%0 Journal Article %1 citeulike:4544146 %A Antal, Tibor %A Traulsen, Arne %A Ohtsuki, Hisashi %A Tarnita, Corina E. %A Nowak, Martin A. %D 2009 %J Journal of Theoretical Biology %K game %N 4 %P 614--622 %R 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010 %T Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies %U http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010 %V 258 %X In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright–Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/ n , or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n × n games in the limit of weak selection.

@article{citeulike:4544146, abstract = {In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright–Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/ n , or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n × n games in the limit of weak selection.}, added-at = {2009-05-19T18:00:18.000+0200}, author = {Antal, Tibor and Traulsen, Arne and Ohtsuki, Hisashi and Tarnita, Corina E. and Nowak, Martin A.}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2f6a1c14cbf443fe49ad61d38ce5992ff/earthfare}, citeulike-article-id = {4544146}, description = {CiteULike: Everyone's library}, doi = {10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010}, interhash = {2da8d2a3248ad4335108ca6586e60d04}, intrahash = {f6a1c14cbf443fe49ad61d38ce5992ff}, issn = {00225193}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology}, keywords = {game}, month = {June}, number = 4, pages = {614--622}, posted-at = {2009-05-19 03:00:38}, priority = {2}, timestamp = {2009-05-19T18:03:27.000+0200}, title = {Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010}, volume = 258, year = 2009 }