%0 Journal Article %1 chen2021governance %A Chen, Liang %A Tong, Tony W. %A Tang, Shaoqin %A Han, Nianchen %D 2021 %I SAGE Publications %J Journal of Management %K control digital_platform digitisation incentive meta-organization organizational_form organizational_governance platform_design platform_governance %P 014920632110450 %R 10.1177/01492063211045023 %T Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization %U https://doi.org/10.1177%2F01492063211045023 %X The burgeoning digital-platforms literature across multiple business disciplines has primarily characterized the platform as a market or network. Although the organizing role of platform owners is well recognized, the literature lacks a coherent approach to understanding organizational governance in the platform context. Drawing on classic organizational governance theories, this paper views digital platforms as a distinct organizational form where the mechanisms of incentive and control routinely take center stage. We systematically review research on digital platforms, categorize specific governance mechanisms related to incentive and control, and map a multitude of idiosyncratic design features studied in prior research onto these mechanisms. We further develop an integrative framework to synthesize the review and to offer novel insights into the interrelations among three building blocks: value, governance, and design. Using this framework as a guide, we discuss specific directions for future research and offer a number of illustrative questions to help advance our knowledge about digital platforms’ governance mechanisms and design features.

@article{chen2021governance, abstract = {The burgeoning digital-platforms literature across multiple business disciplines has primarily characterized the platform as a market or network. Although the organizing role of platform owners is well recognized, the literature lacks a coherent approach to understanding organizational governance in the platform context. Drawing on classic organizational governance theories, this paper views digital platforms as a distinct organizational form where the mechanisms of incentive and control routinely take center stage. We systematically review research on digital platforms, categorize specific governance mechanisms related to incentive and control, and map a multitude of idiosyncratic design features studied in prior research onto these mechanisms. We further develop an integrative framework to synthesize the review and to offer novel insights into the interrelations among three building blocks: value, governance, and design. Using this framework as a guide, we discuss specific directions for future research and offer a number of illustrative questions to help advance our knowledge about digital platforms’ governance mechanisms and design features.}, added-at = {2021-11-19T09:13:43.000+0100}, author = {Chen, Liang and Tong, Tony W. and Tang, Shaoqin and Han, Nianchen}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/275264dc778139eff362f668c5166fe59/meneteqel}, doi = {10.1177/01492063211045023}, interhash = {e2cde621d3cf968bc0d2c280df09165c}, intrahash = {75264dc778139eff362f668c5166fe59}, journal = {Journal of Management}, keywords = {control digital_platform digitisation incentive meta-organization organizational_form organizational_governance platform_design platform_governance}, language = {en-US}, month = nov, pages = 014920632110450, publisher = {{SAGE} Publications}, timestamp = {2021-11-19T09:13:43.000+0100}, title = {Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1177%2F01492063211045023}, year = 2021 }