Article,
Discussion of “The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting”
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 45 (2/3): p282 - 288 (20080801)
Abstract
Abstract: Ramanna 2007. The implications of unverifiable
fair-value accounting: evidence from the political economy of goodwill
accounting, Journal of Accounting and Economics provides interesting
and novel evidence on how firms use contributions from their political
action committees (PACs) to members of Congress as a means of lobbying
for preferred positions on the two exposure drafts that led to SFAS-141
and SFAS-142. My discussion raises some concerns about his main
conclusion: that pooling firms lobbied the FASB to obtain a
“fair-value”-based impairment rule to facilitate their ability to
manipulate financial statements. I offer a more benign explanation and
make some other observations about how this line of research could
proceed in the future. Copyright 2008 Elsevier Copyright of Journal of
Accounting & Economics is the property of Elsevier Science Publishing
Company, Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple
sites or posted to a listserv without the copy
