The “intentional stance” is the disposition to treat
an entity as a rational agent, possessing particular
beliefs, desires, and intentions, in order to interpret
and predict it’s behavior. The intentional stance is a
component of a broader social cognitive function,
mentalizing. Here we report a study that investigates
the neural substrates of “on-line” mentalizing, using
PET, by asking volunteers to second-guess an opponent.
In order to identify brain activity specifically
associated with adoption of an intentional stance, we
used a paradigm that allowed tight control of other
cognitive demands. Volunteers played a computerised
version of the children’s game “stone, paper, scissors.”
In the mentalizing condition volunteers believed they
were playing against the experimenter. In the comparison
condition, volunteers believed they were playing
against a computer. In fact, during the actual scanning,
the “opponent” produced a random sequence in
both conditions. The only difference was the attitude,
or stance, adopted by the volunteer. Only one region
was more active when volunteers adopted the intentional
stance. This was in anterior paracingulate cortex
(bilaterally). This region has been activated in a
number of previous studies involving mentalizing.
However, this is the first study suggesting a specific
link between activity in this brain region and the
adoption of an intentional stance.
%0 Journal Article
%1 gallagher2002imaging
%A Gallagher, Helen L.
%A Jack, Anthony I.
%A Roepstorff, Andreas
%A Frith, Christopher D.
%D 2002
%I Elsevier
%J Neuroimage
%K brain games gametheory imaging intention neurocognition neuroscience pet scans
%P 814-821
%T Imaging the intentional stance in a competitive game
%U http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811902911171
%V 16
%X The “intentional stance” is the disposition to treat
an entity as a rational agent, possessing particular
beliefs, desires, and intentions, in order to interpret
and predict it’s behavior. The intentional stance is a
component of a broader social cognitive function,
mentalizing. Here we report a study that investigates
the neural substrates of “on-line” mentalizing, using
PET, by asking volunteers to second-guess an opponent.
In order to identify brain activity specifically
associated with adoption of an intentional stance, we
used a paradigm that allowed tight control of other
cognitive demands. Volunteers played a computerised
version of the children’s game “stone, paper, scissors.”
In the mentalizing condition volunteers believed they
were playing against the experimenter. In the comparison
condition, volunteers believed they were playing
against a computer. In fact, during the actual scanning,
the “opponent” produced a random sequence in
both conditions. The only difference was the attitude,
or stance, adopted by the volunteer. Only one region
was more active when volunteers adopted the intentional
stance. This was in anterior paracingulate cortex
(bilaterally). This region has been activated in a
number of previous studies involving mentalizing.
However, this is the first study suggesting a specific
link between activity in this brain region and the
adoption of an intentional stance.
@article{gallagher2002imaging,
abstract = {The “intentional stance” is the disposition to treat
an entity as a rational agent, possessing particular
beliefs, desires, and intentions, in order to interpret
and predict it’s behavior. The intentional stance is a
component of a broader social cognitive function,
mentalizing. Here we report a study that investigates
the neural substrates of “on-line” mentalizing, using
PET, by asking volunteers to second-guess an opponent.
In order to identify brain activity specifically
associated with adoption of an intentional stance, we
used a paradigm that allowed tight control of other
cognitive demands. Volunteers played a computerised
version of the children’s game “stone, paper, scissors.”
In the mentalizing condition volunteers believed they
were playing against the experimenter. In the comparison
condition, volunteers believed they were playing
against a computer. In fact, during the actual scanning,
the “opponent” produced a random sequence in
both conditions. The only difference was the attitude,
or stance, adopted by the volunteer. Only one region
was more active when volunteers adopted the intentional
stance. This was in anterior paracingulate cortex
(bilaterally). This region has been activated in a
number of previous studies involving mentalizing.
However, this is the first study suggesting a specific
link between activity in this brain region and the
adoption of an intentional stance.},
added-at = {2009-12-06T15:48:10.000+0100},
author = {Gallagher, Helen L. and Jack, Anthony I. and Roepstorff, Andreas and Frith, Christopher D.},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2ae2446774a221a8188be8e8637a382ff/yish},
interhash = {2e5e77a225adf74e5c3f9c6889b37721},
intrahash = {ae2446774a221a8188be8e8637a382ff},
journal = {Neuroimage},
keywords = {brain games gametheory imaging intention neurocognition neuroscience pet scans},
pages = {814-821},
publisher = {Elsevier},
timestamp = {2009-12-06T15:48:10.000+0100},
title = {Imaging the intentional stance in a competitive game},
url = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053811902911171},
volume = 16,
year = 2002
}