Abstract
The paper outlines a new interpretation of informational privacy and
of its moral value. The main theses defended are: (a) informational
privacy is a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere,
that is, of the forces that oppose the information flow within the
space of information; (b) digital ICTs (information and communication
technologies) affect the ontological friction by changing the nature
of the infosphere (re-ontologization); (c) digital ICTs can therefore
both decrease and protect informational privacy but, most importantly,
they can also alter its nature and hence our understanding and appreciation
of it; (d) a change in our ontological perspective, brought about
by digital ICTs, suggests considering each person as being constituted
by his or her information and hence regarding a breach of one’s
informational privacy as a form of aggression towards one’s
personal identity.
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