%0 Journal Article %1 Lipson:1984 %A Lipson, Charles %D 1984 %J World Politics %K cooperation game security theory %N 1 %P 1--23 %T International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs %V 37 %X Why should cooperative arrangements and rule systems be more prevalent in economic than in security affairs? In both, the actors are interdependent and have opportunities for joint gains. Yet security issues differ from economic issues in two fundamental ways: (1) the immediate and potentially grave losses to an actor who attempts to cooperate without reciprocation and (2) the risks associated with inadequate monitoring of others' decisions and actions. Knowing these risks and uncertainties, prudent states will decline to cooperate with adversaries unless they can monitor with confidence and can circumscribe the arrangements to minimize their vulnerability to defection. Economic issues, by contrast, are more transparent and less subject to devastating surprise. As a result, stable reciprocal expectations (grounded in ongoing transactions) can serve as a basis for international rules and conventions.

@article{Lipson:1984, abstract = {Why should cooperative arrangements and rule systems be more prevalent in economic than in security affairs? In both, the actors are interdependent and have opportunities for joint gains. Yet security issues differ from economic issues in two fundamental ways: (1) the immediate and potentially grave losses to an actor who attempts to cooperate without reciprocation and (2) the risks associated with inadequate monitoring of others' decisions and actions. Knowing these risks and uncertainties, prudent states will decline to cooperate with adversaries unless they can monitor with confidence and can circumscribe the arrangements to minimize their vulnerability to defection. Economic issues, by contrast, are more transparent and less subject to devastating surprise. As a result, stable reciprocal expectations (grounded in ongoing transactions) can serve as a basis for international rules and conventions.}, added-at = {2010-03-02T17:25:53.000+0100}, author = {Lipson, Charles}, bdsk-file-1 = {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}, bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010304}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2658482b3c388ebffdc04f444d8935f3d/jrennstich}, date-modified = {2010-02-28 21:03:34 -0500}, interhash = {37a7b5e24eb8560a588617116b64e98a}, intrahash = {658482b3c388ebffdc04f444d8935f3d}, journal = {World Politics}, keywords = {cooperation game security theory}, month = Oct, number = 1, pages = {1--23}, timestamp = {2010-03-08T18:57:05.000+0100}, title = {International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs}, volume = 37, year = 1984 }