Abstract
Trojan insertion has been made difficult in modern communications in the
recent years, due to extensive research work in the direction to protect Integrated Circuits
(ICs). Several Trojan detection techniques have been developed to prevent the destruction
caused by malicious insertion of Trojan in physical layer, making the process of Trojan
insertion much more difficult. In this paper, we highlight our major findings in terms of
innovative Trojan design that can easily evade existing Trojan detection approaches based
on side-channel analysis. We propose a design that makes Trojan undetectable for known
defense benchmarks and during functional testing. We demonstrate our Trojan model and
validate the results on a known defense mechanism. We also present a novel detection
mechanism for the same proposed Trojan model. The experimental results are presented
using Xilinx Place and Route characteristics, in particular, the Floorplanner tool to identify
the Trojan and address such problems.
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