and edges. Several existing complex network models as well as real-world
networks of scientific collaborations and Internet traffic are
numerically investigated, and the network performance is quantitatively
measured by the average inverse geodesic length and the size of the
largest connected subgraph. For each case of attacks on vertices and
edges, four different attacking strategies are used: removals by the
descending order of the degree and the betweenness centrality,
calculated for either the initial network or the current network during
the removal procedure. It is found that the removals by the recalculated
degrees and betweenness centralities are often more harmful than the
attack strategies based on the initial network, suggesting that the
network structure changes as important vertices or edges are removed.
Furthermore, the correlation between the betweenness centrality and the
degree in complex networks is studied.
%0 Journal Article
%1 Holme2002Attack
%A Holme, P.
%A Kim, B. J.
%A Yoon, C. N.
%A Han, S. K.
%D 2002
%I American Physical Society
%J Phys. Rev. E
%K attack centrality networks robustness
%N 5
%P 056109+
%R 10.1103/physreve.65.056109
%T Attack vulnerability of complex networks
%U http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/physreve.65.056109
%V 65
%X We study the response of complex networks subject to attacks on vertices
and edges. Several existing complex network models as well as real-world
networks of scientific collaborations and Internet traffic are
numerically investigated, and the network performance is quantitatively
measured by the average inverse geodesic length and the size of the
largest connected subgraph. For each case of attacks on vertices and
edges, four different attacking strategies are used: removals by the
descending order of the degree and the betweenness centrality,
calculated for either the initial network or the current network during
the removal procedure. It is found that the removals by the recalculated
degrees and betweenness centralities are often more harmful than the
attack strategies based on the initial network, suggesting that the
network structure changes as important vertices or edges are removed.
Furthermore, the correlation between the betweenness centrality and the
degree in complex networks is studied.
@article{Holme2002Attack,
abstract = {We study the response of complex networks subject to attacks on vertices
and edges. Several existing complex network models as well as real-world
networks of scientific collaborations and Internet traffic are
numerically investigated, and the network performance is quantitatively
measured by the average inverse geodesic length and the size of the
largest connected subgraph. For each case of attacks on vertices and
edges, four different attacking strategies are used: removals by the
descending order of the degree and the betweenness centrality,
calculated for either the initial network or the current network during
the removal procedure. It is found that the removals by the recalculated
degrees and betweenness centralities are often more harmful than the
attack strategies based on the initial network, suggesting that the
network structure changes as important vertices or edges are removed.
Furthermore, the correlation between the betweenness centrality and the
degree in complex networks is studied.},
added-at = {2018-12-02T16:09:07.000+0100},
archiveprefix = {arXiv},
author = {{Holme}, P. and {Kim}, B. J. and {Yoon}, C. N. and {Han}, S. K.},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/25bae9a41e9bb8264450d1e7412aafa78/karthikraman},
citeulike-article-id = {2352879},
citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0202410},
citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0202410},
citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/physreve.65.056109},
citeulike-linkout-3 = {http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-bib\_query?bibcode=2002PhRvE..65e6109H},
citeulike-linkout-4 = {http://link.aps.org/abstract/PRE/v65/i5/e056109},
citeulike-linkout-5 = {http://link.aps.org/pdf/PRE/v65/i5/e056109},
day = 22,
doi = {10.1103/physreve.65.056109},
eprint = {cond-mat/0202410},
interhash = {92de6026fffb6fdf0335713630353ca8},
intrahash = {5bae9a41e9bb8264450d1e7412aafa78},
issn = {1063-651X},
journal = {Phys. Rev. E},
keywords = {attack centrality networks robustness},
month = may,
number = 5,
pages = {056109+},
posted-at = {2014-04-17 06:01:52},
priority = {2},
publisher = {American Physical Society},
timestamp = {2018-12-02T16:09:07.000+0100},
title = {Attack vulnerability of complex networks},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/physreve.65.056109},
volume = 65,
year = 2002
}