Abstract
In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely
on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes
have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multi-hop
communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed
to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding.
However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified.
In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can
exist without incentive mechanisms. We propose a model based on game
theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of
packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium
conditions for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. We
perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions
for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network
scenarios. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves
to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks
- where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stable
- cooperation needs to be encouraged. forwarding. However, the need
for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we
address the problem of whether cooperation can exist \backslashemph\char123without\char125
incentive mechanisms. We propose a model based on game theory and
graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding
strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for
both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. We perform simulations
to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative
equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios. As the
problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static
configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks -- where
the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stable -- cooperation
needs to be encouraged.
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