%0 Journal Article %1 Munger_2005 %A Munger, Michael %D 2005 %K terrorism culture club_goods recruitment CSS739 %T Preference Modification vs. Incentive Manipulation as Tools of Terrorist Recruitment: the Role of Cultures %U http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intranet/cppe/ %X Terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry. Only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics. This weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free-riding or defection from the weaker side. There are two (nonexclusive) answers: (1) Atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation, even if it results in the recruit’s own death (2) Create a set of incentives that reward loyalty, by giving access to excludable near-public (“club“) goods. Culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions. Culture is defined here as the set of “inherited” beliefs, attitudes, and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders, to understand themselves and to communicate with each other. The primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive, or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation. The difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism. If terrorists are selected for having unusual (cooperative, from the perspective of the terror group) preferences, then recruitment must be disrupted somehow. If, on the other hand, terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods, then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods. Keywords: Terrorism; culture; ideology; commitment; club goods.

@article{Munger_2005, abstract = {Terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry. Only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics. This weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free-riding or defection from the weaker side. There are two (nonexclusive) answers: (1) Atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation, even if it results in the recruit’s own death (2) Create a set of incentives that reward loyalty, by giving access to excludable near-public (“club“) goods. Culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions. Culture is defined here as the set of “inherited” beliefs, attitudes, and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders, to understand themselves and to communicate with each other. The primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive, or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation. The difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism. If terrorists are selected for having unusual (cooperative, from the perspective of the terror group) preferences, then recruitment must be disrupted somehow. If, on the other hand, terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods, then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods. Keywords: Terrorism; culture; ideology; commitment; club goods.}, added-at = {2006-04-29T21:40:47.000+0200}, author = {Munger, Michael}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2493d114a483004f9aa65dafc4f2a218d/kperezlopez}, day = 15, description = {Munger explores the role that culture plays in defining choices, as for example, those faced by one being recruited to terrorism. He spends most of the paper defining culture, its meaning and origins, using game theory illustrations of his ideas. He discusses the differences between “institutions,” which are long-lived and entrenched, regardless of whether or not they are optimal, and “organizations,” which are the always-optimal responses to the system embodied by the institutions. At the end of the article, he shows how this explains why terrorism may be a rational organizational response to the one’s institutional situation, and how it shapes the incentives of the game we play with terrorists.}, interhash = {40f290eb540c323f14533832cff37e06}, intrahash = {493d114a483004f9aa65dafc4f2a218d}, keywords = {terrorism culture club_goods recruitment CSS739}, month = {November}, organization = {U of Chicago; previously:Ohio State, Bowling Green State Univ, George Mason Univ}, timestamp = {2006-04-29T21:40:47.000+0200}, title = {Preference Modification vs. Incentive Manipulation as Tools of Terrorist Recruitment: the Role of Cultures}, url = {http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intranet/cppe/ }, year = 2005 }