%0 Journal Article %1 Cranor00 %A Cranor, Lorrie Faith %A Resnick, Paul %D 2000 %J Netnomics %K game negotiation, design, mechanism commerce, trust security, commitment, electronic theory, %P 1--23 %T Protocols for Automated Negotiations with Buyer Anonymity and Seller Reputations %V 2 %X Economic theory has investigated the optimal behavior of rational agents in auction and bargaining situations. We apply the theory to the design of automated negotiation protocols. In particular, in what situations are restricted protocols suffcient to achieve all the same outcomes that a more complete, flexible protocol could achieve?

@article{Cranor00, abstract = {Economic theory has investigated the optimal behavior of rational agents in auction and bargaining situations. We apply the theory to the design of automated negotiation protocols. In particular, in what situations are restricted protocols suffcient to achieve all the same outcomes that a more complete, flexible protocol could achieve?}, added-at = {2006-09-13T17:44:28.000+0200}, author = {Cranor, Lorrie Faith and Resnick, Paul}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2ec602f576b6c07563bf12c2bd14a3dd7/jmm}, description = {JMM master bibtex}, interhash = {83fd46d8286c363ef43587f9e0c9a554}, intrahash = {ec602f576b6c07563bf12c2bd14a3dd7}, journal = {Netnomics}, keywords = {game negotiation, design, mechanism commerce, trust security, commitment, electronic theory,}, pages = {1--23}, timestamp = {2006-09-13T17:44:28.000+0200}, title = {Protocols for Automated Negotiations with Buyer Anonymity and Seller Reputations}, volume = 2, year = 2000 }