Reporting p values from statistical significance tests is common in psychology's empirical literature. Sir Ronald Fisher saw the p value as playing a useful role in knowledge development by acting as an `objective' measure of inductive evidence against the null hypothesis. We review several reasons why the p value is an unobjective and inadequate measure of evidence when statistically testing hypotheses. A common theme throughout many of these reasons is that p values exaggerate the evidence against H0 . This, in turn, calls into question the validity of much published work based on comparatively small, including .05, p values. Indeed, if researchers were fully informed about the limitations of the p value as a measure of evidence, this inferential index could not possibly enjoy its ongoing ubiquity. Replication with extension research focusing on sample statistics, effect sizes, and their confidence intervals is a better vehicle for reliable knowledge development than using p values. Fisher would also have agreed with the need for replication research.
%0 Journal Article
%1 hubbard2008values
%A Hubbard, Raymond
%A Lindsay, R. Murray
%D 2008
%J Theory & Psychology
%K statistics misinterpretation p-values
%N 1
%P 69--88
%R 10.1177/0959354307086923
%T Why
P
Values Are Not a Useful Measure of Evidence in Statistical Significance Testing
%U http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354307086923
%V 18
%X Reporting p values from statistical significance tests is common in psychology's empirical literature. Sir Ronald Fisher saw the p value as playing a useful role in knowledge development by acting as an `objective' measure of inductive evidence against the null hypothesis. We review several reasons why the p value is an unobjective and inadequate measure of evidence when statistically testing hypotheses. A common theme throughout many of these reasons is that p values exaggerate the evidence against H0 . This, in turn, calls into question the validity of much published work based on comparatively small, including .05, p values. Indeed, if researchers were fully informed about the limitations of the p value as a measure of evidence, this inferential index could not possibly enjoy its ongoing ubiquity. Replication with extension research focusing on sample statistics, effect sizes, and their confidence intervals is a better vehicle for reliable knowledge development than using p values. Fisher would also have agreed with the need for replication research.
@article{hubbard2008values,
abstract = {{Reporting p values from statistical significance tests is common in psychology's empirical literature. Sir Ronald Fisher saw the p value as playing a useful role in knowledge development by acting as an `objective' measure of inductive evidence against the null hypothesis. We review several reasons why the p value is an unobjective and inadequate measure of evidence when statistically testing hypotheses. A common theme throughout many of these reasons is that p values exaggerate the evidence against H0 . This, in turn, calls into question the validity of much published work based on comparatively small, including .05, p values. Indeed, if researchers were fully informed about the limitations of the p value as a measure of evidence, this inferential index could not possibly enjoy its ongoing ubiquity. Replication with extension research focusing on sample statistics, effect sizes, and their confidence intervals is a better vehicle for reliable knowledge development than using p values. Fisher would also have agreed with the need for replication research.}},
added-at = {2018-12-07T09:10:16.000+0100},
author = {Hubbard, Raymond and Lindsay, R. Murray},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2f0e8cac9dffa6c9962507c7b72b0733f/jpvaldes},
citeulike-article-id = {2402477},
citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354307086923},
citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://tap.sagepub.com/content/18/1/69.abstract},
citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://tap.sagepub.com/content/18/1/69.full.pdf},
citeulike-linkout-3 = {http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/18/1/69},
day = 1,
doi = {10.1177/0959354307086923},
interhash = {b6547683775963843b82ec5ea09f9aa8},
intrahash = {f0e8cac9dffa6c9962507c7b72b0733f},
issn = {0959-3543},
journal = {Theory \& Psychology},
keywords = {statistics misinterpretation p-values},
month = feb,
number = 1,
pages = {69--88},
posted-at = {2018-11-15 12:27:34},
priority = {2},
timestamp = {2018-12-07T09:38:33.000+0100},
title = {{Why
P
Values Are Not a Useful Measure of Evidence in Statistical Significance Testing}},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354307086923},
volume = 18,
year = 2008
}