Abstract
Until very recently most language research has, in a Cartesian manner,
traditionally regarded linguistic phenomena as internal, mental, isolationist
and amodal (that is, separate and independent from perception, action and
emotion systems, and the body); a view endorsed in psychology, philosophy, and
linguistics. This could lead one into believing that in order to emulate
linguistic behaviour, it suffices to develop 'software' operating on abstract
representations that will work on any computational machine, and that its
operations will be implementation-independent, functioning identically
regardless of the physical hardware. If the system to be developed is to truly
mimic human behaviour, this picture is not very adequate for several reasons,
which are elaborated on in the present paper. Independently of theoretical
persuasion, without taking into account both the architecture of the human
brain, and embodiment - the interaction of the language faculty with the
sensory apparatus and motor system - it is unrealistic to replicate accurately
the processes which take place during language acquisition, comprehension,
production, and non-linguistic actions. Cognitive mechanisms are
synergistically intertwined with affective and somatic components, and largely
inseparable. While evidently robots, even anthropomorphic ones, are far from
isomorphic with humans in terms of both the 'brain' and the rest of the body,
and robust artificial cognitive agents can bypass many human limitations, they
could benefit from strengthened associative connections owing to the motor and
semantic resonance in both optimisation of their processes, and reactivity and
sensitivity to environmental stimuli, across a range of tasks.
Description
The Embodied Language. Why language should not be conceived of in
abstraction from the brain and body, why there is more to it than
sensorimotor and semantic resonance, and the consequences for autonomous
artificial cognitive agents
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